Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[MADAM SPEAKER in the Chair]

PRIVATE BUSINESS

LLOYDS TSB BILL [Lords]

Order for Third Reading read.

To be read the Third time on Thursday 9 July.

Oral Answers to Questions — AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES AND FOOD

The Minister was asked—

Cattle Ear Tagging

Mr. Desmond Swayne: What representations he has received from animal welfare organisations in connection with his Department's new ear tagging arrangements for cattle. [47156]

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Elliot Morley): The new arrangements for double tagging of cattle result from European Union, not national, rules. Welfare organisations were included in the consultations on the new arrangements.

Mr. Swayne: The Minister will be aware that the tags have to be affixed to both ears of a calf during its first week of life. For some breeds, particularly Dexters, the tags will be larger than the calf's ears. For all breeds, those tags will snag and tear the soft flesh of the ear. Will the Minister review the system and take up the matter with his European Union colleagues to obtain an electronic and more humane alternative?

Mr. Morley: The welfare issues relating to double tagging are very important. I should emphasise that the two tags do not have to be in the same ear—there can be one in each ear. We have managed to secure agreement that small breeds of cattle, such as Dexters, can wear a smaller second tag, which should take into account some of the welfare concerns. Welfare organisations and bodies such as the Dexter Cattle Society have been consulted on double tagging.

Mr. Lindsay Hoyle: I congratulate the hon. Member for New Forest, West (Mr. Swayne) on taking a courageous view, for a Conservative Member, on animal welfare. I welcome that revised attitude to animal welfare, and I hope that he will be as sympathetic on the subject of hunting with hounds.

Mr. Morley: Hunting with hounds is not a matter for me, but welfare issues are important. That is why we want

to progress such advances as electronic tagging—trials are currently taking place and will be completed by 2000. There are a whole range of animal welfare issues, and the Government should be congratulated on their progress in improving all kinds of animal welfare.

Rabies

Mr. Robin Corbett: When he expects to receive the report of the independent panel of scientists into alternatives to quarantine to combat rabies. [47157]

The Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Jeff Rooker): The advisory group on quarantine is expected to report to Ministers in the summer or early autumn.

Mr. Corbett: I remind my hon. Friend that most continental European countries have bad records in the enforcement of animal welfare regulations, and a sustained improvement in that performance needs to be demonstrated before we can lower our quarantine defences. Will he quickly implement his new powers to enforce higher welfare standards in quarantine kennels, and close those kennels where the regulations are breached?

Mr. Rooker: My hon. Friend is right. As the House knows, the expert advisory group is comparing five options with the current system. We have asked it to present any option that is as good or better at protecting this country from rabies than the status quo. If it comes up with such an option, we shall fully consult the wider public, including pet owners and non pet owners, and there will be discussions in the House, after which we shall take actions accordingly.
On my hon. Friend's specific question, he is right about welfare in kennels. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Newport, West (Mr. Flynn) on successfully piloting through the Animal Health (Amendment) Act 1998, which allows the Government to make statutory rules for welfare in quarantine. We are having discussions with the kennel owners and the welfare societies about implementing those rules at a very early date.

Farm Incomes

Mr. John Bercow: If he will make a statement on farm incomes in the year to 1 May 1998. [47158]

The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Dr. John Cunningham): Total income from farming is estimated on a calendar year basis. In the last year for which figures are available, 1997, total income from farming fell by 37 per cent. in real terms.

Mr. Bercow: I thank the Minister for his answer, but I hope that he does not underestimate the damage that is being inflicted by current policies. What has he to say to Mr. Godfrey Caldwell, who runs a grass-drying business in my constituency? The strength of the pound has slashed the prices of his products by 40 per cent. over the last year, has cut a quarter of a million pounds from his


turnover although the same amount of work has been undertaken, and has caused him to make a loss for the first time in his 42-year career in the industry. Does the Minister understand why Mr. Caldwell considers him to be the worst occupant of his high office in living memory?

Dr. Cunningham: I understand—as, I think, does every hon. Member—that the strength of sterling causes problems to farmers, and, for that matter, to manufacturing industry. I also understand—as the hon. Gentleman was a special adviser to the Chief Secretary to the Treasury in the last Conservative Government, I hope that he recalls this—that two thirds of the increase in the strength of sterling happened under that Administration, and not once was one penny of agrimonetary compensation paid.

Mr. Lawrie Quinn: My right hon. Friend will know that the incomes of many farmers have been suppressed because of the legacy of the BSE crisis. Is he in a position to update us on the cattle traceability scheme, which I think will do much to help farmers in my constituency?

Dr. Cunningham: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. It is certainly true that, in addition to the strength of sterling, lower commodity prices have impacted adversely on farm incomes. It is for that reason, among others, that we announced £85 million of agrimonetary compensation earlier this year, and it is also for that reason that the Government have invested £30 million in the establishment of the cattle traceability scheme, which is located in Workington. I shall visit it tomorrow with the president of the National Farmers Union to get an on-the-spot update on progress, but I can tell the House that we are on course for the scheme to be fully operational in September.

Mr. Charles Kennedy: Following our exchanges at our last agriculture Question Time about the continuing crisis in farm incomes, and the related increase in the number of farmers and their families who are now receiving various social security benefits, does the Minister share my surprise at what was revealed yesterday by the answers to my written questions to the Department of Social Security?
Those answers reveal that the Department has no reliable data on either the number of farmers involved, or the percentage who are in need of state benefits. They also reveal that the Department's figures do not correlate with the Ministry's census figures in regard to the number of farmers in the country.
Will the Minister undertake an urgent inquiry to try to rectify the position? As he is meeting the president of the National Farmers Union tomorrow on other business, will he take this opportunity to tell us in the House—as a means of approaching the farm incomes crisis—whether he shares the NFU leadership's view that early entry into European monetary union would help to alleviate many of the current difficulties?

Dr. Cunningham: In answer to the hon. Gentleman's last point, let me say that the Government have made their position clear. It is interesting to note that the National Farmers Union shares the Government's view of the importance of this issue to farmers—unlike the

Conservative Opposition, whose policy continues to be extremely damaging to Britain in general and to farmers in particular.
As for the first part of the hon. Gentleman's question, I have not seen the answers that he has received from my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Social Security, but I give him an undertaking that I will consider them urgently. If there is any need to improve the liaison between my Ministry and the Department for Social Security—I acknowledge that there are always opportunities to improve the way in which we perform—we shall certainly do so.

Mr. Alan W. Williams: Does my right hon. Friend agree with the analogy of bringing a supertanker to a halt, as suggested by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Health? The Government took over an industry that was devastated by the BSE crisis, with farm incomes plummeting since March 1996, and it takes time to stop such a precipitious fall. The decline has now halted and we can look forward to recovery and subsequent growth in farm incomes in the final years of this Parliament.

Dr. Cunningham: My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Farm incomes were in steep decline at the time of the general election. The previous Administration did nothing about it, and certainly never paid any agrimonetary compensation. I share my hon. Friend's hope that we can turn round the disastrous circumstances affecting farmers, and especially livestock farmers and the beef industry, as a consequence of the Conservative Government's abysmal policy failures.

Mr. James Paice: Is not it time that Ministers stopped blaming BSE for the crisis in agriculture and recognised that BSE has nothing whatever to do with the collapse in milk, sheep or grain prices? Does he recall the Parliamentary Secretary saying at a previous Agriculture Question Time that 50 per cent. of farmers have borrowings? Why, then, do all the agriculture managers of the major banks say that the figure is between 70 and 90 per cent., and that those borrowings are going up by about 8 per cent. overall and 16 per cent. in Scotland? Is it any wonder that farmers throughout Britain think that the Government do not know and do not care?

Dr. Cunningham: The hon. Gentleman's synthetic anger is misplaced. If he talks to beef farmers, he will find that they really do think that the ban on their product resulting from the previous Government's failures is one of the biggest problems that they face; they say that repeatedly. The information that we get from the banks is very different from the figures that he has just cited.

Sea Levels (South-east)

Mr. Andrew Mackinlay: Pursuant to his answer of 4 June 1998, Official Report, column 341, on sea levels in the Thames estuary and River Medway, if he will carry out surveys relating solely to projected sea level rises. [47159]

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Elliot Morley): It is not the Ministry's responsibility to undertake such surveys. The Environment Agency is responsible for undertaking surveys and studies as part of its flood defence functions; in doing so, it takes into account Ministry guidance on sea level rise.

Mr. Mackinlay: Like many others, I am concerned that this is a question of falling between stools. The Government need to take the initiative and examine the impact on coastal regions of rising sea levels, because the evidence suggests that there will be significant flood tides on the Thames and Medway over the next quarter of a century, which will necessitate increasing use of the Thames barrier and involve a danger of its being overtopped. The problem should be addressed by the Government on behalf of all hon. Members who represent coastal regions.

Mr. Morley: I can reassure my hon. Friend that the projected rises in sea level are taken into account in Environment Agency surveys and in our flood defence calculations. It is not considered that the flood defences in my hon. Friend's constituency are at risk. I know that there has been some press speculation that he has offended the Prime Minister in some way, but I assure him that there is no danger that his constituency will be obliterated as a result.

Common Agricultural Policy

Mr. John Wilkinson: What assessment he has made of the impact of the German Government's proposed reduction of its national contribution to the EU budget upon the common agricultural policy. [47160]

The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Dr. John Cunningham): One key reason why the German contribution is so high is the cost of the common agricultural policy. The best way of keeping member states' contributions to affordable levels is to ensure firm control of the Union's spending. That necessitates policy reform. We hope that Germany will join us in pressing for fundamental reform of the CAP, which will bring savings in the longer term.

Mr. Wilkinson: Is it not the case that neither German electioneering nor the right hon. Gentleman's empty rhetoric have done anything to modify the burgeoning growth of the common agricultural policy? How can he countenance £1 billion ecu in subsidy for tobacco growing? How can he approve of £857 million ecu for wine production up to 2003? Is not the CAP a protection racket for booze and fags?

Dr. Cunningham: I share some of the hon. Gentleman's concerns about the cost of the CAP but I do not share his attitude towards persuading our colleagues in Europe to change it. I also share his view about the tobacco regime; Britain is one of the minority of five member states that do not grow tobacco. Ten members do grow tobacco, and that is why there is a tobacco regime.

We can change the situation only by sensible and reasonable negotiation, and not by using the kind of language employed by the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: Once the German elections have passed, are there any plans for serious discussion of what will happen when new member states begin to make demands on the CAP pool?

Dr. Cunningham: My hon. Friend raises the important need to reform CAP as part of the process of enlargement. It is untenable to suppose that the policy as presently constituted and financed could be acceptable when there is a significant increase in the member states of the European Union.

Mr. Ian Bruce: The Minister must know that he has allowed the presidency of the EU to go by without his placing those important matters on the agenda. Is that why he has not bothered to go to a single agricultural show during the United Kingdom presidency? There are rumours that when he does turn up for one, it will have to be specially policed so that farmers can be kept away from him.

Dr. Cunningham: We can conclude from that question that the hon. Gentleman slept through the UK presidency. In reality, the Agriculture Council unanimously approved conclusions that were adopted at the Cardiff summit. Work on those conclusions will be continued by the Austrian presidency. The hon. Gentleman could not be more wrong.

Genetically Modified Organisms

Mr. David Drew: If the Government will organise an independent investigation into genetically modified organisms, with particular regard to (a) labelling and (b) segregation. [47161]

The Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Jeff Rooker): We have no current plans to do as my hon. Friend asks, but the Government will hold public consultation on biotechnology in the near future in order to inform future policy.

Mr. Drew: I thank my hon. Friend for that answer. Responsibility for GMOs is shared jointly with the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions. Will the Minister acknowledge the unprecedented level of interest in GMOs, ranging from the Prince of Wales to The Express? Will he reconsider his earlier reply, and consider an investigation into labelling and segregation of GMOs to ensure consumer confidence and choice?

Mr. Rooker: The widespread interest in how our food is produced, marketed and labelled should be welcomed by everyone. We ask, however, that people consider the science. I could nitpick about The Express article on Monday, which contained inaccuracies. From September, compulsory labelling of genetically modified soya and maize will begin. Several other products are already voluntarily labelled to show that they are genetically modified. We cannot force segregation of crops


internationally as we would have a problem with the World Trade Organisation, but the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food produced a list of 48 suppliers of non-genetically modified soya and maize a few weeks ago. Others have since been added to the list, which now names 57 suppliers. The more information available, the better for all concerned.

Mr. Anthony Steen: Can the Minister explain why acres of genetically modified soya have been planted just 100 yards from the largest organic farm in the west country without any consultation with the organic farmer about the effect on his livelihood? How can 841 acres of genetically modified trials, approved by MAFF, be allowed only 100 yards from an organic farm?

Mr. Rooker: It is not MAFF that approves that. [Interruption.] No, it is not. It is right that more than one Government Department is involved. In terms of crops, the Department of the Environment controls the releases to the environment through its advisory committee. It is important that it is not MAFF, the food-sponsoring Ministry, which plays that role. If I have the location of the farm mentioned by the hon. Gentleman correctly in mind, there are few acres of genetically modified crops within the total of the experimental acres and the genetically modified crops are 2 km away from the organic farm.

Dr. Ian Gibson: Does my hon. Friend agree that scientists are often regarded as arrogant, distant and uncaring, and that they, too, must win the argument with the consumer?

Mr. Rooker: I endorse what my hon. Friend said. Many scientists wish to be as open as possible. Obviously, sometimes confidentiality and peer group discussions present difficulties. Nevertheless, it is in the interests of science that it is as open as possible and it is in the interests of us all that we keep scientists on tap, not on top.

Agrimonetary Compensation Payments

Mr. Christopher Gill: If he will reconsider his decision not to make agrimonetary compensation payments. [47162]

The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Dr. John Cunningham): I announced on 3 February our decision to pay £85 million in agrimonetary compensation to the UK beef and sheepmeat sectors. This is the first occasion on which a UK Government have paid such aid.

Mr. Gill: Is not the real reason why the Government refuse to pay the full amount of agrimonetary compensation because they are trying to browbeat individual farmers into abandoning their opposition to the single currency? [Laughter.] I am talking about the views, not of the National Farmers Union which the Minister has already articulated, but of individual farmers. In many respects, the views of the NFU are as different from the views of individual farmers, and as out of touch with them, as the views of the Government are out of sympathy with public opinion.

Dr. Cunningham: Even for the fevered anti-European imagination of the hon. Gentleman that one is a tall story.

As I have already told the House, the reality is that this is the first Administration ever to pay agrimonetary compensation to farmers and—

Mr. Gill: A tiny amount.

Dr. Cunningham: We have paid 95 per cent. of the total available to sheep farmers and 75 per cent. of the total available to beef farmers.

Fishing

Mr. Austin Mitchell: When he next proposes to meet the National Federation of Fishermen's Organisations to discuss the regulation of fishing. [47163]

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Elliot Morley): Frequent meetings are held with the National Federation of Fishermen's Organisations on a wide range of fisheries issues. No firm date has been set for a future meeting, but I last met them on Monday of this week.

Mr. Mitchell: I know that my hon. Friend makes unprecedented efforts to keep in touch with the industry and, in particular, to come to its natural home in Grimsby and consult the industry there. At the same time, he is imposing an unprecedented diet of change and now the possibility of charges on the hard pressed industry. Will he undertake, first, to introduce changes and charges only by consent and after consultation and, secondly, to impose no more restrictions or charges on the British industry than its European competitors face? We need a genuinely level fishing ground where regulations are not imposed and enforced in this country while they are blithely ignored across Europe.

Mr. Morley: My hon. Friend knows as well as I do that, when we came to power over a year ago, we inherited a fishing industry in utter shambles. That is why a great many changes in regulations and procedures have been introduced. It is correct to say that, as part of a comprehensive spending review, we have been considering all options, including whether there is a case for charges. That is an academic exercise, and we have made available to the industry the results. I assure my hon. Friend that proposals will not come forward without full and proper consultation with the industry and without taking into account what other European countries are doing in relation to such things as charges.

Mr. John Townend: Is the Minister aware of the great disappointment that, under the proposed regulations, Bridlington will not be a designated port? Is he aware that the reasons that he gave me in his letter of 17 June—that there were no auction facilities and no fisheries office—are not acceptable? It is not acceptable that such decisions are made for bureaucratic convenience. My fishermen see this as further evidence that this is a Government of deregulation and I hope that he will reconsider that decision.
Even more worrying to my fishermen is the fear that in future the regulations for designated ports might be extended to those dealing with pelagic varieties, which would severely affect Bridlington. Can the Minister give an assurance that there will be no extension?

Mr. Morley: Designated ports have been introduced to try to improve fisheries enforcement. Whether we like it


or not, there is a problem of enforcement and blackfish. This is a national issue for which we are responsible. In addition to the reasons given in the letter to which the hon. Gentleman referred, Bridlington was not included because of the number of over-20 m boats which operate from there. We have received representations from Bridlington and they will be considered as part of the consultation exercise. However, I emphasise that the restriction applies only to over-20 m vessels and it simply requires them to give only four hours notice on their way to port or in port to give us the option of having a seafish inspector on the quayside to ensure that everything is in order.

Mr. Andrew George: What assurance can the Minister give the House that Britain's 6 and 12 mile fishing limits can be protected after the reform of the common fisheries policy in 2002?

Mr. Morley: I can certainly assure the hon. Gentleman that we take the issue seriously. The 6 and 12 mile limits are a derogation from the common fisheries policy and must be renewed by a majority vote in the Council of Ministers. However, the value of the 6 and 12 mile limits has already been emphasised in a letter to my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister from the President of the Commission. I am confident that the value of the 6 and 12 mile limits, which other countries also acknowledge, means that they will continue after 2002. That certainly will not be part of the conspiracy theories against Europe that we have heard today in the House.

Mr. Bob Blizzard: Fishermen in my constituency feel that my hon. Friend has done well since the election in his support for the fishing industry, but they never stop telling me that the fishing regulations are just not enforced as strictly by some European countries as they are by Britain. Does my hon. Friend agree and, if so, what steps is he taking, and what steps can he take, to ensure a level fishing ground—words taken out of my mouth earlier by my hon. Friend the Member for Great Grimsby (Mr. Mitchell)?

Mr. Morley: I can assure my hon. Friend that his fishermen are right to be concerned that measures are not enforced equally and fairly by all member states. It was for that reason that, under our presidency, we introduced a new draft directive which addresses the issues of enforcement and control, common definitions and common standards of enforcement, which all member states at the Council of Ministers agreed was important and should be introduced. I am confident that those issues will be properly addressed.

Mrs. Margaret Ewing: Has the Minister given consideration to the implications of the EU working time directive, particularly for the catching sector? Given the complexities of the implementation of the directive and how it will affect that vital sector, particularly in my area, is it the Government's recommendation that the catching sector should be excluded?

Mr. Morley: MAFF accepts that the working time directive is not appropriate for the working pattern of

share fishermen. We have had representations from fishermen's organisations and they have raised the issue with the Department of Trade and Industry.

Mr. Patrick Nicholls: What confidence can the fishing industry have in the Minister's willingness to stand up in Europe to oppose further regulations such as the working time directive, the extension of logbook regulations and species recording when he is unilaterally planning, without reference to Europe, to introduce designated landing ports? Is it not time that he stopped contributing to the blizzard of overregulation that fishermen must undergo and did something positive, in Europe and in this country, to oppose it?

Mr. Morley: This is about national competence and the Government accepting our responsibility for the problem of over-landings and black fish. We had to introduce regulations such as designated ports because of the utter failure of the previous Administration to tackle the issue.

Food Quality

Mr. Barry Sheerman: What steps he is taking to ensure that British farmers co-operate with British supermarkets to ensure high-quality food. [47164]

The Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Jeff Rooker): The quality of British food is second to none. The Government continue to help our farmers and growers to develop their marketing expertise so that they are better able to supply their products with the consistency, and in the volumes, that the supermarkets say they need.

Mr. Sheerman: That answer may seem a little complacent to anyone who has sampled the diversity and richness of other countries' food. Does the Minister agree that we have some of the most efficient and effective but also some of the most powerful supermarkets in the world? The power that they wield against our farming industry is quite intimidating. Will my hon. Friend ensure that our Government play a role in evening the balance to give diversity, choice and a good price to British farmers?

Mr. Rooker: I do not think that the supermarkets are against the British farming industry. That is not my experience from visits around the country or my meetings in London. They have worked incredibly well over the past 12 months, on the farm assurance scheme in particular, so that there is some consistency and so that farmers are not played off one against the other between different supermarkets. MAFF's task force has helped more than 500 food businesses to improve their marketing techniques. Although we make every effort, we cannot, do not seek to, and are not qualified to do the industry's marketing job for it.

Mr. Nick St. Aubyn: One of the finest products on supermarket shelves is traditional British brandy butter, made to a recipe tried and tested for more than 100 years. Does the Minister agree that a new EU directive that will make it illegal to market this traditional product as brandy butter is unreasonable? Will he do something to help brandy butter producers such as


Charles Gordon Associates in my constituency, which tells me that jobs are at risk from the directive? Will he help it to stop the directive preventing it from selling its traditional product in our shops?

Mr. Rooker: For traditional chilled butters with alcoholic content, if there is a minimum of 34 per cent. butterfat content, I presume that there is 66 per cent. rum or brandy. One wonders what else is in there if those quantities are not matched by the manufacturer.

Mr. Mark Todd: As someone who makes and consumes brandy butter, I am sympathetic, but can the Minister go back to the original question and address the relationship between supermarkets and the farming community? Many farmers are concerned that some supermarket chains choose to import goods that are produced to lower standards than those acceptable to our farming community or aware consumers. Steps should be taken to increase public information about such practices.

Mr. Rooker: I take my hon. Friend's point, but I can only repeat what I said earlier. This week, when I was at the spray and sprayers exhibition in Cambridgeshire—[Laughter.] Well, many thousands of other people were there as well. I see that people find that a laughing matter, but that is a serious and important part of the industry. In discussions with representatives of farmers, supermarkets, the agrochemical industry and women's institutes—the whole food chain—it was clear that people were seeking to work together to ensure good-quality British food. We claim that it is the best, and that people should buy British, not just because it is British but because it is the best. People are working together in a way that they have never done before. We would encourage and embrace that, but people have to be free to import products. It comes down to nothing more or less than consumer choice, but food will not be allowed to go on sale in this country unless it conforms to the food safety legislation.

Mr. Cynog Dafis: Surely the Minister must understand that there is a growing realisation that the powers of the supermarkets, their domination of the food chain and the way in which they dictate terms to farmers and suppliers are a cause for concern. Is it not a grotesque fact that one of the most effective farmers' co-operatives, Milk Marque, is under investigation while the supermarkets are able to exercise considerable dominance without being questioned? Is it not important that farmers be encouraged to combine and co-operate to achieve countervailing power? Do not the Government and the development agencies have a role in facilitating and encouraging that?

Mr. Rooker: Yes, indeed. I agree with the hon. Gentleman. We are encouraging farmers' co-operatives, but food producers, especially supermarkets, are always subject to the Office of Fair Trading restrictions. They are not out there as completely free agents.

Mr. Michael Jack: It may be a shade early to talk of Christmas, but my hon. Friend the Member for Guildford (Mr. St. Aubyn) mentioned brandy butter. May I draw it to the attention of the Minister that another Christmas favourite, beef on the bone, remains banned? He knows that we have consistently opposed that ban,

and in today's Financial Times and Evening Standard there is a ray of hope in the indication that the Prime Minister is calling on the Minister of Agriculture to lift the ban. May I congratulate him on recruiting the Prime Minister to our cause? In the light of that information, may I now ask the Minister when he intends to stop pursuing people in the meat trade—caterers, butchers and others—in terms of prosecution? When will he repent like a sinner who has made a mistake, apologise for imposing this unnecessary ban and get it lifted?

Mr. Rooker: We are not the prosecuting authority, as the right hon. Gentleman is aware. We are not pursuing anyone. The law is the law and it will take its course. I am not prepared to comment on cases that are currently before the courts.

Abattoirs

Mr. Ross Cranston: What assessment he has made of the effect of the publication of hygiene scores for abattoirs. [47165]

The Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Jeff Rooker): The publication of individual hygiene scores for licensed abattoirs and cutting plants is one of several measures designed to drive up standards in the meat industry. Although measurable improvements have been achieved and they have been substantial, we accept that more remains to be done, and we continue to push the industry to make further improvements and to eliminate bad practices.

Mr. Cranston: I thank my hon. Friend for that reply. Will he confirm that Britain is the only country in Europe that publishes individual scores? With the aim of propagating that information more widely, will he tell us where the best and worst abattoirs in the country are?

Mr. Rooker: There has been a considerable improvement in the past 12 months. Hygiene scores above the 65 mark in April 1997 were 61 per cent., and in March 1998, were 94 per cent. That must have something to do with the fact that, since January this year, for each abattoir and cutting plant, the scores have been published. The two plants with the lowest hygiene score according to latest figures for June are Heaney meats of Woolwich and Cruisedeal of Manchester—both cutting plants—with a hygiene assessment score of only 50, which is unacceptably low. The two plants with the highest score were Knowles and Son of Bury and Mid Glamorgan Provisions of Bridgend—both stand-alone cutting plants—with a hygiene score of 100.

Miss Anne McIntosh: What are the Government doing to ensure that imported meats meet the same high hygiene standards as meat in this country has to meet?

Mr. Rooker: I can honestly say to the hon. Lady that we are doing a lot more than her party did when it was in government—[HON. MEMBERS: "Come on.] Oh yes. On Friday, we saw as a matter of public record that, in 1992, the previous Prime Minister instructed a previous Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to go easy on hygiene standards in abattoirs in this country. We are doing far


more than that. Meat will not be allowed into this country from abroad to be sold unless it meets the standards demanded of the meat industry by the Labour Government, which are much higher than those demanded by the previous Government.

Drift Nets

Mr. Martyn Jones: What is the UK Government's present policy regarding the use of drift nets. [47167]

The Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Mr. Elliot Morley): The Government have promoted an EC agreement on ending the use of high seas drift nets in order to protect dolphins and other non-target species.

Mr. Jones: My hon. Friend will be aware of the problem of drift netting for migrating salmon off the coast of Ireland, which is devastating the salmon population in Welsh rivers. That is affecting tourism in Wales and, in the long term, it will affect the drift netting of salmon off the coast of Ireland. Will he do everything in his power, at the Council of Ministers and elsewhere, to make sure that that practice is limited to a sustainable level?

Mr. Morley: My hon. Friend makes a serious point. Atlantic salmon stocks have declined dramatically. Irish salmon netting is beyond our national control, but I can assure my hon. Friend that, in our representations to Ireland, we shall draw attention to our concern about the impact of netting on salmon stocks.

Oral Answers to Questions — ATTORNEY-GENERAL

The Attorney-General was asked—

Crown Prosecution Service

Sir Sydney Chapman: When he last had discussions on the Crown Prosecution Service with (a) the Secretary of State for the Home Department and (b) the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. [47146]

The Attorney-General (Mr. John Morris): I frequently discuss matters of mutual interest with ministerial colleagues, including my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary. Officials from the Crown Prosecution Service likewise have frequent discussions with representatives of the Association of Chief Police Officers. Those discussions promote co-operation and effective joint working between agencies in the criminal justice system and are a key feature of the Government's commitment to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the criminal justice system generally.

Sir Sydney Chapman: Now that we have had an opportunity to read the Glidewell report following the statement made in the House by the Attorney-General on 1 June, does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that if there is to be an improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of the Crown Prosecution Service, it is

absolutely essential that there should be better co-operation and co-ordination between that service, the police forces and the Court Service? Will he encourage the new Director of Public Prosecutions, as a matter of priority, to hold discussions with the Home Secretary and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner and to ensure that that becomes a reality in London, where, in my opinion, there is a desperate need for less centralisation and less bureaucracy?

The Attorney-General: The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. The need for better co-operation goes to the heart of the matter. A great deal has been done in recent years and many of the 75 recommendations that Sir Iain Glidewell made deal precisely with that issue. The issue goes wider than my own Department and wider than the CPS, so the Government as a whole, including my right hon. Friends the Home Secretary and the Lord Chancellor, will be looking at all 75 recommendations as a matter of urgency. The document is now out to consultation and I should be grateful for any observations drawn from the experience of the hon. Gentleman in respect of London. As he knows, there are particular proposals for London.

Mr. David Winnick: Arising from the discussions that my right hon. and learned Friend has mentioned, can he confirm that the Crown Prosecution Service has not closed the files on the murder of Stephen Lawrence—the brutal racist killing that took place in April 1993? Will he confirm that, when the inquiry is ended, every effort will continue to be made to ensure that the murderers of Stephen Lawrence—or at least some of the murderers of the 17-year-old—are brought to justice? Is he aware that Stephen's parents will never give up their fight for justice? Those who murdered their son should be put in the dock and, if found guilty, serve a life sentence.

The Attorney-General: I fully understand the sentiments expressed by my hon. Friend; that is what the inquiry under a distinguished former judge is all about. Thereafter, of course, it will be a matter for the police, in the first instance, and if there is evidence, a matter for the Crown Prosecution Service. We have to take it in stages.

Mr. Edward Garnier: When the right hon. and learned Gentleman next meets the Secretary of State for the Home Department to discuss the Crown Prosecution Service, will he discuss the Lord Chancellor's proposals to open up rights of audience for employed solicitors within the CPS to the higher courts? Will he attempt to reconcile the Lord Chancellor's views on that subject with those that he himself expressed at the Bar conference not long ago, when he said that the independent Bar was one of the bastions of a democratic society? Are the views of the Attorney-General and the Lord Chancellor reconcilable on this matter—or on any other matter?

The Attorney-General: The views of my right hon. and noble Friend the Lord Chancellor on the independence of the Bar are precisely the same as mine. I have spelt them out time after time—but repetition is important, and a good thing. The Lord Chancellor includes in his consultation paper words almost to the same effect, which have exactly the same meaning.

Serious Fraud Trials

Mr. Ross Cranston: What analysis he has made of the use of juries in serious fraud trials. [47147]

The Attorney-General: In February my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary launched a consultation exercise seeking views on whether an alternative method of trial should be available in serious and complex fraud cases, and on the viability of various options for change. The Government have not reached a conclusion on whether the ending of jury trials in serious fraud cases is desirable in principle, or formed an opinion on any particular options for change, and will not do so until the consultation process is complete.

Mr. Cranston: I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for that reply. Is he aware of the view recently expressed by the head of the Serious Fraud Office that some fraud trials are incapable of being handled by a jury? In considering that view, will he weigh against it the idea that technological developments have made it possible to simplify cases so that they can be more easily expressed to a jury, thereby making it possible to retain the jury in many fraud cases?

The Attorney-General: I fully recognise the technological changes, which are an invaluable tool in some of the more complicated fraud trials. In her article, the director of the Serious Fraud Office made it clear that she was expressing her personal view. As the Home Secretary said in his consultation paper, the Government recognise that there are concerns that the present system for handling some major complex fraud trials is not working satisfactorily, and that there may be a case for considering some change to the system. Obviously, we shall take into account both the director's views and those of all who participate in the consultation exercise.

Mr. Dominic Grieve: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman also bear in mind, in that context, the fact that, historically, one of the problems with serious fraud trials appears to have been a tendency to overload indictments and not to sever them? If simple matters are explained simply, in a way that will lead to a just verdict, most juries can understand them perfectly well.

The Attorney-General: The hon. Gentleman is right. The responsibility lies in the first instance on the Crown, likewise on the defence, and above all on the trial judge. The Court of Appeal has long spoken against overloaded indictments, but the hon. Gentleman will recall, in a famous case not so long ago, what happened with regard to the second trial.

Mr. John Burnett: Is the Attorney-General aware of the many misgivings at the possible replacement of juries in serious fraud trials? Is he aware of the public outrage in Israel at the recent acquittal, by a judge sitting alone, of numerous politicians charged with serious fraud and corruption?

The Attorney-General: I am not aware of that case. As far back as I can remember, there have been many

views, both in favour of and against, the continuation of jury trials—not just in fraud cases but in some others, too. I for one, with a little experience of handling fraud trials, greatly value the role of the jury in deciding issues such as dishonesty. On the other hand, there are also other considerations in a small number of cases, such as the burden imposed on jurors of taking six months or perhaps a year out of their lives. Some might say that that was intolerable.

Director of Public Prosecutions

Mr. Desmond Swayne: What objectives he plans to set for the new Director of Public Prosecutions. [47148]

The Attorney-General: New objectives for the Crown Prosecution Service are being considered, taking into account the findings of Sir Iain Glidewell's review of the Crown Prosecution Service, the cross-cutting comprehensive spending review of the criminal justice system and the Crown Prosecution Service's own comprehensive spending review. The intention is that revised Crown Prosecution Service objectives will contribute to the Government's wider objectives for the criminal justice system as a whole.

Mr. Swayne: How does the right hon. and learned Gentleman propose to ensure a consistent prosecution policy across England and Wales?

The Attorney-General: We hope to continue the work already done by the CPS to ensure national standards and objectives. To be fair to the CPS, great steps have already been taken over many years in that direction. Provided such national standards are adhered to, a great deal of the responsibility for implementing them can be devolved to local police areas.

Mr. Gordon Prentice: Does the Attorney-General agree that it is wrong that DTI inspectors should investigate allegations of insider dealing and report to politicians in the DTI who have the final say? Surely it would be better to transfer the responsibility for investigating insider dealing, under the Financial Services Act 1986, to an independent investigative body such as the CPS, with decisions on prosecutions being taken by the Director of Public Prosecutions.

The Attorney-General: These are matters for my right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade. Proposals on the future policing of the City have already been announced and are in the public domain.

Mr. Humfrey Malins: Will the Attorney-General ensure that the CPS is made fully aware of the fact that, under the Crime and Disorder Bill, the maximum sentence—in terms of custody to be served—available to a magistrates court will be six weeks? Will he give the CPS revised guidelines to ensure that more cases are tried in the Crown courts, where proper sentences can be imposed? Will he bear in mind the fact that many of us think that six weeks' custody is far too low a maximum for magistrates courts?

The Attorney-General: These matters are primarily for the Home Secretary, but I shall certainly consider the hon. Gentleman's point about the CPS. The latter has to decide on the right venue in which to prosecute each and every case; I believe that it does so to ensure that justice is done.

Mr. David Lock: Will my right hon. and learned Friend accept my congratulations on the recent appointment of a new chief executive to the CPS? What role does he see for the new chief executive, bearing in mind the new structure proposed for the CPS in the Glidewell report?

The Attorney-General: I am grateful for my hon. Friend's observations. We have already, as he knows, announced to the House the appointment of the chief executive. He is in post, familiarising himself with his brief. When he has done so, he will consider with the DPP and other relevant Departments how far the Glidewell proposals should be accepted. He will oversee the bringing together of the senior management team for the new structure and he will initiate the selection process for the 42 chief Crown prosecutors, whose actual selection will require the involvement of the new DPP.

Crown Prosecution Service

Mr. Ian Bruce: If he will make a statement on the reorganisation of the Crown Prosecution Service. [47149]

The Attorney-General: I published the report of the review of the Crown Prosecution Service—the Glidewell

review—on 1 June 1998. Its main thrust, which we accept, lies in proposals for reordering CPS priorities to focus more on the core business of prosecuting, greater separation of management from legal work, greater autonomy for the areas and better prospects for staff.
We immediately accepted the recommendation for the appointment of a chief executive, to which I have just referred, and work is already under way within the CPS and other Departments to consider the recommendations. I expect to provide the House with a progress report in the autumn.

Mr. Bruce: The whole House would respect the Attorney-General for the calm and charming way in which he answers questions in the House. However, if one looks back at the answers that he has given on the Crown Prosecution Service and at the criticism coming from both sides of the House, it is clear that that calm and charm masks a great deal of incompetence in his Department and possibly even on his part. Barbara Mills resigned, rightly, because of the way in which the Crown Prosecution Service was functioning. What about people in the Attorney-General's Department—or will we always be reassured that the CPS is working well, when clearly it has never worked well?

The Attorney-General: I am surprised at the hon. Gentleman's latter comments and grateful to him for his earlier words. We inherited a system that was appallingly bad. We published in opposition "The Case for the Prosecution." I immediately set in train the Glidewell review. It examined in detail what was wrong and produced a report within a very short time—one year—which we are about to implement. We are doing so because the palsied hand of the previous Administration did nothing at all.

Business of the House

Sir Patrick Cormack: May I wish the right hon. Lady a very happy birthday, and ask if she will give us the business for next week?

Mr. Andrew Mackinlay: Charmer.

The President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons (Mrs. Ann Taylor): Very calmly said. I thank the hon. Gentleman.
The business for next week will be as follows:
MONDAY 6 JULY—Estimates Day (1st allotted day).
There will be a debate on further education, followed by a debate on the Government's proposals for a freedom of information Act. Details will be given in the Official Report.
The Question will be put on the relevant estimates at 10 pm.
TUESDAY 7 JULY—Opposition Day (16th allotted day).
There will be a debate on the release of information to Select Committees on an Opposition motion.
Motion relating to the Social Security Amendment (Lone Parents) Regulations.
WEDNESDAY 8 JuLY—Until 2 pm, there will be debates on the motion for the Adjournment of the House.
Remaining stages of the Competition Bill [Lords].
THURSDAY 9 JULY—Debate on the national health service on a motion for the Adjournment of the House.
FRIDAY 10 JULY—Proceedings on the Landmines Bill.
The provisional business for the following week will be as follows:
MONDAY 13 JULY—Opposition Day (17th allotted day).
There will be a debate on an Opposition motion. Subject to be announced.
TUESDAY 14 JULY—Estimates Day (2nd allotted day).
There will be a debate on the UK beef industry, followed by a debate on the structure and funding of university research. Details will be given in the Official Report.
At 10 pm, the House will be asked to agree all outstanding estimates.
WEDNESDAY 15 JULY—Until 2 pm, there will be debates on the motion for the Adjournment of the House.
Proceedings on the Consolidated Fund (Appropriation) (No. 2) Bill.
Consideration of any Lords amendments which may be received to the School Standards and Framework Bill.
THURSDAY 16 JULY—Debate on the economy on a motion for the Adjournment of the House.
FRIDAY 17 JULY—Debate on NATO enlargement on a motion for the Adjournment of the House.
The House will also wish to be reminded that on Wednesday 8 July there will be a debate on the 1999 preliminary draft budget in European Standing Committee B.
Details of the relevant documents will be given in the Official Report.
[Monday 6 July:
Estimates Day [1st allotted day]—Class IX, vote 1: Department for Education and Employment: programmes and central services in so far as it relates to further education. Relevant reports: the Sixth Report from the Education and Employment Committee, Session 1997–98, on Further Education (HC 264—I); the Department for Education and Employment's Departmental Report: The Government's Expenditure Plans 1998–99 (Cm 3910).
Class CVII, vote 1: Cabinet Office: Office of Public Service in so far as it relates to the Government's proposals for a freedom of information Act. Relevant reports: the Third Report from the Select Committee on Public Administration, Session 1997–98, on Your Right to Know: The Government's Proposals for a Freedom of Information Act (HC 398); the Fourth Report from the Select Committee on Public Administration, Session 1997–98, on Ministerial Accountability and Parliamentary Questions (HC 820).
Tuesday 14 July 1998:
Estimates Day [2nd allotted day]—Class IV, votes 1 and 2: Intervention Board executive agency and Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in so far as they relate to the UK beef industry. Relevant reports: the Third Report from the Agriculture Committee, Session 1997–98, on the UK Beef Industry (HC 474); the Second Report from the Welsh Affairs Committee, Session 1997–98, on the Present Crisis in the Welsh Livestock Industry (HC 447).
Class V, vote 2: Department of Trade and Industry: Science in so far as it relates to the structure and funding of university research. Relevant report: the First Report of the Science and Technology Committee on the Implications of the Dearing Report for the Structure and Funding of University Research (HC 303).
Wednesday 8 July:
European Standing Committee B—Relevant European Community documents: (i) SEC(98)800 and (ii) COM(98)300, 1999 Preliminary Draft Budget. Relevant European Legislation Committee reports: (i) HC 155-xxx (1997–98) and (ii) HC 155-xxxii (1997–98).

Sir Patrick Cormack: I thank the right hon. Lady for giving us the business for the next two weeks. We appreciate that. I thank her particularly for responding to the Leader of the Opposition's offer and providing Friday 10 July for consideration of the Landmines Bill. I reiterate that she will have the Opposition's co-operation on that measure. I thank her also for providing time to debate the Social Security Amendment (Lone Parents) Regulations on Tuesday next and for at last providing the debate that we requested on North Atlantic Treaty Organisation enlargement.
I draw the right hon. Lady's attention to the matter that the Opposition have chosen to debate on Tuesday next week and, in particular, to paragraph 6 of the second special report of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, which states:
The Committee considers that it is wrong in principle for the Executive to seek unilaterally to impose prior conditions on the release of information properly sought by a Select Committee in pursuit of the responsibilities given to it by the House. The views of the House are sought at an early date.
Is the right hon. Lady aware that our motion on Tuesday will reflect those words and that the Opposition will allow a free vote, treating this issue—as it should be treated—


as a House of Commons matter? Will the right hon. Lady respond in like spirit and ensure that, as the hon. Member for Thurrock (Mr. Mackinlay) has requested publicly, a free vote is held in the House on that matter?
Is the right hon. Lady in a position to tell us when we can expect statements on the strategic defence review, the comprehensive spending review and the integrated transport White Paper? Much concern is being caused in relation to the latter issue, and I would argue, with great respect, that the Deputy Prime Minister's kite flying is no substitute for a statement on integrated transport policy. Is the right hon. Lady aware that rumours are circulating that the Government's proposals for the North sea oil tax regime will be announced by means of a written reply to a written question? Can she assure me that that is not the case and that there will be a statement about that matter on the Floor of the House?
The right hon. Lady has circulated—as she properly should—her proposals for possible reform of the hours of the House, which she will put before the Select Committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons. I understand, Madam Speaker, that you have made your views known about the matter. Will the right hon. Lady seek your permission to make those views known to all hon. Members—not just those who serve on the Select Committee—so that there may be full consultation and people may know exactly what you think, as well as what the Leader of the House is proposing?
Is the Leader of the House yet in a position to say—I ask on behalf of the staff of the House who serve us so well and so selflessly—whether we shall sit in August?

Mrs. Taylor: The hon. Gentleman raised a number of issues, with which I shall deal in turn.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned the Landmines Bill. I am pleased that we have received sufficient co-operation to make progress on that legislation. There have been discussions through the usual channels with all parties in the House and I hope that we shall continue to make progress. We said all along that we were keen to move on that matter as soon as possible. Many hon. Members on both sides of the House suggested various non-sitting days on which we might consider the measure, and I am glad that we have agreed to use Friday 10 July.
I am pleased also that the hon. Gentleman acknowledges that we have been able to meet the requests for debate on the Social Security Amendment (Lone Parents) Regulations. I said some time ago that we were likely to debate NATO enlargement in July.
The hon. Gentleman mentioned some of the words that might appear in the Opposition's motion on Tuesday. I cannot possibly comment on that motion until I have seen it; although I am responsible for many things, I am, fortunately, not responsible for whipping arrangements. No one would discuss whipping arrangements before knowing what any particular motion said, although I might want to amend the Opposition's motion.
The hon. Gentleman asked about dates for various statements that may be made in the near future. I do not normally give dates of statements in advance, but there has been great speculation about certain important statements. I can confirm that some dates are pencilled in provisionally—the strategic defence review for Wednesday 8 July and the comprehensive spending review for the week after—although events sometimes

mean that we have to alter the dates that we have in mind. The integrated transport White Paper is expected later this month, and I anticipate a statement being made to the House. I have not considered North sea oil tax revenues, so I cannot answer the hon. Gentleman on that point; at the moment, I do not have provisional plans for a statement on that before me.
I am glad that the hon. Gentleman has drawn attention to the memorandum that has been submitted to the Modernisation Committee. The Committee is in the early stages of drawing up ideas on potential changes to the parliamentary calendar and, as a whole, is anxious that all hon. Members should make their views known. We are taking steps to ensure that people are aware of that opportunity. I should be more than happy to make sure, with Madam Speaker's permission, that her views were available, and that is something that we can pursue.
Everyone is anxious to know when the recess will be, and, had I been able to announce the precise dates today, I should have been pleased. The most that I can say is that it is clear that the House will not rise before the end of July.

Mr. Gordon Prentice: May we have an early debate on how insider dealing investigations are dealt with by the Department of Trade and Industry? May I say that, for a fact, Sir Nicholas Lloyd, has never been interviewed by Department of Trade and Industry inspectors in connection with the 1994 investigation concerning insider dealing in Anglia Television shares? Do we not need an early debate on that matter, because Sir Nicholas Lloyd has been held out publicly as the source of the tip to a certain well-known individual who traded in shares in January 1994 and made £77,000? We need an explanation.

Mrs. Taylor: My hon. Friend has been assiduous in raising issues of that kind at various Question Times. I am afraid that I cannot promise him the debate that he wants in Government time, but perhaps he will be fortunate and obtain an Adjournment debate.

Mr. Paul Tyler: I hope that, if I add my felicitations on her birthday, the right hon. Lady will be even more co-operative than she has been on private Members' Bills. In the light of what she said last Thursday, is there any way to assist non-controversial private Members' Bill with all-party support not only to complete their passage through this House, but, if they are amended in the House of Lords, to complete their passage in the spillover section when they come back?
Will there be room in the next couple of weeks, or soon thereafter, for a comprehensive debate on arms sales? There is a general view that the Foreign Secretary's views on the Scott report are not fully reflected in the report on strategic export controls published yesterday. It is a timid report, and I hope that hon. Members on both sides of the House will have an opportunity to examine it.
Before next Thursday's debate on the national health service, will the Leader of the House ensure that there is an opportunity for the Prime Minister to correct the no doubt unfortunate and unintentional, but considerable, mistake that he made in his answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Winchester (Mr. Oaten) yesterday? The Leader of the House will recall that my hon. Friend asked


what the Prime Minister would do about the severe deterioration in the recruitment position of doctors, and the Prime Minister said:
medical students are exempt from the new provisions on student finance."—[Official Report, 1 July 1998; Vol. 315, c. 355.]
That is simply untrue and I am sure that the Prime Minister will want an early opportunity to put the record straight. Under the new regime, medical, veterinary and dental students will have to pay extensive sums to support their studies in the first three years. An absurd anomaly is that in Scotland they will have to do so for the fourth year as well. Will the Leader of the House give an absolute undertaking that the Prime Minister will correct the record before next Thursday's debate?

Mrs. Taylor: I will check the hon. Gentleman's last point and get in touch with him about it.
On the two substantive points that the hon. Gentleman raised on private Members' Bills, I hope that some of the Bills before the House tomorrow will make progress. Many people think that they are important measures that command widespread support. As I pointed out last week, the House itself decides at the beginning of each Session how much time to give private Members' Bills, but some interesting suggestions have been made about how we could deal with private Members' Bills that need only a vote rather than further debate. The Modernisation Committee will look at that matter in due course. I am open-minded about what we might be able to do and will watch what happens to individual Bills.
I think that the hon. Gentleman was somewhat churlish in saying that no progress had been made on arms sales. The White Paper published yesterday is for consultation, and it takes us further forward. We are willing to listen to further suggestions on how the position might be improved. At the moment, there is clearly no time for a debate on that matter, but views are being sought and will be taken into account.

Mr. Dennis Skinner: Has my right hon. Friend noticed the speculation in the press in recent days about the possible collaboration between the Labour Government and the leader of the Liberal Democrats, and the possibility that he will get a job in a future Cabinet? The other daft idea being carted around is that the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith) will be the next Speaker. May we have an early statement to put an end to all those rumours? While we are at it, will my right hon. Friend tell the others in the Cabinet that they should bury the report from Lord Jenkins about changing to proportional representation and tell him to stick to what he has always done—rushing about trying to find a posh table at a restaurant?

Mrs. Taylor: I am not sure that I can find time next week for the specific debate that my hon. Friend requests, interesting though it might be, especially to those of us who have been in the House for many years.
On my hon. Friend's specific point, I am not aware that there is any credibility in many of the stories that appear in the press. I am sure that you intend to be in your place for some time yet, Madam Speaker, so any speculation on that front is pretty worthless.
On jobs in Cabinet, I promise to bring my hon. Friend's recommendations to the attention of my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister.

Mr. Peter Brooke: Given the pressure on legislative time revealed by the Landmines Bill, which I welcome, can the Government ensure that Ministers are available to take their business when it occurs so that we avoid the surrealist farce that we had last night of Labour Back Benchers filibustering on the Finance (No. 2) Bill while the Government allegedly retrieved the next relevant Minister from the highlands?

Mrs. Taylor: I think that the right hon. Gentleman is under some misapprehension. Two days for the Finance Bill was the time that we agreed to give, following discussions through the usual channels. If anyone was absent, it was Opposition Members.

Mr. Peter L. Pike: May I draw my right hon. Friend's attention to early-day motion 651?
[That this House believes that the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions should undertake an urgent review of the standard of motorway driving with a particular view to the need for all newly qualified drivers to undertake some form of motorway tuition and that urgent action should be taken to address the problems that exist and to secure a higher standard of proficiency of motorway driving and to help reduce the present motorway accident level.]
I pay tribute to my constituent, Anne Ravenhill, who, for some years, has vigorously campaigned for motorway driving tuition. The early-day motion has 104 signatures. Anyone who drives on motorways will recognise that this issue is of concern. Does my right hon. Friend see any opportunity of discussing these issues at an early date?

Mrs. Taylor: My hon. Friend is an experienced Member of the House, and he knows ways of finding time in debates to raise issues that he wants to pursue. The Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions is undertaking a comprehensive examination of driver training issues. My hon. Friend has made points about safety on motorways and about measures that need not penalise newly qualified drivers. That is an important issue, but he will understand that I cannot find time for a debate on it. With his ingenuity, I am sure that he can find other ways of raising this matter.

Rev. Martin Smyth: Does the right hon. Lady join me in condemning the arson attacks on Roman Catholic chapels in Northern Ireland last night? Such actions are attacks not just on places of worship, but on communities, and they are to be deployed in any community that stands for civil and religious liberty.
Is the right hon. Lady able to tell us when the Northern Ireland constitution Bill will be introduced? Yesterday, we launched the assembly. It is like starting a marathon race without telling people where they are going.

Mrs. Taylor: I am sure that the whole House wants to be associated with the hon. Gentleman's comments about the arson attacks. Such behaviour unites everyone in the House, and, like him, we want to place our views on record.
Discussions are still taking place on the Northern Ireland constitution Bill, so I cannot give the hon. Gentleman a precise answer. He knows that we take Northern Ireland legislation extremely seriously. We have moved quickly to present such legislation when it has been necessary. Much work is being carried out at present, and discussions will continue through the usual channels. As soon as I can give the House information, I shall do so.

Mr. Paul Flynn: I welcome what my right hon. Friend said about tomorrow's Bills. Is it not a perversion of democracy that 74 Bills will come before Parliament tomorrow? The day has become known as the slaughter of the innocents, because many would-be King Herods can destroy those Bills by shouting a single word. It is wrong for the will of the House to be ignored. One of those Bills received a majority vote of 411, but it is unlikely to get through the system and become law. Bill No. 13 on the Order Paper seeks to tackle by far the worst case of drug misuse in this country, which is the over-prescription of neuroleptic drugs to the elderly in residential homes. We should have a debate on the system that allows Bills that have majority support not to get through Parliament and to be damaged or destroyed by malign or malicious individual Members.

Mrs. Taylor: We had a short debate on that subject last week. Points made in that debate will help the Modernisation Committee when it turns its mind to this subject.

Mr. Wilkinson: I thank the Leader of the House for letting us know that the statement on the strategic defence review will be made on Wednesday of next week. Does that not highlight the fact that, this year, we have had only one debate on one of the three services, the Royal Air Force? It is remiss of the Government not to have given more time to the armed forces. Will she guarantee that, before we rise for the summer recess—preferably in the next two weeks—we will have a two-day debate on the armed forces? If The Times is to be believed, they are likely to lose £1 billion of their budget, which will affect the career prospects of many service men.

Mrs. Taylor: I have said that it is likely, although not absolutely fixed, that that statement will be made on Wednesday.
On the hon. Gentleman's other point, we have had one defence debate—we discuss subjects for debate through the usual channels. I hope that we shall be able to have significant defence debates later in the Session, but I think that, as in other years, the bulk of that time may have to be in the spillover.

Mr. Andrew Mackinlay: Will the Leader of the House please consider the position of Her Majesty's Government in relation to the disclosure of information to Select Committees? The Opposition's zeal to criticise the Government is a grave matter for those of us who want to promote a bipartisan approach in Select Committee considerations. I urge her to lead discussions with other Government managers, and perhaps the Opposition, to establish whether the current impasse can be overcome.
Members of Select Committees should be able to approach matters without private interests or partial affections, so that they can seek the truth and fulfil their

duty to oversee Government Departments. That is extremely important in relation to next Tuesday's debate—we must recognise that, if such an approach is to endure, it must be reflected in the vote on Tuesday evening. The debate needs to be treated as a so-called House of Commons matter, so that individual Members of Parliament can vote on the motion without fear or favour and without fear of intimidation by party Whips.

Mrs. Taylor: I think that my hon. Friend will have heard what I said to the deputy shadow Leader of the House, to which I do not have anything to add.

Mr. Graham Brady: May we have an early debate or statement to clarify the relationship between Health Ministers and local health authorities in the decision-making process? I ask that in the light of the astonishing events in Salford and Trafford on Tuesday, when the Secretary of State for Health intervened, using a legal directive procedure—it has been used only once before in the history of the national health service—to require the local health authority to withdraw a properly conducted public consultation exercise merely so that he could avoid adverse publicity when he visited Trafford general hospital on Sunday.

Mrs. Taylor: My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Health felt that there had been insufficient discussion with the neighbouring authorities before Salford and Trafford health authority issued its consultation document on 1 June. He believed that any proposed changes to children's services should be considered in the context of the establishment of health action zones rather than in isolation. He has a responsibility to take a position on such matters, and I am surprised that the hon. Gentleman should regard that as astonishing. I am also surprised at the implication of what he said—he seemed to imply that he wanted those beds to be lost and that ward to be shut.

Mr. Denis MacShane: Following on from what the Leader of the House said about next Tuesday's debate, will she find time to have an early debate on parliamentary scrutiny of the Executive? Many unpleasant comments are being made about the Leader of the Opposition, but, as someone who suffered from acute sinusitis as a boy, I wish him well—it is one of the most painful conditions that anyone can have. The lack of an effective Opposition gives rise to a fundamental problem, but is it not related to the fact that no fewer than 19 of the appointments that the right hon. Gentleman has made to the shadow Front-Bench team have lucrative outside interests? The most recent announcement is that the shadow President of the Board of Trade is taking money from Murray Financial, a financial firm dedicated to destroying building societies and mutual assurance companies. Is not the real problem that, until we have an effective Opposition, the Executive will not receive the scrutiny that it needs?

Mrs. Taylor: I said earlier that I was not responsible for whipping; thankfully, I am not responsible for the Opposition either.

Mr. Alex Salmond: Is the Leader of the House aware that another important upcoming


anniversary is the 10th anniversary of the Piper Alpha disaster? Some of us have spent the afternoon in the precincts of the House watching a film by one of the survivors, Ed Punchard, which will be broadcast next week.
May I make a request, which I know will be supported by the hon. Members who represent Aberdeen, the hon. Member for Greenock and Inverclyde (Dr. Godman) and many others, for a debate on the full ramifications of the disaster, to examine whether we got to the bottom of the causes of the incident and how the Cullen changes have been working over the past 10 years?
In particular, we could discuss how the Government's proposals on corporate criminality are progressing—I believe that there is widespread support for such legislative change. As the Leader of the House will understand, many of us were extremely concerned when, in a civil action earlier this year, responsibility and blame were placed on two dead people who had no chance of representing themselves. The issue of corporate liability has never been fully explored.
Will the Leader of the House take my comments on board? Does she accept that only if we have such a debate will we discharge our responsibility not just to those who died on Piper Alpha, but to the many thousands who still work in the North sea?

Mrs. Taylor: I well understand the hon. Gentleman's concern, which is echoed by my hon. Friends. I did not know about the film that is to be shown next week, but of course I remember the incident, as many others will.
I will take on board the hon. Gentleman's comments. I cannot guarantee him the debate that he wants in the next few weeks, but I assure him that I will draw what he has said to the attention of all Ministers who are concerned with the matter.

Mr. John McDonnell: My right hon. Friend may have read reports over the past two weeks of the near-gridlock of air traffic over Heathrow airport as a result of chronic weaknesses in the air traffic control system. Heathrow is in my constituency, and I am extremely anxious for the safety of my constituents. The Government have acted promptly in launching an investigation. Will my right hon. Friend liaise with her colleagues in the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, so that when the report of the investigation is completed, it is brought to the House promptly and an important issue of public safety can be debated?

Mrs. Taylor: I will certainly discuss the matter with my right hon. and hon. Friends.

Mr. Michael Jack: The Leader of the House did not announce time for a debate in the next two weeks on the fight against bovine tuberculosis. As she will know, an important report—the Krebbs report—is being considered by the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. May I ask her, in all seriousness, to talk to the Minister of State about the possibility of finding time for a debate on the report and on bovine tuberculosis? Many farms in the south-west are disrupted by the disease,

and many people in the west midlands and Cheshire are fearful of its spread. It is important that the House should have a chance to debate the implementation of the Krebbs report before the die is finally cast.

Mrs. Taylor: My hon. Friend the Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food is present, and has heard the right hon. Gentleman's comments. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, we are considering how best to implement the recommendations made by Professor Krebbs last December. A good deal of work is going into the issue, and my hon. Friend the Minister of State has received many representations from Members whose constituents are extremely worried about the problem.
We are not in a position to make an announcement yet, but all contributions received during the consultation period have been considered carefully. Announcements will be made, but all the views of hon. Members will be taken into account first.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: Does my right hon. Friend recollect that, before we were committed to going into Bosnia, there was a general indication that it would be for a limited time? In answer to the hon. Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson), my right hon. Friend said that a debate on the strategic defence review would take place later in the Session; presumably, she has November in mind. May we have some reflection on giving an undertaking to the House—I do not ask my right hon. Friend to give it now—that, should there be military commitment in Kosovo or in the Gulf, the House of Commons will be recalled, whatever stage the recess has reached, before any decisions are put into cement?

Mrs. Taylor: I believe that I made the position clear last week, although it may have been two weeks ago. I said that I could not give an absolute undertaking that statements would be made in the House before any decision to deploy troops. However, I also said—and I can confirm—that, operational circumstances permitting, we would seek to keep the House of Commons informed first.

Jackie Ballard: The Leader of the House will be aware that the Equal Opportunities Commission presented its annual report to the Secretary of State for Education and Employment on 15 June. One of its key proposals is to replace the Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983 and the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, which set up the commission, with an all-encompassing sex equality law. The report is called "Making Equality Work—the challenge for government". Will there be time in the coming weeks to debate the report and for the Government to say how they intend to respond to the challenge that it presents?

Mrs. Taylor: Important though that report is, I cannot find time for such a debate in the next few weeks. It is an interesting suggestion, and one which members of the Modernisation Committee might bear in mind as typical of the requests that we get for debates that would be non-partisan and useful to the House. The Committee is considering how we could find more time for such debates.

Dr. Norman A. Godman: I fully support the request made by the hon. Member for Banff and Buchan (Mr. Salmond).
The hon. Member for South Staffordshire (Sir P. Cormack) referred to the second special report of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. My right hon. Friend can see at a glance that there were sharp divisions on it, as there were on the first report. I fully expect the Foreign Secretary to make an early statement following the publication of the Legg report, and I would also demand that he initiate a debate on Legg.
The Foreign Secretary should bear in mind the advice given in the ministerial code. Paragraph 28.j on page 12 states:
Every effort should be made to avoid leaving significant announcements to the last day before a Recess.
That is what the other outfit used to do. I do not want the Government to follow that Conservative tradition. I fully expect the Foreign Secretary to come before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, of which I am a member, to answer questions on the Legg findings. It is better for a Select Committee to cross-examine Ministers and officials than for us to attempt to do so in a debate.

Mrs. Taylor: On my hon. Friend's first point, I think that the whole House agrees with the concern that was expressed about Piper Alpha.
My hon. Friend is right to say that the Select Committee was sharply split on both reports. Other such matters may emerge in the debate on Tuesday, although we have not yet seen the motion. My hon. Friend asked for an early statement and a debate on Legg. My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary may well want to make a statement once the report is published. The inquiry is independent, and it is within the power of Sir Thomas Legg himself to determine the time scale, but I know that he understands the urgency of the matter, and I hope that we will not have to wait too long.
My hon. Friend will know that the most recent letter from my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary to the Chairman of the Select Committee made an offer to appear before it; he is still awaiting a reply.

Mr. Patrick Nicholls: The Leader of the House will be aware of the concerns in the British fishing industry, especially in relation to regulation. Will she find time for a debate in the near future, if not next week, so that hon. Members of all parties can express the fact that the industry is concerned not only by the regulation imposed by Europe, and indeed the disparity of enforcement, but by the fact that Her Majesty's Government are now unilaterally imposing further restrictions? The Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food would then have the opportunity, which he probably would not welcome, to explain what he is doing about it.

Mrs. Taylor: I am sure that Ministers would like many debates, but they are as much constrained as anyone else. There simply is not time in the immediate future for all the debates that we would like. I can only advise the hon. Gentleman to apply for an Adjournment debate.

Dr. Brian Iddon: The highest priority for debate in the House is given to fiscal matters. However, the Government regard sustainable development as a high priority, too, and have set up the Select Committee on Environmental Audit, which published its second report today. May I draw my right

hon. Friend's attention to just one of the report's many recommendations, which is that there should be a major debate on sustainable development on a Government motion relating to the Committee's annual report? I hope that that recommendation will be taken seriously.

Mrs. Taylor: I will certainly take that recommendation seriously. Clearly it will not be possible to provide time for a debate before the summer recess. I cannot say whether there will be time during the spillover period, but, if there is not, I can bear the subject in mind for debate in future parliamentary years. We attach great importance to that subject and will consider how to take into account the wishes of the Select Committee.

Mr. John Bercow: Will the Leader of the House find time for an early debate on the expenditure policies of North Lanarkshire council? That would give the House a chance to consider the specific and worrying case of a lollipop man who was paid at a rate equivalent to £17,500 a year for working 10 hours a week. Given the right hon. Lady's prodigious reading of the daily newspapers, does she recall that that fortunate individual told The Daily Telegraph on 4 June that he could not believe his luck? He was able to do up his flat, take his wife and kids on holiday and buy a new car as a result of the outrageous profligacy of that Labour council. Will the right hon. Lady enable the Secretary of State for Scotland to come to the House in the near future to defend or to condemn that typical record of an old Labour council?

Mrs. Taylor: I am surprised to learn that the main interest of the constituents of Buckingham is the activities of North Lanarkshire council. The hon. Gentleman knows that this Government, unlike the previous one, have acted quickly. We will not tolerate any failure or inefficiency in local government. It is a bit rich for a former adviser to Jonathan Aitken to raise matters of that kind.

Mr. Andrew Stunell: Will the right hon. Lady take account of serious concern on both sides of the House and among our constituents about the congestion of parliamentary business? Many matters will not be debated and considered, including private Members' business, Law Commission reports and Select Committee reports. There are also many Adjournment debates: I understand that Madam Speaker received requests for more than 50 such debates next Wednesday. Will the right hon. Lady put to the Modernisation Committee the urgent need to find other channels for conducting our business so that the work of the House is not impeded by the time constraints that beset us?

Mrs. Taylor: Demand for debates cannot always be met. That is the case in every parliamentary year. The hon. Gentleman mentions some areas in which there is particular pressure, and he knows that the Modernisation Committee has said that it will consider private Members' Bills in future. He is right to say that more could perhaps be done. We should use our imagination to come up with new ideas on how to resolve some of the problems, although I do not think that we will ever be able to satisfy every hon. Member, given the time available.

Mr. Dalyell: On a point of order, Madam Speaker. I do not wish to prolong our debate, but is there not


an old-fashioned code of conduct in the House? Before Members of Parliament attack particular councils, they should at least find out the facts. The intervention of the hon. Member for Buckingham (Mr. Bercow) relates not to my constituency, but to those of parliamentary neighbours. It is high time that the House was a bit more restrained in throwing around accusations under privilege against people who cannot defend themselves, when there is another side to the story. Would you care to reflect on the old code of conduct which was accepted as a convention, whereby Members of Parliament were careful before attacking councils and other elected bodies?

Madam Speaker: The hon. Gentleman's words are extremely wise. He has used them before, and on numerous occasions I have reminded the House that with our great privileges also come responsibilities. Before we launch into attacks on other people, we must get our facts absolutely right.

ROYAL ASSENT

Madam Speaker: I have to notify the House, in accordance with the Royal Assent Act 1967, that the Queen has signified Her Royal Assent to the following Acts and a Measure:

National Lottery Act 1998
Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998
Road Traffic Reduction (National Targets) Act 1998
National Institutions Measure 1998

Orders of the Day — Human Rights Bill [Lords]

[4TH ALLOTTED DAY]

Considered in Committee [Progress, 24 June]

[MR. MICHAEL LORD in the Chair]

New clause 9

FREEDOM OF THOUGHT, CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION

'—(1) If a court's determination of any question arising under this Act might affect the exercise by a religious organisation (itself or its members collectively) of the Convention right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, it must have particular regard to the importance of that right.
(2) In this section, "court" includes a tribunal.'.—[Mr. Straw.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 13

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

'.—(1) This section applies if a court is considering whether to grant any relief which, if granted, might affect the exercise of the Convention right to freedom of expression.
(2) If the person against whom the application for relief is made ("the respondent") is neither present nor represented, no such relief is to be granted unless the court is satisfied—

(a) that the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent; or
(b) that there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified.
(3) No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed.
(4) The court must have particular regard to the importance of the Convention right to freedom of expression and, where the proceedings relate to material which the respondent claims, or which appears to the court, to be journalistic, literary or artistic material (or to conduct connected with such material), to—

(a) the extent to which—

(i) the material has, or is about to, become available to the public, or
(ii) it is, or would be, in the public interest for the material to be published;
(b) any relevant privacy code.

(5) In this section—
court" includes a tribunal, and
relief' includes any remedy or order (other than in criminal proceedings).'.—[Mr. Straw.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Jack Straw): I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The Second Deputy Chairman of Ways and Means (Mr. Michael Lord): With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 1—Breach of right to privacy—
'.—When a court finds that Article 8 (right to privacy) of the Convention has been breached and that save for the provisions of the Convention and this Act there is no other protection or remedy


available under United Kingdom law for the party complaining of the breach, the Court shall make a report to Parliament setting out the circumstances of the breach and the action which the Court proposes to take and proceedings shall be stayed until Parliament has debated the report.'.
New clause 7—Convention rights under Articles 8 and 10—
'.In any proceedings where a court has to adjudicate between—

(a) a claim that Convention rights under Article 8 (Right to respect for private and family life) have been infringed, and
(b) a claim for protection of Convention rights under Article 10 (Freedom of expression),
the court shall normally, and particularly where the right to impart or receive information about matters of public interest is at issue, give precedence to rights arising under Article 10.'.

Mr. Straw: With these new clauses we have an opportunity to debate the potential impact of the Human Rights Bill on the freedom of the press. The issue was debated at some length on different occasions in another place and in this House, particularly on Second Reading on 16 February. Today, I seek to explain to the Committee how Government new clause 13 fulfils the commitment that I gave on that occasion.
As the Committee will know, there was concern in some sections of the press that the Bill might undermine press freedom and result in a privacy law by the back door. That was not the Government's view. On the contrary, we have always believed that the Bill would strengthen rather than weaken the freedom of the press. In practice, the European convention on human rights has been used in Strasbourg to uphold press freedom against efforts by the state to restrict it. By virtue of clause 2 of the Bill, our courts will be required to take the Strasbourg case law into account. Therefore, we are bringing home not just the rights contained in the convention but the associated jurisprudence, including the importance that the European Court in Strasbourg over the years has attached to freedom of expression.
On Second Reading, I gave notice that I would place in the Library and make available to Opposition Members an abstract of various judgments made in the Strasbourg court, which spells out the extent to which that court time and again has come down in favour of press freedom as opposed to privacy and the right to family life. I know that Opposition Members will have read and digested the abstract and that that will elevate the standard of debate this afternoon.
We recognise the concerns expressed in the press. As I have made clear, for example in respect of the Bill's impact on the Churches, we are anxious, so far as is consistent with the framework of the Bill and, above all, with our obligations under the convention, to deal constructively with the concerns expressed about the Bill. In the light of those concerns, we decided to introduce a new clause specifically designed to safeguard press freedom. We thought long and hard about that, and Government new clause 13 is the result. It is an important new clause, and I shall go through its provisions in some detail.
Subsection (1) provides for the new clause to apply in any case where a court is considering granting relief—for example, an injunction restraining a threatened breach of confidence; but it could be any relief apart from that

relating to criminal proceedings—which might affect the exercise of the article 10 right to freedom of expression. It applies to the press, broadcasters or anyone whose right to freedom of expression might be affected. It is not limited to cases to which a public authority is a party. We have taken the opportunity to enhance press freedom in a wider way than would arise simply from the incorporation of the convention into our domestic law.
Subsection (2) provides that no relief is to be granted if the person against whom it is sought—the respondent—is not present or represented, unless the applicant has taken all practicable steps to notify the respondent or there are compelling reasons why the respondent should not be notified. The courts are well able to deal with the first limb of that exception relating to whether all practical steps have been taken to notify the respondent, and, in the case of broadcasting authorities and the press, rarely would an applicant not be able to serve notice of the proceedings on the respondent.
The latter circumstance—compelling reasons—might arise in a case raising issues of national security where the mere knowledge that an injunction was being sought might cause the respondent to publish the material immediately. We do not anticipate that that limb would be used often. In the past, such applications have been rare, but there has been at least one recent case involving the Ministry of Defence.
As I made clear on Second Reading, the provision is intended overall to ensure that ex parte injunctions are granted only in exceptional circumstances. Even where both parties are represented, we expect that injunctions will continue to be rare, as they are at present.
Subsection (3) provides that no relief is to be granted to restrain publication pending a full trial of the issues unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to succeed at trial. Among concerns expressed about the Bill's possible impact on freedom of the press, there was concern that interim injunctions—known in the trade as Friday night injunctions, as the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) will confirm; I do not doubt that he has been present in the courts on many Friday nights earning an honest crust—might be granted simply to preserve the status quo, with a view to a full hearing of the application later. However, by that time the story that was to be published might no longer be newsworthy. As I said earlier, time and again the convention jurisprudence reinforces the freedom of the press against, for example, the assertion of rights under article 8. One example of that is part of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the 1991 "Spycatcher" case. Dealing with the issue of interlocutory relief, the court said:
news is a perishable commodity and to delay its publication for even a short period may well deprive it of all its value and interest.
Given that, we believe that the courts should consider the merits of an application when it is made and should not grant an interim injunction simply to preserve the status quo ante between the parties.
I hope that this provision will strike a chord with the hon. and learned Member for Harborough, who said:
Reverting again to my own sphere of practice, the courts frequently have to balance the rights of a plaintiff who has been defamed or is about to be defamed and wants an injunction prior to publication, and the rights of the newspaper or potential defendant who says, 'I shall prove that what I say is true.' In those


circumstances, at an interlocutory stage, the judge says to the plaintiff, 'I am sorry, but the right to utter an untruth, if it proves to be so, takes precedence over your right to protect your reputation.' The injunction is not granted and the article is published."—[Official Report, 17 June 1998; Vol. 314, c. 426.]
The hon. and learned Gentleman was making the point that, even now, the courts are very reluctant to grant interlocutory relief preventing publication. I gather that in his experience, many more times than not, the courts will say, "I am sorry, but you will just have to take the alleged untruth on the chin and if you want relief later, you can seek damages."

Mr. Edward Garnier: I am grateful to the Home Secretary for advertising my practice. I am always grateful for any such small crumbs. I hope that that quotation is an accurate reflection of law and of practical experience. Many potential applications for interlocutory injunctions, whether during the day or late at night, are simply not made because the lawyers advising the plaintiffs anticipate that the defendant newspaper will argue that what is being said is true or partially true or that there is some other substantive defence. They tell their clients not to waste their time going to court because they will lose and have to pay the costs.

Mr. Straw: That is helpful. The hon. and learned Gentleman anticipates me. I was going to say that in drawing attention to his sphere of practice, we might be breaching the Bar Council's code on advertising, but I think that we should allow ourselves an exception in this case. People on either side of a defamation action would be well advised to seek his advice. He makes the important point that it is already difficult to get interlocutory relief. We are in a sense reinforcing that difficulty, for good reasons that I wholly defend, because of the importance of protecting the right to freedom of expression against other rights.

Mr. Peter Bottomley: I support the Home Secretary in what he is saying, but can he confirm that the provision will deal with the Maxwell abuse, where someone who has—or seems to have—a lot of money can intimidate others by the threat of interlocutory applications? Secondly, can he confirm that if there is a way for a potential plaintiff to serve notice on a publisher that what he is about to publish is untrue or in part untrue, it will be taken into account in post-publication action?

Mr. Straw: On the hon. Gentleman's first point about Maxwell intimidation, we believe that the new clause would protect a respondent potential publisher from what amounts to legal or legalised intimidation. We have already discussed the difficulty of getting interlocutory relief. It will be very difficult to get it unless the applicant can satisfy the court that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed. That is a much higher test than that there should simply be a prima facie case to get the matter into court.
To paraphrase, the second point of the hon. Member for Worthing, West (Mr. Bottomley) concerned a respondent who succeeded in preventing an injunction at the interlocutory stage and then published but it turned

Out that there had been some breach of the law. He asked whether that could be weighed in the balance in respect of damages.

Mr. Garnier: indicated assent.

Mr. Straw: The answer from someone much more learned than I is that it could be. We discussed exemplary damages in such situations earlier.

Mr. Garnier: And aggravated damages

Mr. Straw: I am grateful for my continuing education on the issue from the hon. and learned Gentleman. We should all be grateful for that advice because, after all, it is entirely free.

Mr. Garnier: Up to a point.

Mr. Straw: Up to a point, the hon. and learned Gentleman says.
I should at this point explain something that will not be known, with a bit of luck, to the hon. and learned Member for Harborough, but may be known to the two Liberal Democrat Members sitting below the Gangway. The existing law in this area in Scotland is different from that in England and Wales. The Scottish courts, in considering whether to grant an interim order restraining publication, will take account of the relative strengths of the case put forward by each party. A Scottish court would be unlikely to grant an interim order unless it was already satisfied that the applicant was likely to establish his case. Therefore, subsection (3) is technically unnecessary in Scotland. It remains true, however, that media activities cross the boundaries of the separate jurisdictions in the United Kingdom, as I rather famously know from my experience at Christmas. For that reason, and because it is right in principle, we believe that the safeguards for freedom of expression contained in the new clause should apply throughout the United Kingdom.
4.30 pm
Subsection (4) requires the court to have particular regard to the importance of the article 10 right to freedom of expression. Where the proceedings concern journalistic, literary or artistic material, the court must also have particular regard to the extent to which the material has, or is about to, become available to the public—in other words, a question of prior publication—and the extent to which publication would be in the public interest. If the court and the parties to the proceedings know that a story will shortly be published anyway, for example, in another country or on the internet, that must affect the decision whether it is appropriate to restrain publication by the print or broadcast media in this country.
Under subsection (4), the court must also have particular regard to any relevant privacy code. Depending on the circumstances, that could be the newspaper industry code of practice operated by the Press Complaints Commission, the Broadcasting Standards Commission code, the Independent Television Commission code, or a broadcaster's internal code such as that operated by the BBC. The fact that a newspaper has complied with the terms of the code operated by the


PCC—or conversely, that it has breached the code—is one of the factors that we believe the courts should take into account in considering whether to grant relief.

Mr. Dominic Grieve: I am sorry to take the right hon. Gentleman back slightly, but would he care to amplify on the definition of "the public interest", which is a critical phrase in subsection (4)(a)(ii) of the new clause?

Mr. Straw: I was hoping not to have my brain exercised in such a challenging way. The courts are well versed in making judgments about the balance between a private interest of an applicant before them and the wider public interest. That is inherent in any case in a clash between article 10 and article 8. It is also inherent in the way in which the courts until now have dealt with many issues surrounding proceedings for defamation. The European convention and the European Court of Human Rights have devoted quite a lot of time and effort to developing the concept of the public interest. Without being too tautologous, one of the points of the public interest is, to quote the words of the Strasbourg court in Handyside v. the United Kingdom in 1976, that
freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, one of the basic conditions for its progress, and for the development of every man"—
and these days, I have no doubt, every woman. That is a brief sketch of a subject on which I have every confidence in the courts' ability to make good judgments in particular cases.

Mr. Peter Bottomley: I am grateful to the Home Secretary for allowing me to intervene a second time. On the subject of privacy codes, one of the interesting questions that need to be put to publishers, proprietors and editors is: what are their own standards that their own staff are supposed to meet? Obviously, there are times when, in the public interest, they have to investigate—to act like a vacuum cleaner and suck up the dirt—in order to discover what is right and justifiable to print. They do not have an easy job, but, instead of relying solely on the Press Complaints Commission code or the similar requirements for broadcasters, will the Home Secretary confirm that all such organisations ought to have their own standards about which their own staff and freelances know; that those standards should be made public; and that if, when challenged, it is shown that they have fallen below their own standards, as well as below the standards of the PCC or the broadcasting authorities, that would class as a "relevant privacy code" under the legislation?

Mr. Straw: First, the hon. Gentleman asserts that all those organisations ought to have their own privacy code. I understand his point, but I do not think that it is up to us to assert that an individual private newspaper ought to have its own privacy code. However, it is very much in newspapers' interests to have such a code, because otherwise they would not get the benefit of the relevant limb, which is subsection (4)(b) of the new clause.
Secondly, I would point out that national newspapers and those belonging to the regional newspaper associations are all members of the Press Complaints Commission; therefore, they have signed up to the PCC code, which, as far as I am aware, is the strongest and certainly the most public press code available. It may well

be that other newspapers, both those within and those outside the PCC framework, have their own codes on staff conduct. Plainly, the higher the conduct required, the better for the public and—this is why the provision creates a virtuous circle—the better the defence available under the new clause to a newspaper, should it be subject to an application for relief, for example, under article 8.

Mr. Martin Linton: While my right hon. Friend is still on the subject of subsection (4)(a)(i), I should be grateful if he clarified the exact meaning of the material that is, or is about to become, available to the public; and whether that word "public" would have a geographical limitation. This is a "Spycatcher" clause and the argument used in the "Spycatcher" case was that the material was available to the public in any country other than the United Kingdom. In the only similar case—the one involving my right hon. Friend, to which he referred—the argument used was that the material was available to newspaper readers in Scotland. However, if the term "public" was interpreted in a very narrow way, such arguments might fail.

Mr. Straw: There is no direct qualification to the word "public" in the new clause. Ultimately, it would be a matter for the courts to decide, based on common sense and proportionality. The fact that the information was available across the globe in very narrow circumstances would not be weighed in the balance. The fact that, in the situation in which I was involved at Christmas, the information was fully public in newspapers in Scotland and, by virtue of that fact, available in newspapers on sale at every London railway terminus and airport, made the notion of protection by an injunction issued in courts covering only England and Wales rather risible. The courts would be bound to take such facts into account. As I said earlier, they would also take into account the extent to which the information was available in another country or on the internet, but in each case, the courts would have to apply balance and proportionality.
The reference in the new clause to
conduct connected with such material
is intended for cases where journalistic inquiries suggest the presence of a story, but no actual material yet exists—perhaps because the story has not yet been written.
Subsection (5) provides that references to a court include references to a tribunal, and that references to relief include references to any remedy or order, other than in criminal proceedings. We drafted the amendment with civil, rather than criminal, proceedings against the media in mind. Without such an exclusion, judges wanting to impose reporting restrictions in a criminal trial would, for example, have to consider any relevant privacy code, although plainly it would not be appropriate in that context.
Nevertheless, as public authorities, the criminal courts will of course, in the same way as other courts, be required not to act in a way that is incompatible with articles 8 and 10 and other convention rights. The special provision that we are making in new clause 13 does not therefore exempt criminal courts from the general obligations imposed by other provisions of the Bill. However, had we included criminal proceedings under new clause 13, we would have made the running of criminal trials very complicated.
I hope that the Committee found that explanation useful. I shall now make some general points and then deal with the Opposition new clauses. Much of the debate on this issue in recent months has concerned the Press Complaints Commission. Indeed, amendments were tabled that would have exempted it from the public authority provisions of the Bill.
As the Committee will know, we did not consider that the idea of exempting any particular organisation from the provisions of the Bill would have been consistent with the scheme of the Bill. Indeed, it could have been inconsistent with the convention as well. In any event, new clause 13 seems to us a better and more thorough response to the concerns that have been expressed.
As the regulator of the newspaper industry, the PCC has an obvious interest in any amendment to safeguard the freedom of the press. As I explained on Second Reading, Lord Williams of Mostyn and I had been involved in detailed discussions about that with the chairman of the PCC, Lord Wakeham, and we reached an understanding on a framework for amending the Bill.
The new clause was drafted in consultation with Lord Wakeham and representatives of the national and regional press. They have given it a warm welcome, as Lord Wakeham made clear in a statement earlier today. I am grateful to him for having said:
I warmly welcome it"—
the new clause—
as I know does the newspaper industry—and am grateful for the skilful way the Government has dealt with the potential problems.
The Government have always made clear our support for effective self-regulation as administered by the Press Complaints Commission under its code of practice. We have also said that we have no plans to introduce legislation creating a general law of privacy. On the question of prior restraint, our intention, as I said in the House on 16 February, is that the thresholds that the new clause sets will mean that interlocutory injunctions should be granted ex parte only in the most exceptional of circumstances.
Similarly, on self-regulation, the new clause provides an important safeguard by emphasising the right to freedom of expression. Our intention is that that should underline the consequent need to preserve self-regulation. That effect is reinforced by highlighting in the amendment the significance of any relevant privacy code, which plainly includes the code operated by the PCC.
I am glad that we have been able to frame an amendment that reflects the Government's stated commitment to the maintenance of a free, responsible press, and the consequent need for self-regulation, while maintaining the protection of the convention that all our citizens should, and do, enjoy.
I have explained the effect that we want to achieve with our new clause. If, for any reason, it does not work as we envisage, and press freedom appears at risk, we shall certainly want to look again at the issue. I shall now deal briefly with the Opposition new clauses.
New clause 1 would provide that if a court finds a breach of article 8—the article concerning the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence—for which domestic law apart from the

Bill provides no remedy, the court must give Parliament a report setting out the circumstances of the breach and the action that it proposes to take. The court proceedings would be adjourned until Parliament had debated the report.
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I assume that that is intended to discourage the courts from developing a law of privacy on the sole basis of article 8's being given further effect in domestic law. But I must tell the Opposition that there are several difficulties in such an amendment, although of course I understand why it has been put forward as a vehicle for a debate about the connection between the development of the common law and that of the statutory law.
First, such an amendment would not prevent the courts from developing a law of privacy through the existing common law, for example by developing the law on breach of confidence, which has advanced to quite a degree over the past three decades. Secondly, the requirement to adjourn proceedings pending parliamentary consideration of a court report would add to delays in the court system. Thirdly, there is no provision for what is to happen after Parliament has debated the report. In particular, there would be nothing to prevent the court from proceeding to grant a remedy for a breach of article 8.
Fourthly, and above all, I urge the Committee to recognise a profound error in the thinking behind new clause 7, which collides with a fundamental pillar of our constitution—the separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature. It is one of the bases of the rule of law that the courts should be able to say whatever they want, even if that is inconvenient or unacceptable to Members of Parliament and Ministers. So long, but only so long, as the courts are willing to show that independence, can there be a democracy and the rule of law in this country, or in any other country.
To interweave the legislature and the judiciary would lead judges to think, "My intellect, wisdom and sense of public purpose require me to do one thing, but on the other hand I have Parliament looking over my shoulder suggesting that I do something else." That seems to me unacceptable, so I hope that the Opposition will not press that point too far.
New clause 7 would provide that in a case where a court had to decide between a claim under article 8 and a claim under article 10, it should normally give precedence to the article 10 rights. That would be especially so in connection with the right to impart or receive information about matters of public interest.
The difficulty with that new clause is that it goes further than the terms of the convention and Strasbourg case law. Nothing in the convention suggests that any one right is normally to be given precedence over any other right. The courts will need to balance the competing claims and come to a decision on the facts of each case, taking account of any relevant Strasbourg case law. Although the European Court of Human Rights has stressed the great importance attaching to the right to freedom of expression, it has not gone as far as new clause 7 would go.
I remind the Opposition that the same issue arose on the question of how far we could protect the position of the Church under new clause 9, which the Committee has


approved. Then, we said that where an issue of the exercise of religious freedom under the convention came up, the court should have particular regard to the importance of that right. That is exactly what we are saying in subsection (4) of new clause 13; we use the phrase "particular regard".
So far as we are able, in a manner consistent with the convention and its jurisprudence, we are saying to the courts that whenever there is a clash between article 8 rights and article 10 rights, they must pay particular attention to the article 10 rights. I think that that is as far as we could go, and I hope that, on consideration, the Opposition will think so, too. We must strike a balance, and we believe that in new clause 13 we have got the balance right.
I repeat that I am extremely grateful to Lord Wakeham and his colleagues for all the consideration that they have given to helping us to achieve what I believe is a proper balance.

Sir Norman Fowler: As the Home Secretary said, new clause 13 is important; as he also mentioned, we have tabled new clauses of our own on the same subject. I begin by declaring an interest, as I did earlier, as non-executive chairman of Regional Independent Media, which publishes newspapers in both Yorkshire and Lancashire.
The only difference between the Home Secretary and me concerns the relative merits of the Lancashire Evening Post and the Lancashire Evening Telegraph. I shall try to educate the right hon. Gentleman about the former; I know that he is familiar with the latter.
The new clause is not exclusively about newspapers. Just as important, it covers broadcasting and any other areas where the right to freedom of expression may be affected. This is not remotely to do with party politics. I acknowledge that there are differing views in both our parties—I say that to protect myself at the outset from my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier).
The Government have repeatedly said—this is my first general point—that they do not intend to introduce a general law of privacy. The Home Secretary has stated that the Government do not accept that there is a case for general legislation on the matter. Others would take a different view; as it happens, mine is the same as the Home Secretary's. There are hon. Members who believe that we need a new law—there have been a range of attempts to introduce one over the past 10 years. We can all agree—whatever our stance on a general law of privacy—that we should not like a new privacy law to come in by accident, by mistake, or by the back door.
It is one thing to set out proposals openly and for debate; it is quite another to slip through regulations without their full consequences being understood.
Clause 1 sets out the European convention rights that are given effect by the legislation—including article 8, which concerns respect for private and family life. That article states that a public authority should not, except in certain exceptional circumstances, interfere with the exercise of a right to that respect: in other words, it is the right of privacy.
Article 10, by contrast, sets out a right to freedom of expression and to publish information. Clearly, a balance must be struck between the two rights. The right to free speech and free reporting is, after all, basic in a democratic society.
When last we debated this issue in Committee, I offered the example of Mrs. Maclean, the wife of the traitor Donald Maclean who disappeared to Russia with Burgess. When she was left behind, the Daily Express watched her and was roundly condemned for that alleged intrusion on her privacy. In the end, however, she did exactly what the newspaper thought she would, and disappeared behind the iron curtain. That is perhaps an extreme example of the possible clash between the privacy of the individual and a newspaper's freedom to report.
That is why new clause 7 tries to inject some certainty, by stating that a court shall,
where the right to impart or receive information about matters of public interest is at issue, give precedence to rights arising under Article 10.
That is a rather broad-brush approach, and I do not intend to press the new clause—but we wanted to set out our view.
My second general point is that clause 6 makes it unlawful
for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right.
The Home Secretary, not entirely without reason, glossed over this part of the debate. What is and what is not a public authority is crucial, but we have been subjected to a bewildering range of Government advice on that— [Interruption.] I note that the right hon. Gentleman is looking for his folder, so I shall give him time to look up what he needs.
On Second Reading in another place, the Minister, Lord Williams of Mostyn, said that he anticipated that the BBC would be a public authority, that Channel 4 might be one, and that commercial television might not be. Even more dramatically, the Lord Chancellor proceeded on the basis that the Press Complaints Commission was not a public authority and was therefore not covered.
According to The Guardian—the Home Secretary and I are both devoted readers—the Lord Chancellor dismissed with contempt any argument against his stance, in particular the protests of the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport. He did so on the ground that the Secretary of State was only a layman, whereas the Lord Chancellor was an experienced lawyer. As it happened, the layman was right; I can only hope that his victory will serve him well in the forthcoming reshuffle. I doubt whether it will, but he deserves credit for being right on this issue.

Mr. Straw: rose—

Sir Norman Fowler: The Home Secretary is coming to the aid of the Lord Chancellor.

Mr. Straw: As the Committee will know, even Homer nodded. It shows the Lord Chancellor's generosity of spirit that he came back and said that, on further consideration, his initial view had been incorrect, and there was
a disposition on the part of the Courts to regard the PCC as a 'public authority'."—[Official Report, House of Lords, 24 November 1997; Vol. 583, c. 784.]


As to our interpretation of clause 6—the acts of public authorities—I can say without exaggeration that my postbag has been almost full of compliments for the exquisite clarity with which I presented an interpretation of how clause 6 would operate—

Jane Kennedy: Hear, hear.

Mr. Straw: I look forward to more such letters arriving by the hour. I believe that the right hon. Gentleman will ultimately accept that clause 6 is the best and more workable definition of public authorities that we could achieve.

Sir Norman Fowler: "Exquisite clarity" is not exactly the phrase that comes to my mind, but I acknowledge that the Lord Chancellor admitted that he had made a mistake. On 18 November, he said, having previously said precisely the opposite, that it was possible that the Press Complaints Commission would, after all, be held to be a public authority under the Bill when it became law. An opinion given to the PCC by David Pannick QC had persuaded him that it probably would be. That confirms, of course, that the Lord Chancellor made a spectacular legal U-turn.
Now, after several months of rather tortuous progress, we can all agree that the PCC is indeed a public authority and will be covered, joining other organisations such as the BBC.
That brings me to my third general point. The Government had two possible ways of extricating themselves. They could try to define which organisations were covered and which were not. In Committee, the Opposition tabled an amendment to have some light shed on that. Alternatively, the Government could table a new clause that sought to govern the operation of the legislation—which is what the Home Secretary has done today. I welcome that. The new clause tabled by the Home Secretary is important and takes us forward in the debate.
Government new clause 13 emphasises the importance of the convention right to freedom of expression. That was also the purpose of our new clause 7, so we welcome the Government's proposal. It is right that we should preserve the present position and guard the freedom of speech and freedom to report. It should be stressed that the new clause does not apply just to the press. We tend to conduct the debate as if only newspapers were affected, but it applies also to broadcasting organisations—television and radio.

Mr. Garnier: Should we not also bear in mind the fact that the debate also applies to ordinary members of the public, who have the right to express themselves?

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Sir Norman Fowler: Indeed; the debate goes very wide. It has tended to concentrate exclusively on the press. I am delighted that everyone thinks so highly of newspapers, but it should be recognised that other forms of media also report, expose and reveal. If we had named the Press Complaints Commission as an exempt body, that might have helped the press, but it would have done

nothing for television or radio reporting. However, the Government and the PCC, which provided help, have found a useful way through.
The Government's new clause requires courts, when judging what is justifiable or unjustifiable, to take account of any relevant privacy code. I hope that the Home Secretary will confirm my understanding that although broadcasting and the press will be covered, they will not necessarily be covered by exactly the same rules, for the good reason that the privacy code operated by the Press Complaints Commission can be different in some respects from the code operating in broadcasting.
Perhaps that difference is more apparent than real. The PCC states:
Everyone is entitled to respect for his or her private and family life, home, health and correspondence. A publication will be expected to justify intrusions into any individual's private life without consent.
The public interest is the exception, and includes
detecting or exposing crime…protecting public health and safety.
Many of those conditions are repeated in the Broadcasting Standards Commission's code, which states:
An infringement of privacy has to be justified by an overriding public interest in disclosure of the information.
It also mentions detecting crime, disreputable behaviour, protecting public health or safety, and so on.
I welcome the Government's proposal to tighten the law on interim injunctions. It cannot be right in principle, as my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing, West (Mr. Bottomley) pointed out, that a system can be used to prevent the truth from being told—I fear that that is sometimes intended—provided that a person is wealthy enough and legally well advised. I shall leave it to my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough to elaborate.
Other questions need to be asked. Our new clause 1, which we shall not press, was designed to allow us to examine the possibility that a law of privacy will be developed by the courts in any event. I should prefer any such attempt to be straightforward and open. The Government do not favour a law of privacy. How will they respond if one is developed for them by the courts? It is predicted by none other than the Lord Chancellor that that will happen.
Another question arises from an interview given by the Lord Chancellor to the New Statesman in February. He advocated that the Press Complaints Commission should develop a mechanism for prior restraint—in other words, that the PCC should order a paper not to publish under certain circumstances. It is certainly not a power which the PCC wants; I could put that much more strongly. Will the Home Secretary take the opportunity to say that that is no part of the Government's plans?
Assuming that the Home Secretary can satisfy us on that, I am content with his new clause, which meets the concerns that we have expressed and were eloquently expressed in the other place. I share the right hon. Gentleman's belief in the system of self-regulation—for example, the Press Complaints Commission. We underestimate the effect that such a system, and the prospect of an investigation, has on the working journalist. That was true when I was a working journalist years ago, in the days of the Press Council, and it is true today.
It must always be remembered that the task of a newspaper is to reveal and expose. At the best, it exposes criminals and fraudsters. At the worst, it can reveal issues that seem to have no true public interest. Making a judgment against publication and about what is or is not in the wider public interest is full of peril.
In conclusion, I shall tell a story entirely against myself. In 1966, when I was a journalist, I was writing a series of articles on prisons for The Times. I visited Dartmoor prison, where there was nothing for me to do at lunchtime, so I went out on to the moors and ate my sandwich in one of the fields there. My attention was taken by a man working alone in a field near my parked car. He was a giant of a man. When I returned to the prison, I mentioned my lunchtime companion. There were knowing looks, and finally one of the senior staff said, "For goodness' sake don't report that. That's Frank Mitchell, the mad axeman. He has been in prison half his life, and we think we are getting him to the point when he can be released."
Mitchell had been sentenced to life imprisonment in 1958 for robbery with violence. He was only 29, and he had been under some form of restriction since the age of nine. I had a choice. I could have reported the story, and I guarantee that the rest of Fleet street would have followed it, or I could have taken the advice of the prison staff who knew Mitchell best, and whose view was that it would have done infinite harm to his rehabilitation for that to be reported. I chose not to report that story.
Ten weeks later, in December 1966, Mitchell escaped or, more accurately, was taken by several others. He was never seen again. Three years later, the Kray twins and several others stood accused of his murder. They were found not guilty, but one person was found guilty of helping the escape. The theory was that when the hue and cry got too hot, the man was killed. There is no question but that Frank Mitchell was killed and has never been seen since.
The totally detached journalist would have written the story and not concerned himself with the consequences. As it turned out, that would have been very much in the interests of the unfortunate Mr. Frank Mitchell. My conclusion is that function of the press is to report, to reveal and to expose. We will get into all kinds of difficulties if we interfere with the freedom to report. With that in mind, I welcome the Government's proposal. I shall certainly support the new clause.

Mr. Clive Soley: I shall be brief. I am very interested in the proposed new clause 13, and I welcome it. The Home Secretary will know that we have worked long and hard to try to balance privacy with freedom of the press, and this is as good a chance of success as we are likely to get.
I welcome the Government's efforts, because we are beginning to piece together several laws that protect both freedom of the press and individuals' rights. The Data Protection Bill—which we shall consider later—protects the public by requiring accuracy in the press. Members of the public will have the right to view the files held on them by the press—which might result in some 650 Members of Parliament queueing outside editors' offices on the day that the legislation comes into force.
I do not share the Home Secretary's confidence that voluntary regulation will work—it has always seemed to me to be a triumph of hope over experience. However,

as I should like it to work, I am more than willing to give it a shot. I am anxious about balancing articles 8 and 10 of the European Court and how they will deal with the ordinary cases that appear in the press. The Opposition spokesman, the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Sir N. Fowler), referred to such a case.
We often talk about privacy only in terms of how it relates to the late Princess Diana, a famous film star or a famous politician. The reality is that only a minority of complaints to the Press Complaints Commission deal with privacy. It is also important to appreciate that many of the most serious abuses involve ordinary people, not the rich and the powerful. I am fairly relaxed if a person in a powerful position who is used to dealing with the media gets a rough ride, not because that is necessarily just, but because it is difficult to intervene in such a case.
I shall describe several test cases. The first involves the helicopter winchman who, in January this year, rescued nine people from a sinking freighter off the Shetland Islands. Unfortunately, after he had landed the last sailor, he was swept to his death by a giant wave. That man's son was hounded by the press and surrounded by photographers, and he made a rather desperate plea to be allowed to grieve in peace. That is a classic case for enforcing article 8, which protects family rights, in order to allow the son to grieve properly.
The individual's rights must be balanced against press freedom, but I should have thought that a court would rule in favour of family rights in such a case. I ask the Minister not to reach a conclusion about that case, but to confirm whether I am correct in thinking that people who are the target of that sort of harassment and invasion of privacy would be able to go to a local court and invoke their right indirectly, through the human rights legislation—perhaps it may be necessary to provide legal aid in such cases—to stop that harassment and invasion of privacy during the grieving period prior to a funeral.
That first case is about expense and access to the courts by an individual who is caught up in tragic circumstances. The most typical cases of that type involve people who have been recently bereaved in rather dramatic circumstances and who are not public figures. They are the people about whom I am interested.
I have grouped together several other cases involving people who cannot act for themselves. On 5 May this year, the Daily Mirror published details of expenditure at a prison shop by a well-known notorious criminal, who is currently serving a sentence in Broadmoor secure hospital for a number of murders and is a recluse and a psychotic. The newspaper had obtained those details from another prisoner, which was, in itself, a questionable operation. Although the man did not spend very much money—he purchased bars of chocolate, toothpaste and things of that nature, which amounted to only a few pounds—the story concluded that, because the man was receiving benefit, like all patients in secure hospitals, all other benefits in his savings account should be taken from him and given to his victims.
Leaving aside the argument about whether we should put criminals in a particular category and not give them any benefits, the case involved a prisoner in a secure hospital, who was therefore a patient under the Mental Health Act 1983 and had a right to privacy. Who will intervene on a person's behalf and call into question the balance between articles 8 and 10 in such a case?
5.15 pm
There are equally difficult cases involving children. It is unacceptable that children are frequently caught up in similar situations. On 7 May this year, the Daily Mail named a four-year-old child, whose photograph appeared on the front page of that paper, in the context of a story about the child's grandmother who had had the child's mother sent to prison. From my understanding of the story, the grandmother probably took the right action: the mother was involved in drugs, and so on. However, I question the newspaper's judgment in putting the name and photograph of that child on the front page. As I have said before, the last thing that a small child needs is for a mass circulation tabloid to print his or her name and photograph on its front page announcing that the child's grandmother had sent the mother to prison.
Who will intervene in such cases? The grandmother was clearly not prepared to do so in that case—perhaps she was poorly advised about the role of the media in that situation. Children must receive some protection, and I believe that article 8 will address that problem. That protection must be balanced against press freedom and, as the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield said, it is a delicate balance.
I suspect that the Minister will respond by saying that the solution involves case-made law, and he is probably right. However, the purpose of my intervention is to flag the importance of ensuring access to the law by people who are often on low incomes, who may be inarticulate and who, above all, are not experienced in handling the media and do not know about available remedies. Those people need the protection of article 8, and the courts must look carefully at privacy and the needs of family life when judging such cases.
We should not confuse those cases—as has occurred too often in the past—with the rights of the great, the powerful and the rich to privacy and freedom of the press. We must focus on the everyday cases that appear in so many tabloid newspapers. At present, ordinary people cannot get protection of the type that I hope the proposed new clause will provide. I think that it will meet that need, but any information that the Minister can provide in his winding-up speech will be welcomed by those who might wish to consider this discussion if they find themselves in similar circumstances.

Mr. Garnier: I begin, as I did on another occasion, by declaring my interest as a practitioner at the Bar in this area of law. However, that is perhaps not necessary, given that my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Sir N. Fowler) and the Home Secretary have declared it for me. I fear that my colleagues in chambers will snigger when they read the Hansard—if they get around to it—and see the kind things that the Home Secretary and my right hon. Friend have said about my prowess as a lawyer. However, I shall leave it there and bask in the glory, for what it is worth.
The Home Secretary said at the outset that some people feared that the Bill would undermine press freedom, but he went on to say that proposed new clause 13 would enhance press freedom. He cited the agreement of my noble Friend Lord Wakeham, the chairman of the Press Complaints Commission, as evidence of that. The noble Lord has certainly welcomed the new clause, but whether it necessarily follows that it is a good thing is another

matter altogether. I do not have any huge or principled objections to new clause 13. I suggest, rather offensively, that it may do a little good and some harm—although I accept not very much.
My main point is that I am not sure that the new clause is altogether necessary. I shall not encourage anyone to vote against it, if that assists the Home Secretary and my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield, but I sometimes become wary about undue cross-party cosiness when there are questions that should be tested with rigour. In the debate on the Crime and Disorder Bill, I made that point about anti-social behaviour orders, about which there seemed to be perfectly sensible cross-party agreement. I thought it right to tease out one or two issues then, and I hope that the Committee will forgive me if I have another go on this question.
The hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush (Mr. Soley), to give him his new title—

Mr. Straw: My hon. Friend represented Hammersmith, North when I was first elected.

Mr. Garnier: How times have changed. In those days, of course, many things were different, as the Home Secretary will no doubt remember.
The hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush, in his own way, highlighted the point that the press often forget, find it convenient to forget, or fail to distinguish between two separate concepts: what is the public interest or in the public interest, and what is interesting to the public. From time to time, they defend stories that are of no genuine public interest but which they reckon will sell a lot of newspapers—stories that are interesting to the public. We should be aware of that point, and the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush put his finger on it by drawing certain cases to our attention.
We occasionally consider such cases in our pastoral role as Members of Parliament, when we assist our constituents, but when we come to Westminster and enter the Chamber, we suddenly put on a different overcoat—that of a very important person—and think that the press should pay particular attention to our rights. However, it is more important for Members of Parliament to protect the interests of their constituents—the small people who do not have access to expensive lawyers and who need us to protect their interests against the big battalions. I applaud the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush for making that point.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield and the Home Secretary said that this issue is to do with not only the press in the widest sense—I include within that ambit the electronic media such as television and radio—but the rights of expression of ordinary citizens, to which the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush referred. I hope that we can protect those rights, just as much as I hope that we can construct a suitable balance between the rights of the press, and our rights and the rights of other citizens.
I shall briefly outline what I think is the current state of the law with regard to libel and confidence. They represent the two most easily available courses of action available under the common law which the new clause attempts to bolster. In respect of libel, there are already rules of sufficient quality to protect defendants—potential


publishers—because, first, the plaintiff must show that what the defendant intends to publish is, with reasonable certainty, capable of being defined. The plaintiff could not go to a judge and say, "I fear that someone is going to say something nasty about me." He would have to persuade the court that particular defamatory allegations were about to be published, so, much as I would sometimes like it to be the case, there would not be, for example, a blanket injunction saying, "Don't talk about Edward Garnier in tomorrow's paper—that won't do."
Secondly, the plaintiff must show that what the defendant intends to publish is plainly defamatory of him. In that respect, the Home Secretary was kind enough to recount something that I said last week. If the defendant said to the judge, "I will justify it and prove it to be true," or said that he would rely on another substantive defence such as qualified privilege or fair comment, the judge would say, "That does not permit the granting of an interim injunction." It is my understanding that the blanket rule can be overcome only if the judge is persuaded at the interlocutory hearing that those defences—justification, or qualified privilege or fair comment—are bound to fail. Indeed, it is rare for a judge to reach a conclusion of that sort on affidavit. Such matters are normally left to the constitutional tribunal of fact—the trial.
Thirdly, the plaintiff must normally notify a defendant of his application and, if the defendant does not attend the hearing, should tell the court what he genuinely believes the defendant's position to be. I have been at this game for 20 or 25 years and, in my experience, it is unheard of for a person to go to a judge's house to try a Friday night job without expecting him to say, "What will the defendant respond to your application? Will he say that it is true, or that he does not intend to publish what you think that he is going to say?" The plaintiff would be tested, and I am not entirely convinced that new clause 13 does any more than is already provided.
With all the diffidence at my command, I suggest that the new clause adds nothing in practice, except perhaps the imposition of an obligation on the court to express a view about the ultimate merits of an application before trial. Indeed, the Home Secretary was candid enough to make that clear when he went through new clause 13(3), referring to the words:
No such relief is to be granted so as to restrain publication before trial unless the court is satisfied that the applicant is likely to establish that publication should not be allowed.
He translated that into "likely to succeed at trial". Out of the mouth of the Home Secretary came a requirement on the tribunal to reach at an early stage—when evidence is broadly unformulated and the issues not entirely defined—a pretty firm conclusion about the result of the trial.
In respect of confidentiality, the current rules provide sufficient protection to a defendant because, first, a plaintiff must satisfy the court that what is intended to be published is confidential and, secondly, an injunction would not be granted if the public interest in disclosure was significantly strong or the information was already in the public domain. If the plaintiff discharges the first of those criteria, and the defendant cannot satisfy the court about the second, the injunction serves to protect the confidence until the trial, which can, in appropriate cases, be expedited.
When discussing the granting of an injunction in a confidence case, the former Master of the Rolls, Lord Donaldson of Lymington, deliberately used the pun, "Confidential information is rather like a block of ice: once it is exposed to the full glare of the sun, it melts." We should be careful about exposing potential plaintiffs' rights to the protection accorded to confidential information where such information would lose its value if publication were not restrained. That is the obverse of the Home Secretary's point about newsworthy stories: if such stories are restrained, they can lose their newsworthiness and the value of publishing can be lost over a few hours or a weekend. We have to do a little more than worry about the newsworthiness of newspaper stories and the concerns of editors to beat the competition to a particular exciting story. To come back to the point made by the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush, we are also here to protect the interests of the small man.
My third point on the question of confidentiality is that the new clause involves a full trial of the issues on the application, which in many respects can be practically impossible, and the risk is that the subject matter of the action will be destroyed before trial. It may turn out after a full investigation that the plaintiff was right all along. It will be little comfort to him in six months' time if the full trial agrees that the information was confidential and should not have been disclosed. What use is that to the plaintiff? By virtue of clauses 2 and 6, the court will, in any event, have to have regard to jurisprudence under articles 8 and 10 of the convention in dealing with such applications. Can the Home Secretary persuade me that the new clause does not conflict with article 8 by preventing the courts from protecting article 8 rights before trial? That matter concerns me a little, but I am sure that the Home Secretary can resolve my doubts in his usual way.
Mention was made of the existing law and of articles 8 and 10. I have not yet seen, as I should have, the paper that the Home Secretary has placed in the Library of the House, but if it is based on the learning in a text book written by Toulson and Phipps, I probably know what it says.

Mr. Straw: It is Deposit 6042, which I placed in the Library of the House on Second Reading. I have a copy before me and further copies are available in the Library.

Mr. Garnier: I am amazed at the Home Secretary's command of command numbers—

Mr. Straw: It is a deposit.

Mr. Garnier: I shall not worry about the Home Secretary's deposits. I simply repeat my confession that I have not read it. However, if it says what I suspect that it says, it contains a lot of wise words.
Although the convention has not yet been domesticated—or, to use the Home Secretary's words, deposited—within British statute law, the courts are increasingly taking into account the jurisprudence of the European Court in so far as it deals with articles 8 and 10. The Home Secretary will know of the case of the Crown


v. Khan and the wise words of the, sadly, late Chief Justice Lord Taylor. He said that from the authorities that he cited,
it is clear that it is permissible to have regard to the Convention, which is of persuasive assistance, in cases of ambiguity or doubt. In the circumstances of the present case the position is neither ambiguous or doubtful; nor is it incumbent on us to consider whether there was a breach of article 8, and we do not propose to do so.
Thus, the Court of Criminal Appeal took a flexible and sensible approach to the jurisprudence of the European Court, despite the fact that it was not part of English domestic law.
In article 10 cases, the Court of Appeal in the House of Lords has again taken a sensible approach to making use of European Court jurisprudence. In the case of Rantzen v. Mirror Group Newspapers in 1986, Lord Justice Neill noted that the courts had no power to enforce convention rights directly, but might refer to the convention for assistance to resolve an ambiguity in English legislation or when considering the exercise of a discretion. He went on to say:
Where freedom of expression is at stake, however, recent authorities lent support for the proposition that article 10 has a wider role and can be properly be regarded as an articulation of some of the principles underlying the common law.
As my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) would be the first to admit, there is an awful lot of good in the convention, of which we need not be frightened, and I am not. All I am saying is that, by virtue of the sensible way in which our common law has developed with the assistance of the convention, we may not need new clause 13 because it does no more than what we are already doing. If the Home Secretary can persuade me that it is not simply a gesture—I see the Home Secretary shake his head disapprovingly. If he can persuade me that the new clause is not being inserted in the Bill simply to placate my noble Friend Lord Wakeham and the barons, big and small, of the press, I shall be grateful to him.

Mr. Straw: The Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. O'Brien), will wind up the debate. The new clause is no sense a gesture. Anyone who reads it can see that it provides important substantive and procedural safeguards for those seeking to rely on article 10 rights.

Mr. Garnier: I am always happy to take the Home Secretary at his word and, during the Bill's proceedings, my happiness to do so has increased. I accept his assurance that the new clause is not simply a gesture, although I am still not entirely sure that it is strictly necessary. I have no quarrel with the message underlying the new clause, even if it is not a gesture. If it is of any comfort to anybody, I shall not invite the Committee to divide on it.
I wish to anticipate some remarks that may be made by the hon. Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton). He was concerned about the use of the word "public" in subsection (4)(a)(i), which says:
the extent to which…the material has, or is about to, become available to the public".
He may find help from the wise words of the noble and learned Lord Bridge in a case that involves his former employer, the publishers of The Guardian, in the

"Spycatcher" case. Those Committee members who took an interest in that aspect of press freedom will remember that the House of Lords upheld the then Attorney-General's application for an injunction to restrain the publication of information that was confidential to the Government. However, Lord Bridge gave a powerful dissenting judgment. He was dealing with information that was made available to the public outside the jurisdiction of the court, and he said:
I can see nothing whatever, either in law or on the merits, to be said for the maintenance of a total ban on discussion in the press of this country of matters of undoubted public interest and concern which the rest of the world now knows all about and can discuss freely…The maintenance of a ban, as more and more copies of the book Spycatcher enter this country and circulate here, will seem more and more ridiculous. If the Government are determined to fight to maintain the ban to the end, they will face inevitable condemnation and humiliation by the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Long before that they will have been condemned at the bar of public opinion in the free world.
Lord Bridge, although in the minority in the Judicial Committee in the House of Lords, was proved rights because the European Court disapproved of the injunction and awarded The Guardian and its sister newspaper, The Observer, £100,000, and The Sunday Times £100,000. That underlines the humiliation point and goes some way towards answering the concerns of the hon. Member for Battersea about information that is in the public domain but not necessarily confined to the jurisdiction of our courts.
That is quite enough from me. The Home Secretary is getting fidgety and obviously wishes to leave. It was polite of him to remain in the Chamber to listen to my warblings. I hope that the Under-Secretary can allay some of my gentle fears that the new clause is unnecessary, albeit well intended.

Mr. Linton: I rise to support new clause 13 as someone who has never seen what is wrong with a law on privacy. The Home Secretary says that he is not in favour of a general law on privacy—and I accept that—but this proposal is a law about privacy, because it incorporates in our law the words of article 8 of the European convention, which guarantees privacy in people's private and family life and in their correspondence.
The Bill may not be solely about privacy, but it deals with the subject as I imagined a privacy Bill would do. Crucially, it determines where the principle of privacy ends and freedom of the press begins. By saying that the court must "have particular regard" to article 10, the new clause establishes, in the fairest possible way, a balance between article 8 on privacy and article 10 on freedom of the press. New clause 7 would put undue weight on one rather than on the other. Subsection (2)(a) and (b) of new clause 13 solve the problem of Maxwell-type ex parte injunctions, and subsection (4)(a) deals with the "Spycatcher" issue to which the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) referred. Subsection (4) brings the Press Complaints Commission within its ambit.
It has always surprised me that Lord Wakeham has been opposed to this measure. He has argued that self-regulation has been an unsung success story. Self-regulation of the press has been a success in the sense that it has defended the press against regulation for many years, but it has not been a success in protecting the public from the press.
I have never believed overly in self-regulation. Life is a jungle. I can conjure up a picture of the jungle in which it is decided that too many children from the neighbouring villages have been eaten by tigers and in which self-regulation is introduced. The high council of the jungle discusses how the restraint can be exercised. Baloo the bear says to Shere Khan, "Could you kindly eat a quota of babies next week? Do not eat too many. Restrain yourself a little."
The Press Complaints Commission is based on a similar principle, because it comprises the editors of several national newspapers, including the editors of the Daily Mail, until the recent death of Sir David English; The Sunday Times; The Sporting Life; and the Sunday Mail. In the recent past, it has included the editors of the Sunday People and the News of the World. I am not suggesting that any of those individuals are incapable of self-restraint, but the principle involved in self-regulation is strange, because it assumes that newspaper editors are the best people to protect the public against the press.
It also surprised me that Calcutt, at the end of his long inquiry, recommended against a privacy law, although he was in favour of a law against bugging, burgling and telephoto pictures. Eighteen months later, in the light of experience, when he reviewed his own report, he recognised that the Press Complaints Commission was not an effective regulator of the press and he recommended a statutory press complaints tribunal.
It is strange that many years after Calcutt came to that fair conclusion, so many people resisted that recommendation. Only 27 out of 3,023 cases before the PCC in 1996—the last year for which figures are available—were upheld. It cannot be maintained that such regulation is a success. I have been alarmed at the reluctance with which the press, and Lord Wakeham in particular, have conceded inch by inch that press regulation is inadequate. That has became more and more obvious, particularly in relation to events involving the royal family. A few days after the death of the Princess of Wales, Lord Wakeham said:
Motorbike chases, stalking and hounding are unacceptable",
as though he had just been driven to that conclusion. The PCC amended the privacy code to make it clearer that it was over-zealous to hound someone on a motorbike.
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According to opinion polls, almost 90 per cent. of the public favour a privacy law. As The Guardian, my former employer, said, this is a type of privacy Bill: it is not solely about privacy, but while Lord Wakeham, as the watchdog, has been guarding the patio doors, a privacy Bill has slipped through the cat flap. I am very glad that it will be on the statute book.
I do not have an interest as such to declare, but I have an interest in that the hon. and learned Member for Harborough and I have been, respectively, night lawyer and night reporter on The Guardian, and on many occasions we have been at the sharp end of the ethical dilemmas with which the Bill is intended to deal. It is 30 years since I first joined a national newspaper as a reporter. I—and many of my erstwhile colleagues—believe that, in that period, the ethical standards of the press have deteriorated alarmingly. Journalists are often portrayed as having no interest in the ethical standards of the press. It is true that, individually, they have an interest

in winkling out the facts, however damaging they may be to the person concerned, but journalists collectively have an important interest in ensuring that their professional standards are maintained and that people's privacy, especially the privacy of ordinary people, is not invaded for purely commercial interests.
Many of my former journalist colleagues will welcome the clarity of the new clause and the fact that it establishes the law of privacy as coequal with the freedom of the press. It is many years since the former Secretary of State for National Heritage said that they were nearly calling time at the last chance saloon. When he said that in 1991, he presumably meant that it was about 10.50 pm. Successive Secretaries of State have put back that deadline time and again, even though the problems of privacy and freedom of the press have deteriorated. By my reckoning, it is now about half-past five in the morning. I am sure that the Bill will be the moment at which we say, "Time gentlemen, please" in the last chance saloon.

Mr. Grieve: I find myself facing this debate with welcome surprise. At the start of the Bill's progress through Parliament, it seemed to me that this would be the great dust up. On Second Reading, there were expressions of great concern about the freedom of the press, the way in which the convention would impinge on it and the dreadful consequences that might flow for the historic liberties of the fourth estate that were thereby threatened. It seemed to exercise the minds of quite a few of my colleagues. In the light of the Government's response, I thought that I would have to comment on the fact that the Government were giving way to pressure from the fourth estate—of a kind other than the hon. Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton)—and were tinkering with the European convention on human rights by incorporating it in an undesirable fashion.
I am the first to be delighted that, in new clause 13, the Government have done nothing of the kind. Indeed, it seems that, for some magical reason, that tremendous canard—if I may use the phrase—has finally been dispelled. The convention—with or without new clause 13, as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) so perspicaciously identified—was never going to pose that extraordinary danger.
None the less, I welcome new clause 13, if only because it has succeeded in placating those who have made some of the more extreme comments about the way in which the convention will operate. The new clause is also wholly compatible with current practice, as my hon. and learned Friend correctly said. I do not think that it will tinker around with well-established principles—at least, I hope it will not.
The cosiness may be becoming too great, but I believe that, when the convention is incorporated—with the new clause to interpret it—it will provide a motor force for the gradual development of a law on privacy. I greatly welcome that, for precisely the reasons that have been cogently articulated by the hon. Member for Battersea and, in a very interesting speech, by the hon. Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush (Mr. Soley). Privacy rights need to be protected in this country, and we need to be able to strike a balance. That balance must preserve the freedom of the press to expose hypocrisy and criminal activity, but it must ensure that photographs of young children whose mother was sent to prison by the


grandmother's denunciation are not put on the front page. Those are precisely the excesses of press activity which a civilised society should abhor.
I have never believed that we need a privacy law, as I have always believed that, once the convention is incorporated, such a law will develop gradually and of its own accord—it will assume a civilised, measured and proper form. If it does not, doubtless Parliament will keep it under review—we may be able to help it on its way as and when necessary. I hope that such legislation will not be necessary, and that incorporation will focus minds on the balance between articles 8 and 10, which need to be reconciled if we are to remain a civilised society that respects the rights of individuals not to have their privacy wantonly trampled on.
I do not intend to take up much of the Committee's time. As I said, I had rather expected that I should have to remind the Government not to tinker around with the convention, but I am delighted that I do not have to. The Home Secretary is to be commended on new clause 13, which is well crafted, well reasoned and seems to meet the objections that were previously being raised. We shall keep the matter under review—it will be a subject of abiding interest to me and, I dare say, to a number of hon. Members on both sides of the Committee. As time goes by, we shall have to see whether it is achieving the desirable aim that I believe it can achieve.

Mr. Ross Cranston: I want to make a few remarks about the way in which the new clause reconciles the rights to freedom of speech and to the protection of private and family life. Both rights are important. Freedom of speech, in a way, encapsulates our vision of democracy; it is essential to our democratic procedures. If we do not have freedom of speech, we cannot operate our democratic mechanisms. The protection of private life involves a range of concerns—our rights, for example, to individual autonomy, to reputation, to the protection of private information and to an individual name. Those are important rights, but, like all rights, they have to be qualified both when considered alone and, in some cases—as we are considering today—when they conflict.
New clause 13 represents a sensible way in which those different rights may be reconciled. It suggests that they can be balanced in a number of ways—various criteria are identified. That is especially helpful. English courts develop the law pragmatically and incrementally, but it is sometimes useful that they should have some guidance. New clause 13 provides guidance on reconciling those rights.
Our courts can gain some insight into how rights may be balanced by considering the experience of other countries. Even in the United States, the right to freedom of speech is qualified, although, under the first amendment, a much more absolutist view is taken of the right. Some Supreme Court judges, such as Justice Black, have indeed taken an much more absolutist view of freedom of speech than is taken by the European Court of Human Rights, but they, too, have recognised that, in some cases, the right has to be qualified.
My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary has placed a brief summary of the European case law in the Library. The point that I think he was making with the case

extracts is that, in most cases, the European Court of Human Rights has given primacy to the right to free speech. The extracts suggest, on the whole, that the article 10 right will trump other rights. We know that from the case law that has arisen from this country. The Sunday Times thalidomide case some 25 ago years showed that the contempt proceedings against the newspaper could not be upheld under article 10. In the "Spycatcher" case, which has been mentioned, the court made the important point that dangers were inherent in the prior restraint of freedom of speech. More recently, in the Goodwin case, the court made an important point about the protection of journalistic sources.

Mr. Garnier: I am listening carefully to the hon. Gentleman, but he will not want the Committee to conclude from his remarks that articles 8 and 10 do not allow for prior restraint. Paragraph 2 of article 10 and paragraph 2 of article 8 show that there are exceptions. Indeed, one of the problems of the convention is that it is as much a list of exceptions as it is of rights. I trust that the hon. Gentleman will not move from this point without addressing his mind to the exceptions—including the allowances to prior restraint—that are contained in the articles.

Mr. Cranston: The hon. and learned Gentleman is absolutely right—the rights are qualified. Indeed, as I said at the outset, rights are always qualified. We are considering how the new clause can deal with a conflict between two rights. I shall come back to some of his remarks, as I do not agree that the new clause achieves nothing.
We tend to ignore the jurisprudence of the German courts, but they have, for many years, balanced the right to free speech with the right to privacy.
My friend and former colleague Professor Markesinis has published some lengthy discussions of the German case law. He points out that the German courts have developed sophisticated methods of balancing the two rights. For example, they distinguish between speech that informs, and speech that is mere gossip. My hon. Friend the Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton) alluded to that distinction when he castigated some of his former colleagues.
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The German courts also distinguish between speech motivated by greed, and speech that is in the public interest. I see that the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Sir N. Fowler) has returned to the Chamber. I am not sure that the story he told does him any discredit; I think that all professionals should act with some concept of the public interest in mind, and I consider that the right hon. Gentleman acted in the right way all those years ago. We must balance those rights, and new clause 13 sets out a number of criteria.
I accept what the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) said about ex parte and interim relief. I am not sure that new clause 13 adds a great deal to the existing law in that respect, but I think that it is valuable in that it refers to the public interest and to privacy codes. It is possible that the courts would have developed a deferential attitude to the privacy codes that exist. In judicial review, for example, the Datafin case


showed that our courts will defer to self-regulatory codes. In that instance, the takeover code was involved. The court said that the City operated the takeover code in a reasonably satisfactory way, that the panel was closer to the market than the court was and that it should, therefore, defer to its operation. In time, our courts may develop a case law that respects the decisions of self-regulatory bodies such as the Press Complaints Commission, but I am not certain that we can say at this point that they will automatically adopt such an approach.
It is also helpful that new clause 13 invokes the concept of the public interest. The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) asked what the term actually meant, and he was right to do so, because it is a difficult concept—the concept of the unruly horse to which Lord Diplock referred all those years ago. Again, German case law is useful. In one of his papers, Professor Markesinis sets out a range of considerations taken into account by the German courts—in particular, the German constitutional court—in the definition of the public interest.
The German courts have considered, for instance, the motives of the publisher, whether the speaker will benefit financially, the extent to which the information has been disseminated, the breadth of the restriction that the plaintiff wishes to impose on the defendant's speech rights and the methods used. My hon. Friend the Member for Battersea referred to the legality of such methods as telephoto lenses.
Although I consider new clause 13 valuable in that respect, I must add that we are only at the beginning of our journey. Over the years, in a range of decisions, the courts will have to reconcile those two rights. Nevertheless, the new clause constitutes a valuable contribution to the start of the journey.

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. Mike O'Brien): We have had a good debate, in which all hon. Members have welcomed new clause 13.
The new clause seeks to do what—as I think is generally recognised—could have been a difficult, even precarious job: the job of ensuring that the balance between articles 8 and 10 is right. I am pleased that Lord Wakeham, on behalf of the Press Complaints Commission, said today:
The amendment being discussed in the Committee of the House today safeguards the freedom of the press and self-regulation. I warmly welcome it—as I know does the newspaper industry—and am grateful for the skilful way the Government has dealt with the potential problems.
I am also delighted by the welcome given to the new clause by the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Sir N. Fowler), in a very good speech. I particularly enjoyed his account of his failure to write a story which he thought that he should not write, for good reasons, finding later that there might be good reasons for him to have done so. That is a lesson for all journalists who must make such judgments.
The right hon. Gentleman asked a number of questions. He pointed out that the press and broadcasting agencies are all involved in the way in which the convention will operate, and that, in the operation of the new clause, separate codes may be taken into consideration. I confirm that separate codes will operate. As the right hon. Gentleman suggested, there are minor—even marginal—

differences between them. I suspect that those differences will not make much odds in terms of court judgments, but the right hon. Gentleman was right to point them out.
The right hon. Gentleman welcomed the tightening of the law on interim judgments, which we consider an important safeguard for the press. He asked whether the Press Complaints Commission should develop prior restraint powers. That is not part of our plans, which I hope reassures him. He said that the task of newspapers was to reveal and to expose. We agree that it is a basic safeguard of an active and vital democracy to reveal and expose when at least some public interest is involved. I am sure that that is the right hon. Gentleman's view.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush (Mr. Soley) and the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) rightly said that we should consider not so much whether the rich, famous and powerful would benefit from the new clause, but whether there would be some protection for the ordinary individual who might feel that his private life was being infringed. I think that all hon. Members want to get the balance right between the freedom of the press—the importance of which was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield—and the rights of the "small man", as he was described by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough. We must get the balance right between articles 8 and 10. The courts will no doubt weigh the vulnerability of ordinary citizens and of the rich and famous in the appropriate way. Article 8 is available to everyone, including the small man.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush asked about various cases. He asked whether the helicopter winchman would be able to claim under the convention and, if so, in which court. The venue depends on the nature of the case and of the claim, so I cannot give him guidance on that, but there would be various ways of proceeding.

Mr. Soley: This is a key question of access to the law. Given that the man was grieving at the time and trying to prevent the intrusion that was taking place, it seems to me that there should be an ability to go to the local court—perhaps the magistrates court—to seek protection. If the human rights convention is now part of our domestic law, is an appeal available on that basis?

Mr. O'Brien: When there is a case that can be brought before a court, the convention can be brought in. Which court that will be will depend on the nature of the case. I cannot give an absolute assurance that the man to whom my hon. Friend referred will be able to pursue the matter in a county court. It would be wrong to give individual advice from the Dispatch Box, and the man will have to rely on his own lawyer. When they become a matter of dispute and concern, issues relating to the convention can be raised in ordinary cases. People have access to rights that previously had to be enforced in Strasbourg. I hope that my remarks have afforded at least some reassurance.
My hon. Friend the Member for Ealing, Acton and Shepherd's Bush also asked about a child. There are various options: the child could be made a ward of court, a guardian ad litem could bring a case, or the official solicitor could look after the child's interests. In some cases, the courts decide that the invasion of privacy outweighs the right to freedom of expression. The new clause does not prevent that.
An important point that has, to some extent, been overlooked is that newspapers will not be public authorities and could not be proceeded against directly under the Bill, but an article 8 point could be raised in proceedings for harassment or a libel action, for example.
Concerning the example of the expenditure at the tuck shop of an inmate of a special hospital, there are arguments either way about whether publication should be considered to be in the public interest, and the courts would have to decide the case on its merits. The new clause simply requires them to have regard to whether publication would be in the public interest.
The hon. and learned Member for Harborough made the important point that, when Front Benchers agree, it is the responsibility of Back Benchers to put the testing arguments to the Government. He asked us to remember the distinction between the public interest and what is interesting to the public. I hope that, to some extent, we have caught that important distinction in subsection (4)(a)(ii) of the new clause.
The hon. and learned Gentleman asked whether the new clause went further than the current law. I hope that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary was able to reassure him to some extent. We are seeking to put in place some new safeguards to provide help and clarity in the law. When we introduce something as important as the convention, it is important to ensure that the courts understand how we intend it to be interpreted. The provisions in subsections (4) and, especially, (2) offer safeguards. The hon. and learned Gentleman says that those safeguards are acknowledged to some extent in the practice of the courts, but now they will be acknowledged in statute, and the added clarity in the law will give them substance.
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The hon. and learned Gentleman asked whether the tribunal—by which, I presume, he means the divisional court judge or whoever is considering the application—would have to reach a conclusion at an early stage about whether the case was likely to succeed. That would be the case, but only to the extent that the judge would be considering issuing an injunction. If he decided, for whatever reason, that an injunction was inappropriate, he would not have to consider the substance of the case and its chances of success at that stage.

Mr. Garnier: I am not entirely sure that the Minister addressed my point. If the judge—it is a Queen's Bench judge in chambers, as often as not, rather than a divisional court—is not minded to grant an injunction on the application of a plaintiff who is seeking to protect confidential information, that more or less becomes the main question, because once the information is in the public domain, there is nothing to be done other than the award of damages—and we are talking about non-pecuniary loss, not about anything of great financial value.

Mr. James Clappison: The damage is done and the cat is out of the bag.

Mr. Garnier: Indeed, or as I said in Lord Donaldson's language, the ice, once in the full glare of the sun, has melted.
We need to think more carefully about requiring a judge considering an application for an injunction to reach a judgment on the merits of a trial that could have long-term implications, when we all know that a trial involves the consideration of far more detailed evidence than is available to a judge at that stage.

Mr. O'Brien: That is right, but judges have to make such decisions, and will have to bear in mind the consequences and consider whether it is right to grant the injunction. They may decide that it is not, but feel subsequently that damages are a better way in which to deal with the case. The judge must consider all the circumstances and find the right balance between articles 8 and 10, taking into account the factors that we have suggested in the new clause and considering the hon. and learned Gentleman's valid point that information that has a value because of its confidentiality cannot regain that value once the confidentiality is lost. The judge will have to bear in mind both that point and the consequences that it might have for what the hon. and learned Member for Harborough called the small man. Those are issues for the judges to wrestle with. I am not sure that we can go much further than providing the judges with the clarity and guidance that we are giving. There will perhaps be more clarity and guidance for the judges when the convention is in place.
The hon. and learned Gentleman said that subsection (3) made no difference. We suggest, however, that the law on granting injunctions is flexible in privacy cases, and we are tightening it to ensure that the applicant will in all cases need to establish a stronger case.
My hon. Friend the Member for Battersea (Mr. Linton) made several points about defects in self-regulation. The Government have no plans to end self-regulation. My hon. Friend rightly drew attention to the Calcutt report and the comments of the former Member of Parliament for Putney, David Mellor, who warned the press that time was running out at the last chance saloon. In many ways, Mr. Mellor's comment had an effect, and the Press Complaints Commission is trying robustly to ensure freedom of the press while trying to ensure that privacy is respected. The Bill helps the PCC to balance article 10 and article 8. Our new clause will add to press safeguards, giving the PCC better guidance on how to achieve that balance.
The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) raised several important points. Unfortunately, his most important point came during his intervention on the Home Secretary about the public interest. My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley, North (Mr. Cranston) also raised that point in his helpful speech. I am perhaps tempting further interventions by going into the issue of what the public interest is, but the basic question is whether the public should have particular information. For example, information might have an effect on proper political discourse, or a matter of public policy. It might also affect individual behaviour. For example, information about BSE might have affected decisions on whether to eat beef. Those are areas in which there is a proper public interest in the press revealing information. The judge would have to ask the same question put by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough: is a matter only of interest to the public, or is it a matter of public interest? There should be some good reason why the public should know.
It is arguable whether there should be a good reason for the public not to know something. That takes us into realms of philosophy and jurisprudence, and I do not want to go too far into them. However, judges will debate that matter among themselves as they reach their decisions.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dudley, North said that we were at the beginning of a journey. We have tried to safeguard the interests of the individual and the interests of press freedom and strong democracy. Much work and thought has gone into that, and I thank the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield and others who have praised my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and Lord Williams of Mostyn for their hard work on getting the Bill right. We worked closely with the PCC, which has been enormously helpful. Getting the Bill right was important to our democracy, and I am delighted that our debates have indicated that we have done so.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause read a Second time, and added to the Bill.

New clause 10

GUARANTEE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION

'—(1) If a court's determination of any question arising under this Act concerns an issue of discrimination, it must have particular regard to the guarantee in Article 14 of the Convention that the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground.
(2)In this section, "court" includes a tribunal.'. — [Mr.Maclennan.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Robert Maclennan: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The Bill does not seek to introduce new human rights into our domestic law. It seeks merely to bring home the rights guaranteed by the European convention. New clause 10 is closely modelled on new clause 13, and on the earlier new clause tabled by the Government at the behest of the Churches, which were concerned about possible interpretations of convention rights. It is intended to help to guide our courts in their interpretation of article 14. It may be asked whether that is necessary, given considerable jurisprudence over the years on article 14, but it has not been conclusively determined whether that article should be interpreted as setting out rights that are exhaustively covered by the phrase "such as", or whether that phrase is merely a preliminary—I submit that that was what was intended—to an illustration of the rights protected by the convention.
The point is limited in some respects. By passing my new clause, the Committee would not widen the ambit of protection to categories of people who are not specifically mentioned in article 14 of the convention for such matters as, for example, employment, which is not covered. Article 14 is, in a sense, a parasitic prohibition against discrimination, in that it derives from other protected fundamental rights and freedoms. A number of people are concerned that it would be possible to interpret the article restrictively and to treat categories of persons as exhaustive.
That would be undesirable, and it would be out of line with much jurisprudence. It would also be out of line with how courts in Ireland have interpreted comparable

provisions in the Irish constitution, in which grounds of discrimination are enumerated. It would be out of line with the Canadian charter of rights and freedoms. In the Egan case in 1992, Canada's superior courts decided that such rights should be interpreted as not exclusively determined by lists of rights.
The areas of potential discrimination about which some anxiety might exist include disability, age and sexual orientation. As to the policy of the Government and western European countries generally, it is entirely clear that members of the European Union at least are determined that we should take action to combat discrimination based on disability, age and sexual orientation. It is so set out in article 6A of the Amsterdam treaty, to which this Government are party. I hope that my proposal is entirely in line with the Government's thinking about how best to approach the implementation of that treaty obligation. The new clause seems a straightforward way to put beyond doubt the convention's intention to ensure that the protections of our citizens—their fundamental rights and freedoms—are not limited by reference to some status other than those mentioned in article 14.
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The matter has come before the European Court of Human Rights, but not conclusively. For example, the Dudgeon case dealt with sexual orientation and the law in Northern Ireland. The matter was resolved by reference not to the status of the individual, but to the article 8 rights on respect for private and family life. Perhaps the matter has been taken rather further in the Sutherland case more recently, in which it could be argued that the court leant more clearly towards regarding homosexuality as another status protected against discrimination.
The new clause is entirely in line with the policy of our Government and our international treaty obligations. Its purpose is to spell out the matter beyond doubt.

Mr. Clappison: I listened carefully to the right hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Mr. Maclennan) putting forward his arguments for the new clause. I pay tribute to him for his characteristic care and courtesy in advancing his arguments.
I am somewhat enlightened now about the new clause, but, when I first considered it, it sprang to mind that it expressed a perfectly worthy sentiment, which might have unintended consequences in practice. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman, as I am sure many others, if not all hon. Members, would do, that individuals have access to rights free from discrimination. I know that the right hon. Gentleman did not serve on the Committee on the Crime and Disorder Bill, where we moved similar amendments to protect individuals from discrimination under some of its new provisions. I am sure that the Under-Secretary will remember that. I cannot remember whether he responded at the time, but there was common ground in the Committee on that issue, and the Government were keen to reassure us.
I have some doubts about how the new clause would work in practice. I suspect that the right hon. Gentleman is trying to deal with the problem of interpretation. When I read article 14 in conjunction with the right


hon. Gentleman's arguments, I thought that the wording of the article was clear and did not need further elaboration. It is clearly set out that
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination".
The right hon. Gentleman gave examples of people who might be discriminated against and, clearly, he has gone into far more detailed legal research than I have had the opportunity to do. The wording of the article at face value and first glance suggests that it is not intended to be an exhaustive list. The characteristics that might give rise to discrimination, such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, and national or social origin, are set out in the article as examples of the sort of characteristics that should not be discriminated against or lead to a loss of enjoyment of rights under the convention. If I may have my penn'orth on the interpretation of the article, I would think that disability, age and sexual orientation should not give rise to discrimination, but sit alongside the other matters spelt out in the article. They fall broadly into the same category and certainly should not give rise to somebody losing any enjoyment of their rights.
I am not sure whether that agreement with the right hon. Gentleman leads me to accept the need for the new clause to be incorporated in the Bill. He described the right in article 14 as a parasitic right. I was not going to describe the new clause in that way, but it is his description. He is correct that the right set out in article 14 is different in its nature from many of the other rights contained in the convention that are free-standing rights—the rights to freedom of expression, freedom of religion, to a fair trial and to family life. They are all rights in themselves. Article 14 deals with the access to those rights across the board, but is not a free-standing right in itself.

Mr. Maclennan: indicated assent.

Mr. Clappison: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for nodding.
The right hon. Gentleman's argument continued that new clause 10 was similar in nature to new clause 13, which we have just debated, and new clause 9, which we debated on an earlier occasion, which invite the courts to pay particular regard to the right to freedom of religion, thought and conscience in the case of new clause 9 and the right to freedom of expression in the case of new clause 13.
I would submit that there is a difference because new clause 10 does not relate to a free-standing right. For that reason, the two new clauses are perfectly workable and should not give rise to problems for the courts. However, I wonder whether this new clause might give rise to problems for the courts, because it is not a free-standing right, but a right of enjoyment that applies across the board.
As I have already said, the words of article 14 are clear enough in themselves. I wonder how a court would try to apply new clause 10. Indeed, I wonder about the type of case that might arise in practice. So, although I am perfectly happy with the sentiments behind the new clause, I should be happier if the right hon. Gentleman could give us more practical examples of how it might operate in practice.
I am concerned that new clause 10 would make it difficult for the courts to give effect to the convention. As I have said, the courts are already enjoined to give people access without discrimination to the rights under article 14, but how would the new clause work in practice and how would the courts approach it if, in the enjoyment of any right, the issue of discrimination arose? Would not the matter be weighted in favour of the applicant and would it not be difficult for the courts to give effect to such a measure?
The right hon. Gentleman has clearly done some research into the cases. He described the Dudgeon case from Northern Ireland, which he said was resolved by reference to rights rather than the status of the individual. It is always slightly dangerous to venture an opinion on a case without knowing all the facts, but, on the right hon. Gentleman's brief description of it, I was rather inclined to agree with the judgment of the court. The court got it right by resolving that by reference to rights rather than the status of the individual. I suspect that new clause 10 may not be needed and that it might have some unintended consequences. Moreover, it would be difficult for the courts to give effect to it in practice.
The Minister appears eager to respond, and I am interested in hearing what he has to say. Earlier, my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) wisely advised us against tinkering with the Bill. New clause 10 may, although with the best of intentions, be a piece of such tinkering, which we might come to regret. I would not go as far as the Minister did in replying to the previous debate, when he described this as a splendid piece of legislation without any blot or blemish and a tribute to the draftsmanship of the Lord Chancellor—the Lord Chancellor is certainly proud of the Bill as a piece of work—but if we were to accept the new clause, we would be at risk of tinkering. I look forward to hearing the Minister's response because I suspect that he will tell us that, although worthy, the new clause is not needed.

Mr. Mike O'Brien: The hon. Member for Hertsmere (Mr. Clappison) is right, but the right hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross (Mr. Maclennan) has raised a series of important points, and I hope that I shall be able to deal with some of them.
New clause 10 requires a court or tribunal, when determining any question arising under the Human Rights Act that concerns an issue of discrimination, to have particular regard to article 14—that the rights and freedoms set forth in the convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground.
I am ready to join the right hon. Gentleman in emphasising the importance of article 14 and the position that it occupies in the convention, and to express the Government's hope and confidence that it will be given full weight in our courts in the same way as the other articles in the convention. I acknowledge, too, that the words "on any ground" are important. Article 14 contains a list of grounds on which discrimination in securing other convention rights is prohibited, but it is important not to overlook the crucial words "or other status" which appear at the end. The list is not an exhaustive one, and should not be treated as such.
I share the concerns of the hon. Member for Hertsmere that we may be at risk of tinkering with the Bill in a way that might have some unintended consequences. I cannot


advise the Committee to accept the new clause. My reason, in a nutshell, is that the new clause is either empty of substance because it merely states the obvious, or it represents an attempt to gloss the convention rights, however slightly, in a way that we have so far avoided doing in our proceedings. We have been careful to avoid doing so, particularly in the clauses that have been added to the Bill in recent months.
There is no disguising the fact that article 14 and the way in which it has been applied are not regarded as fully satisfactory by a number of commentators who have a particular interest in, for example, race equality issues. Its most obvious limitation in their eyes is that it is not a free-standing anti-discrimination provision, but, as the hon. Gentleman said, is parasitic. I do not like that phrase, but essentially it is tied to the other convention rights.
It is no secret that discussions are under way in Strasbourg on the possibility of a new protocol to the convention to introduce a free-standing anti-discrimination provision. That is the right way of dealing with that question—if, indeed, it needs to be dealt with.

Mr. Clappison: I am grateful to the Minister for agreeing with my description of the provision as a parasitic right which would affect other free-standing rights. Does he share my concern that, given that it would affect all the other free-standing rights in the convention, it would create an incentive for individuals who are seeking to take advantage of their alleged entitlement to those rights to plead discrimination, and that we would see a welter of cases involving free-standing rights, in which individuals were pleading discrimination, thus making it difficult for courts to give effect to the convention?

Mr. O'Brien: We shall have to consider that situation in due course. No doubt those who are considering whether there should be a new free-standing provision will have to consider its effect not only on domestic problems in our courts but on the Strasbourg court and the sorts of cases that are brought before it. Clearly, such issues will need to be discussed and probably the best way is to ensure that the UK delegation, which is playing an active in the Strasbourg deliberations on any protocol, bears in mind the impact that it would have on our courts and on the Strasbourg court in deciding whether a free-standing anti-discrimination provision should be forthcoming. Therefore, we should not prejudge the situation that may develop; in a sense, that is what the new clause does.

Mr. Maclennan: I should be grateful if the debate did not go off at a tangent. The new clause is not intended to pre-empt the discussion about the free-standing rights against discrimination. I am aware of those discussions, and I hope that the Government will be supportive of establishing a free-standing anti-discrimination provision. The new clause is designed simply to ensure that the fundamental rights and freedoms that the convention seeks to safeguard are available not just to the limited number of categories of people who are mentioned in article 14, but to those of other status. I am delighted to hear the Minister say that he regards it as common sense

that the categories are not closed by these illustrative examples. I agree. I am simply seeking to put the matter beyond argument and doubt.

Mr. O'Brien: But the new clause essentially puts a gloss on the convention and, throughout the Bill, we have tried not to do that. We have tried to grant access rather than create a new gloss on those convention rights. Even in new clause 13, we were careful about that. Our concern is that, with the best of intentions, new clause 10 would not continue that level of care.
I understand the view that may be expressed that, despite, for example, the Sutherland case, the European Court of Human Rights has been somewhat conservative in its judgments concerning article 14, and perhaps too ready to find in favour of states on the ground that there was objective justification for some action which, on its face, might be considered discriminatory. However, whether or not that is so, it is not something we can influence by an amendment to the Bill. Nor do the Government wish to suggest that, in general, our courts should take a different view on the issue from that taken by the European Court.
The Bill is based firmly on the proposition that it is about access to the convention rights, not their substance, and that our courts must take into account the Strasbourg jurisprudence. We cannot honourably pick and choose which rights should be subject to those propositions and which should be open to more generous treatment from the point of view of applicants to our courts.
New clause 10 is an attempt to go some way down that road. It might be seen as an attempt to gloss the convention, encouraging our courts to interpret article 14 more widely than can be justified by reference to Strasbourg jurisprudence. If it does not do that, I fail to see what it does do.
It has been pointed out that, in many ways, new clause 10 merely tries to do for various minorities what other new clauses that the Committee has accepted do for the Churches and the press. I do not think that the parallel is appropriate. Our provision on the Churches emphasises to the UK courts how the Strasbourg institutions have consistently interpreted article 9 rights. It directs the courts' attention to Strasbourg case law, which is to the effect that a Church body or other association with religious objects is capable of possessing and exercising rights contained in article 9 in its capacity as a representative of its members.
Similarly, the provision on freedom of the press is grounded firmly on Strasbourg case law, which encourages the particular importance of the article 10 right to freedom of expression. Moreover, those changes, as well as being wholly in accord with the principles of the Bill and the convention, address concerns of the Churches and the media that the Bill might worsen their position. That consideration does not apply to article 14.
Our reservations about new clause 10 do not imply any lessening of our commitment to combat discrimination. I do not think that anyone has suggested that. We recognise the importance of judges being able to deal with minority groups in a way in which those groups can have confidence. The Judicial Studies Board carries out extensive training involving members of ethnic minorities, for example, in talking to judges to ensure that


discrimination does not occur. We think that that is a better way forward. We do not think that adding glosses to the convention at this stage is appropriate or desirable.
I agree with many of the points raised by the hon. Member for Hertsmere, and I will not repeat them. However, the new clause would do something that we have been trying to avoid. It would be a change in the way that we have handled the Bill which should not be acceptable to the Committee. I accordingly invite the right hon. Member for Caithness, Sutherland and Easter Ross to withdraw his new clause, in the interests of a Bill which is about granting access to the rights that people should have access to in our courts—but for which, at present, they have to go Strasbourg—rather than about changing the substance of those rights.

Mr. Maclennan: The Minister's reply was rather disappointing, on more than one count. First, he sought to distinguish between the Government's approach in respect of the clauses that dealt with the Churches and the press. Those undoubtedly put a gloss on convention rights and how they were to be enforced in this country, to secure a greater clarity where some powerful interests in the land felt that their interests were at risk.
The Churches had loud voices. The people whom I am seeking to protect in new clause 10, which is modelled on the Government's new clause, do not have such loud voices. They are the disabled, the aged and minorities with differences of sexual orientation. They are not powerful interests. Their interests need the clarity that the Government have been eager to bring in for the Churches and the press.
Secondly, the argument is that this is not an attempt to widen the protections for these groups in any way other than already provided for by the European convention. As I made plain in my initial remarks, it is not to provide a new protection against discrimination at work because that is not covered by the convention. It is designed simply to ensure that access to the protections that the Government claim are in their mind is not debarred because the status of those groups is not specifically mentioned in article 14.
I was glad that the Minister said that it was common sense that the categories were not closed. If we could rely entirely on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights on this matter, I should be happy to accept his invitation to let it go at that. However, in all the cases that have been considered, the matter has not been concluded. Our courts are not assisted by being pointed to the European courts. They will have to make up their own minds if the matter arises.

Mr. Mike O'Brien: The right hon. Gentleman makes my point. He seeks to change the substance of the convention rather than merely clarify things. He is dissatisfied with the way in which the courts proceed and, therefore, seeks to change the substance. He is going beyond anything that we have agreed to do in the Bill so far.

Mr. Maclennan: That is a misinterpretation of what I said. What I am saying is that the courts in Strasbourg have not found it necessary to reach a conclusion on these

matters. In several cases, they have decided the issue under another article, although the article 14 rights have been raised. The matter has not been concluded.
The Government claim to be anxious—I do not dispute it—to protect these categories of people against discrimination. As they have subscribed to the Amsterdam treaty provisions, which explicitly mention the appropriateness of European Union member countries offering the protection of our law to those who are disabled or elderly or who might be discriminated against on grounds of sexual orientation, it is perverse not to take this opportunity to put the matter beyond doubt. For that reason, I shall seek to divide the Committee.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 18, Noes 234.

Division No. 326]
[6.57 pm


AYES


Allan, Richard
Livsey, Richard


Ballard, Jackie
Maclennan, Rt Hon Robert


Brand, Dr Peter
Öpik, Lembit


Burnett, John
Rendel, David


Cable, Dr Vincent
Russell, Bob (Colchester)


Chidgey, David
Smith, Sir Robert (W Ab'd'ns)


Corbyn, Jeremy
Tonge, Dr Jenny


Harris, Dr Evan



Harvey, Nick
Tellers for the Ayes:


Hughes, Simon (Southwark N)
Mr. Andrew Stunell and


Jones, Nigel (Cheltenham)
Mr. David Heath.




NOES


Ainger, Nick
Clarke, Charles (Norwich S)


Alexander, Douglas
Clwyd, Ann


Allen, Graham
Coffey, Ms Ann


Anderson, Donald (Swansea E)
Coleman, Iain


Anderson, Janet (Rossendale)
Connarty, Michael


Armstrong, Ms Hilary
Corbett, Robin


Ashton, Joe
Cousins, Jim


Atkins, Charlotte
Cranston, Ross


Austin, John
Crausby, David


Banks, Tony
Cummings, John


Battle, John
Cunliffe, Lawrence


Beard, Nigel
Cunningham, Jim (Cov'try S)


Bennett, Andrew F
Dalyell, Tam


Bermingham, Gerald
Davey, Valerie (Bristol W)


Berry, Roger
Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)


Betts, Clive
Davis, Terry (B'ham Hodge H)


Blears, Ms Hazel
Dawson, Hilton


Blizzard, Bob
Dean, Mrs Janet


Boateng, Paul
Dobbin, Jim


Bradley, Peter (The Wrekin)
Doran, Frank


Bradshaw, Ben
Dowd, Jim


Brinton, Mrs Helen
Drew, David


Brown, Rt Hon Nick (Newcastle E)
Dunwoody, Mrs Gwyneth


Brown, Russell (Dumfries)
Eagle, Angela (Wallasey)


Buck, Ms Karen
Eagle, Maria (L'pool Garston)


Burden, Richard
Ennis, Jeff


Burgon, Colin
Field, Rt Hon Frank


Campbell, Alan (Tynemouth)
Fisher, Mark


Campbell, Mrs Anne (C'bridge)
Fitzsimons, Lorna


Campbell, Ronnie (Blyth V)
Flint, Caroline


Cann, Jamie
Flynn, Paul


Casale, Roger
Follett, Barbara


Cawsey, Ian
Foster, Rt Hon Derek


Chapman, Ben (Wirral S)
Foster, Michael Jabez (Hastings)


Chaytor, David
Foster, Michael J (Worcester)


Chisholm, Malcolm
Gapes, Mike


Clapham, Michael
Gibson, Dr Ian


Clark, Dr Lynda (Edinburgh Pentlands)
Gilroy, Mrs Linda



Godman, Dr Norman A


Clark, Paul (Gillingham)
Goggins, Paul






Gordon, Mrs Eileen
Marshall, David (Shettleston)


Griffiths, Jane (Reading E)
Martlew, Eric


Griffiths, Nigel (Edinburgh S)
Meacher, Rt Hon Michael


Griffiths, Win (Bridgend)
Meale, Alan


Grocott, Bruce
Merron, Gillian


Grogan, John
Milburn, Alan


Hain, Peter
Miller, Andrew


Hall, Mike (Weaver Vale)
Mitchell, Austin


Hall, Patrick (Bedford)
Moffatt, Laura


Hanson, David
Moran, Ms Margaret


Heal, Mrs Sylvia
Morgan, Rhodri (Cardiff W)


Henderson, Ivan (Harwich)
Mullin, Chris


Hepburn, Stephen
Murphy, Jim (Eastwood)


Heppell, John
O'Brien, Bill (Normanton)


Hewitt, Ms Patricia
O'Brien, Mike (N Warks)


Hill, Keith
Olner, Bill


Hinchliffe, David
Palmer, Dr Nick


Hoey, Kate
Pearson, Ian


Hoon, Geoffrey
Pendry, Tom


Hope, Phil
Pickthall, Colin


Howarth, Alan (Newport E)
Pike, Peter L


Howarth, George (Knowsley N)
Plaskitt, James


Hoyle, Lindsay
Pollard, Kerry


Hughes, Ms Beverley (Stretford)
Pope, Greg


Hughes, Kevin (Doncaster N)
Powell, Sir Raymond


Hutton, John
Prentice, Ms Bridget (Lewisham E)


Iddon, Dr Brian
Prentice, Gordon (Pendle)


Illsley, Eric
Prosser, Gwyn


Jackson, Ms Glenda (Hampstead)
Purchase, Ken


Jackson, Helen (Hillsborough)
Quin, Ms Joyce


Jamieson, David
Quinn, Lawrie


Jenkins, Brian
Rammell, Bill


Johnson, Miss Melanie (Welwyn Hatfield)
Rapson, Syd



Reed, Andrew (Loughborough)


Jones, Mrs Fiona (Newark)
Reid, Dr John (Hamilton N)


Jones, Ms Jenny (Wolverh'ton SW)
Rooker, Jeff



Ross, Ernie (Dundee w)


Jones, Jon Owen (Cardiff C)
Roy, Frank


Jones, Dr Lynne (Selly Oak)
Ruddock, Ms Joan


Jowell, Ms Tessa
Russell, Ms Christine (Chester)


Keeble, Ms Sally
Ryan, Ms Joan


Keen, Ann (Brentford & Isleworth)
Salter, Martin


Kemp, Fraser
Sawford, Phil


Kennedy, Jane (Wavertree)
Sedgemore, Brian


Khabra, Piara S
Sheerman, Barry


Kilfoyle, Peter
Sheldon, Rt Hon Robert


King, Andy (Rugby & Kenilworth)
Simpson, Alan (Nottingham S)


King, Ms Oona (Bethnal Green)
Skinner, Dennis


Kumar, Dr Ashok
Smith, Angela (Basildon)


Ladyman, Dr Stephen
Smith, Llew (Blaenau Gwent)


Lawrence, Ms Jackie
Southworth, Ms Helen


Laxton, Bob
Spellar, John


Lepper, David
Squire, Ms Rachel


Leslie, Christopher
Stewart, Ian (Eccles)


Lewis, Terry (Worsley)
Stinchcombe, Paul


Liddell, Mrs Helen
Stoate, Dr Howard


Linton, Martin
Strang, Rt Hon Dr Gavin


Livingstone, Ken
Stuart, Ms Gisela


Lloyd, Tony (Manchester C)
Sutcliffe, Gerry


Lock, David
Taylor, Rt Hon Mrs Ann (Dewsbury)


Love, Andrew



McAllion, John
Taylor, Ms Dari (Stockton S)


McAvoy, Thomas
Taylor, David (NW Leics)


McCabe, Steve
Thomas, Gareth R (Harrow W)


McCafferty, Ms Chris
Timms, Stephen


McDonagh, Siobhain
Touhig, Don


McDonnell, John
Truswell, Paul


McFall, John
Turner, Dr Desmond (Kemptown)


McGuire, Mrs Anne
Turner, Dr George (NW Norfolk)


McKenna, Mrs Rosemary
Vis, Dr Rudi


Mackinlay, Andrew
Wareing, Robert N


McNulty, Tony
White, Brian


MacShane, Denis
Whitehead, Dr Alan


Mactaggart, Fiona
Wicks, Malcolm


Mallaber, Judy
Williams, Rt Hon Alan (Swansea W)


Marsden, Paul (Shrewsbury)






Williams, Alan W (E Carmarthen)
Wright, Dr Tony (Cannock)


Wills, Michael



Winnick, David
Tellers for the Noes:


Wood, Mike
Mr. David Clelland and


Worthington, Tony
Mr. Robert Ainsworth.


Wright, Anthony D (Gt Yarmouth)

Question accordingly negatived.

Schedule 1

THE ARTICLES

Amendment made: No. 112, in page 19, line 23, at end insert—

'PROTOCOL No. 6

ARTICLE 1

THE DEATH PENALTY SHALL BE ABOLISHED

ARTICLE 2

A State may make provision in its law for the death penalty in respect of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war; such penalty shall be applied only in the instances laid down in the law and in accordance with its provisions. The State shall communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe the relevant provisions of that law.'.—[Mr. McFall.]

Schedule 1, as amended, agreed to.

Schedule 2 agreed to.

Schedule 3

JUDICIAL PENSIONS

Question proposed, That this schedule be the Third schedule to the Bill.

Mr. Mike O'Brien: Schedule 3 makes the provision specified in clause 18(6) about judicial pensions in relation to the holder of judicial office in the UK who serves as a judge of the European Court of Human Rights. It places a duty on the relevant Minister—the Lord Chancellor for a judge serving in England and Wales or Northern Ireland and the Secretary of State for a Scottish judge—to make an order ensuring that a UK serving judge's pension position will not be prejudiced as a result of his or her appointment to the court.

Sir Norman Fowler: We may need a slightly longer exposition of the schedule than the one just given by the Minister. I am suspicious about the fact that the last schedule to a Bill on human rights deals with judicial pensions. I suppose that we are dealing with the human rights of judges, as opposed to those of everybody else. I should like to know a little more about the position on judicial pensions. What are the Government trying to do in the schedule? What is the demand for the measure? Will the Minister say a few words about the cost that is involved?
I should like to ask four straightforward and specific questions. I know that there is not much time left, but I am sure that there is enough time for the Minister to reply to my questions and I am equally sure that he knows the answers. First, will he tell us a little about the schemes? Are they properly funded by employer's and/or employees' contributions, or are they pay-as-you-go? How much is the cost to the taxpayer of the employer's contributions?
Secondly, how long does the scheme take to mature? The standard final-salary pension scheme is one that matures after 40 years of work, but we assume that not many judges qualify under that criterion. Will the Minister tell us what the qualification is and how many years to maturity a full pension requires? In the schedule, we are protecting the rights under the scheme of a judge who transfers from one place to another, but how long does a judge have to serve to obtain the full pension?
Thirdly, what contributions do the judges have to make and what contributions does the taxpayer have to make?
Fourthly, is the scheme permissive? In other words, is it permissive in the sense of allowing a judge to transfer to a personal pension if that is his wish; or is he tied in to the final-salary scheme as set out at the end of the schedule? If he is able to transfer to a personal pension, will the Government as the employer make the same contribution as would be made to the final-salary scheme?
Those are straightforward, simple questions, to which I am sure that the Minister knows the answers. I should be grateful for any answers, because public money is involved and the taxpayer is involved through employer contributions. The Committee will want to hear a little more explanation than the 30 seconds-worth that the Minister gave at the beginning, given the importance of the matter, not only to judges but to taxpayers generally.

Mr. O'Brien: I am grateful to the right hon. Gentleman for raising his questions. Given the enthusiasm with which he put them. I thought that he was concerned that we might have a judicial pensions mis-selling scandal on our hands, but I can assure him that we have nothing like that. The schedule makes statutory provision so that if a judge from the UK courts goes to Strasbourg, his or her pension will be protected. That is all we are doing.
The right hon. Gentleman asked a series of detailed questions about how the judges' pension scheme operates. I shall have a word with my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department, and give him all the details. However, we are talking about a relatively small sum of money, used to fund over the next 20 or 30 years the pensions of a couple of judges—unless the right hon. Gentleman expects us to appoint many judges to the Strasbourg court. In the explanatory and financial memorandum to the Bill, under the heading "Financial effects of the Bill", he will see set out clearly:
The cost will depend on both the number of years served at the Court and the salary of the relevant UK judicial office at the point of retirement.
All that we are doing is ensuring the same sort of pension provision that a judge would get if he served in the UK.

It being three hours after the commencement of proceedings in Committee, THE CHAIRMAN, pursuant to the Orders [1 June and 17 June], put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair.

Question put and agreed to.

Schedule 3 agreed to.

THE CHAIRMAN then proceeded to put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that hour.

New schedule 3

REMEDIAL ORDERS

Orders

1.—(1) A remedial order may—

(a) contain such incidental, supplemental, consequential or transitional provision as the person making it considers appropriate;
(b) be made so as to have effect from a date earlier than that on which it is made;
(c) make provision for the delegation of specific functions;
(d) make different provision for different cases.

(2) The power conferred by sub-paragraph (1)(a)includes—

(a) power to amend or repeal primary legislation (including primary legislation other than that which contains the incompatible provision); and
(b) power to amend or revoke subordinate legislation (including subordinate legislation other than that which contains the incompatible provision).

(3) No person is to be guilty of an offence solely as a result of the retrospective effect of a remedial order.

Procedure

2. No remedial order may be made unless—

(a) a draft of the order has been approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament made after the end of the period of 60 days beginning with the day on which the draft was laid; or
(b) it is declared in the order that it appears to the person making it that, because of the urgency of the matter, it is necessary to make the order without a draft being so approved.

Orders laid in draft

3.—(1) No draft may be laid under paragraph 2(a)unless—

(a) the person proposing to make the order has laid before Parliament a document which contains a draft of the proposed order and the required information; and
(b) the period of 60 days, beginning with the day on which the document required by this subsection was laid, has ended.

(2) If representations have been made during that period, the draft laid under paragraph 2(a) must be accompanied by a statement containing—

(a) a summary of the representations; and
(b) if, as a result of the representations, the proposed order has been changed, details of the changes.

Urgent cases

4.—(1) If a remedial order ("the original order") is made without being approved in draft, the person making it must lay it before Parliament, accompanied by the required information, after it is made.
(2) If representations have been made during the period of 60 days beginning with the day on which the original order was made, the person making it must (after the end of that period) lay before Parliament a statement containing—

(a) a summary of the representations; and
(b) if, as a result of the representations, he considers it appropriate to make changes to the original order, details of the changes.
(3) If sub-paragraph (2)(b) applies, the person making the statement must—

(a) make a further remedial order replacing the original order; and
(b) lay the replacement order before Parliament.



(4) If, at the end of the period of 120 days beginning with the day on which the original order was made, a resolution has not been passed by each House approving the original or replacement order, the order ceases to have effect (but without that affecting anything previously done under either order or the power to make a fresh remedial order).

Definitions

5. In this Schedule—
representations" means representations about a remedial order (or a proposed remedial order) made to the person making (or proposing to make) it and includes any relevant Parliamentary report or resolution; and
required information" means—

(a) an explanation of the incompatibility which the order (or proposed order) seeks to remove, including particulars of the relevant declaration, finding or order; and
(b) a statement of the reasons for proceeding under section 10 and for making an order in those terms.

Calculating periods

6. In calculating any period for the purposes of this section, no account is to be taken of any time during which—

(a) Parliament is dissolved or prorogued; or
(b) both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.'.—[Mr. McFall.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Bill reported, with amendments.

Bill, as amended, to be considered tomorrow

Orders of the Day — Data Protection Bill [Lords]

As amended (in the Standing Committee), considered.

Clause 1

BASIC INTERPRETIVE PROVISIONS

The Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department (Mr. Geoffrey Hoon): I beg to move amendment No. 19, in page 2, line 43, leave out from beginning to end of line 4 on page 3.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Sir Alan Haselhurst): With this, it will be convenient to discuss Government amendment No. 48.

Mr. Hoon: The purpose of the amendments is to delete clause 1 (5) and (6) and the associated reference to the definition of "transfer" in the index of defined expressions in clause 71.
Subsections (5) and (6) were originally included in the Bill with the intention that they would help to clarify the somewhat opaque provisions relating to the international movement of personal data in articles 4 and 25 of the directive. In the Bill, we sought to clarify the relationship between those two rules by means of the partial definition of "transfer" in clause 1(5) and the provision in clause 1(6) setting out the application of the geographical scope of provisions in clause 5.
However, those provisions have not met with uniform approval and, on reflection and after listening carefully to further representations, the Government have concluded that there still remains a measure of difficulty about their purpose. Given that the sole reason for the inclusion of the provisions was to clarify the position, the fact that they do not appear to have that effect means that they are plainly unsatisfactory. We cannot immediately see a useful way in which the necessary clarity can be achieved by further amending these subsections, so we have concluded that the best thing would be simply to delete them.

Mr. John Greenway: In Committee, I asked why the subsections were there at all. I made the point that I had been minded to table an amendment to delete them, but had decided that it might be seen as a wrecking amendment. We warmly welcome the Minister's decision. For the avoidance of doubt or confusion, it is better to remove clause 1 (5) and (6) altogether. It says much about the complexity of the legislation that all the best brains in the Home Office cannot find a way of putting on the face of the Bill what the two subsections intend. Imperfect though the legislation will be without them, it will be less imperfect than it would be with them.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 7

RIGHT OF ACCESS TO PERSONAL DATA

Mr. Hoon: I beg to move amendment No. 20, in page 5, line 22, after 'subject' insert
'for the purpose of evaluating matters relating to him such as, for example, his performance at work, his creditworthiness, his reliability or his conduct,'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: Government amendments Nos. 21 to 23.
No. 11, in page 5, line 48, after 'otherwise', insert
', and with the proviso that the identity of individuals providing information used by credit reference agencies in supplying trade references for partnerships and sole traders should also be exempted from disclosure.'.
No. 12, in schedule 7, page 57, line 48, at end insert—
'2. In addition, personal data are exempt from section 7 if they consist of the name of the person who has given a reference in confidence for the purpose of assisting a credit reference agency to comment on the creditworthiness of the data subject.'.
Government amendment No. 55.

Mr. Hoon: Amendment No. 20 relates to clause 7(1)(d), which gives individuals the right of access to information about the logic involved when decisions about them are based solely on the automated processing of their personal data. The intention is that, consistent with the directive, the provision should apply only to decision making to which clause 12 applies.
Amendments Nos. 21, 22 and 23 are technical amendments which make more precise the wording of clause 7(2). Amendment No. 55 concerns the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, which involves detailed provision relating to the collection of, and access to, personal information. In that sensitive area of treatment affecting the very basics of human life, it is important to ensure that those provisions are not in any way undermined by the Bill. The amendment would ensure that the existing position is maintained.

Mr. Greenway: Amendment No. 20 addresses an issue that I raised in Committee, and I welcome it. In one sense, it limits the scope of the duty for data controllers with regard to the logic in automated decisions. However, the inclusion of the words in the amendment, especially those referring to an individual's
performance at work…his reliability or his conduct",
are beneficial to the Bill, as they make it clear that such key matters are covered and that automated decision taking will not be permitted concerning them.
I think that amendments Nos. 21 to 23 are drafting amendments. I have had the opportunity of discussing amendment No. 55, concerning embryos, with the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, the hon. Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East (Mr. Howarth), and I agree that, for the avoidance of doubt, it is probably sensible to remove that passage.
Amendments Nos. 11 and 12 stand in the names of my hon. Friends the Members for Esher and Walton (Mr. Taylor) and for Poole (Mr. Syms). I do not know whether my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and

Walton wishes to catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Speaker, but there has been concern that there should be some exemption from disclosure for the
identity of individuals providing information used by credit reference agencies in supplying trade references for partnerships and sole traders".
I know that the Government have received several representations on that subject, and the Opposition strongly urge Ministers to keep the issue under review should our amendments not commend themselves to the Government. Several commercial organisations are concerned about the matter, and I hope that the Minister will accept that the Bill as drafted leaves some room for doubt. If it is not to be amended, we ought to have some assurance that the matter will be kept under active review and that perhaps, in two or three years' time, a more formal review will be undertaken.

Mr. Ian Taylor: I apologise to the Minister for missing, as I dashed into the Chamber, what must have been his fairly extensive opening remarks. I apologise for my lack of courtesy in that respect, but I am grateful that my Front-Bench spokesman has already mentioned amendments Nos. 11 and 12. I do not intend to speak for more than a moment about them because we discussed the general area in Committee.
In Committee, the Parliamentary Secretary, said that he would consider the subject sympathetically, but the Home Office then redefined the word "sympathetically" to mean that it would consider the subject very cautiously.
I am concerned that, because of the requirement to reveal sources, sole traders, small partnerships and other very small companies may have difficulty in getting credit at all. I believe that there is a general understanding that the subject should be reviewed within three years, and if the Minister is prepared to give me some comfort in that direction, I would not wish to go much further. I want the Government to keep the matter under close review, because, if things went wrong, there could be serious repercussions for very small companies and single traders.

Mr. Brian White: I raised this issue a couple of times in Committee, and I know that, since the Minister gave me an assurance at that time, there have been a couple of meetings with the Home Office. I echo the comments that have been made about the need to take the matter seriously and to consider a review.
If the Government are not prepared to accept the amendments, perhaps before the Bill comes back from the Lords they will think about keeping the matter under review. Although the provision affects only a small number of people, it could be crucial for the small business men concerned. I urge the Minister to give further thought to that aspect of the Bill. Under the Consumer Credit Act 1974, special provision was made, which was repeated in the Data Protection Act 1984, and it would be useful to review the issue on a continuing basis.

Mr. Hoon: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Esher and Walton (Mr. Taylor) for his comments. He should note that, although my introductory observations may not have been extensive, they were certainly comprehensive. He should also appreciate the fact that it is possible to consider representations sympathetically without necessarily agreeing with them.
The Government have indeed received a number of representations on the subject, and we recognise that the industry's concerns are genuinely held. The question at the heart of the matter is whether the fundamental information privacy right—the right to subject access—should be restricted because of concerns about the future availability of credit.
The arguments presented to the Government so far have not been sufficient to persuade us that the Bill would have the harmful effect on the granting of credit that the industry fears. Therefore, at this stage, the Government cannot accept the amendments. Nevertheless, we recognise that only experience will establish conclusively whether the industry's concerns are justified and, in view of the strength of the concern, I am pleased to give the assurance that the Government will keep the issue under review. We shall reconsider it, in consultation with both the credit industry and small businesses, to see whether the Bill is operating as we intend. I hope that the Opposition will agree that that provides a positive way forward, and will not press their amendments.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 21, in page 5, line 27, at end insert 'he has received'.

No. 22, in page 5, line 28, leave out 'has been made'.

No. 23, in page 5, line 30, leave out 'has been paid'.—[Mr. McFall.]

Clause 11

RIGHT TO PREVENT PROCESSING FOR PURPOSES OF DIRECT MARKETING

The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department (Mr. George Howarth): I beg to move amendment No. 24, in page 8, line 27, leave out 'requirement' and insert 'notice'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 25, 26, 30 to 32, 39 to 45, 47, 49 to 54, 56 to 67 and 69.

Mr. Howarth: These are essentially minor, technical drafting amendments, and to save the time of the House I do not intend to make a speech about them. However, I should be happy to explain the purpose of any of them, should that be necessary.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 25, in page 8, line 28, leave out 'requirement' and insert 'notice'.—[Mr. McFall.]

Clause 12

RIGHTS IN RELATION TO AUTOMATED DECISION-TAKING

Amendment made: No. 26, in page 9, line 27, leave out from second 'decision' to end of line 28 and insert
'which is not based solely on such processing as is mentioned in subsection (1)'.—[Mr. McFall.]

Clause 14

RECTIFICATION, BLOCKING, ERASURE AND DESTRUCTION

Mr. George Howarth: I beg to move amendment No. 27, in page 10, line 30, leave out 'failure' and insert 'contravention'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 28 and 29.

Mr. Howarth: The first of the amendments simply corrects an inconsistency in the drafting of clause 14(4). Paragraph (a) refers to a contravention of the Act. Paragraph (b) refers to a further failure. It should refer to a "further contravention". The amendment makes the necessary change.
Clause 14(4) gives the court the power in certain circumstances to order the erasure, destruction or blocking of personal data. Elsewhere, for example in clause 14(1), the court has the power to order the rectification of personal data as well as their blocking, erasure or destruction. There is no good reason why clause 14(4) should not also allow the court to order the rectification of personal data. Indeed, the directive appears to suggest as much. On reflection, we think that confining the rectification remedy to cases of inaccuracy is unduly restrictive. The amendments add the power to rectify to clause 14(4) and make the consequential provision in clause 14(5); and generally align the wording with that used elsewhere.

Mr. Greenway: We welcome the amendments. Clause 14 is extremely important in terms of data subject rights. We agree that the court should have the power to rectify information that is inaccurate in respect of data subjects. The three amendments strengthen the Bill in that area, and we are happy to see them incorporated.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendments made: No. 28, in page 10, line 32, leave out 'erasure, destruction or blocking' and insert
'rectification, blocking, erasure or destruction'.

No. 29, in page 10, line 35, leave out 'erasure, destruction or blocking' and insert
'rectification, blocking, erasure or destruction'—[Mr. McFall.]

Clause 17

PROHIBITION ON PROCESSING WITHOUT REGISTRATION

Mr. George Howarth: I beg to move amendment No. 70, in page 12, line 6, leave out
'section 22 applies to the processing'
and insert
the processing is assessable processing for the purposes of section 22'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 71 to 82.

Mr. Howarth: I hope to be able to deal quickly with this group of amendments, which makes what is essentially a series of technical improvements to the


preliminary assessment provisions in clause 22 and associated provisions. The Bill provides for a limited category of processing, a category where particular worries about data subjects' interests arise, to be assessed by the Data Protection Commissioner for compliance with the principles before it may begin.
That implements the system described in article 20 of the directive as prior checking. It is essentially a system reliant on such processing being brought to the commissioner's attention some time before it actually begins, so that he or she can consider it and give a view. In itself, it is not a direct control on processing. It does not give the commissioner a power to intervene in advance and prevent the processing before any problem has in fact arisen. It remains the data controller's responsibility to address any concerns raised in his own way.
The simplest means of operating this system is through the process of notification. That is why all processing in this limited category, even where it is carried out manually or might otherwise have been exempted from the notification regime, has to be notified. Usually, when a data controller has made a notification, he may start processing immediately. In the limited category that we are now considering, after the processing has been notified, the data controller must wait for a fixed period, or until he has heard from the commissioner if that is sooner, before he may start processing. That is so that he or she can carry out an assessment.
As it stands, the Bill is not as clear as it might be that that is how the system works. The Government are aware that this is a very new feature in our data protection law, being introduced by the Bill as a result of an obligation in the directive. We are also aware that there is an understandable desire among those who might be directly affected for reassurance that the new system will work as clearly and straightforwardly as possible. That is why we have tabled the amendments.
The amendments essentially do three things. First, they make technical changes so that the key provisions in clause 22 are easier to follow and the sequence of events is set out more plainly. The drafting is simplified and made more narrative.
Secondly, the amendments make clearer the relationship between the preliminary assessment itself and the notification that precedes it. The entire operation of clause 22 is now explicitly predicated on the receipt of a notification by the commissioner, and a more distinct link is made between the processing as it is described in the notification and as it falls to be assessed.
Thirdly, both those improvements are carried through to the transitional provisions, where the arrangements are substantially simplified. The provisions on manual and automated data are brought together, and the preliminary assessment system is straightforwardly disapplied in both cases in respect of processing already under way immediately before 24 October 1998.
As I have said, preliminary assessment of this nature is a novelty in UK data protection law. Its purpose is to address understandable anxieties relating to particular categories of data processing. The Government are concerned that, in this sensitive area, the Bill's provisions should be as easy to follow and to operate as possible.

These technical amendments make substantial improvements in that direction. I commend them to the House.

Mr. Greenway: In Committee, I made the point that, as the effect of the clause is to prevent the data controller from commencing processing until the Data Protection Commissioner has given consent for that processing, it is crucial that the commercial organisations involved know where they stand. Although I still have reservations about the period specified, I agree with the Minister that the amendments improve the meaning of the legislation. However, I draw attention to the fact that, even at this late stage, we are being asked to approve a large number of technical amendments.

Amendment agreed to.

Clause 20

DUTY TO NOTIFY CHANGES

Amendment made: No. 30, in page 13, line 45, after 'notification' insert 'under notification regulations made'.—[Mr. McFall.]

Clause 22

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT BY COMMISSIONER

Amendments made: No. 71, in page 14, line 8, leave out from beginning to "processing" and insert
'In this section "assessable processing" means'.

No. 72, in page 14, line 17, leave out from 'whether' to 'and' in line 18 and insert
'any of the processing to which the notification relates is assessable processing'.

No. 73, in page 14, line 19, leave out 'proposed' and insert 'assessable'.

No. 74, in page 14, line 23, leave out
'processing to which this section applies or would apply'
and insert 'assessable processing'.

No. 75, in page 14, line 25, leave out 'proposed'.

No. 76, in page 14, line 31, leave out from 'No' to 'shall' and insert
'assessable processing in respect of which a notification has been given to the Commissioner as mentioned in subsection (2)'.

No. 77, in page 14, line 32, leave out from beginning to 'either' in line 34.

No. 78, in page 14, line 42, leave out from 'controller' to end of line 44 and insert
'is guilty of an offence'.—[Mr. McFall.]

Clause 28

NATIONAL SECURITY

Mr. Harry Cohen: I beg to move amendment No. 13, in page 17, line 43, at end insert—
'(13) The relevant Commissioner may—

(a) investigate any procedure which relates to—

(i) the processing of personal data for the purpose of safeguarding national security,


(ii) the application of an exemption which is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security, or
(iii) the signing of a certificate under this section,

(b) make any recommendation which relates to—

(i) an investigation under paragraph (a) of this subsection, or
(ii) safeguarding the interests of data subjects, and

(c) if appropriate—

(i) raise any matter which relates to an investigation in an annual report, or in any other report to the Prime Minister, or
(ii) liaise with the Data Protection Commissioner or another relevant Commissioner on matters which relate to an investigation.

(14) The Data Protection Commissioner may raise with a relevant Commissioner any matter which relates to the processing of personal data for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
(15) In this section, the "relevant Commissioner" means the Commissioner appointed by virtue of—

(a) section 4 of the Security Service Act 1989,
(b) section 8 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994,
(c) section 91 of the Police Act 1997, or
(d) section 8 of the Interception of Communications Act 1985.'.

The idea of the amendment is to introduce some element of accountability to the processing of personal data for the purposes of national security. I find it strange, to say the least, that, in certain respects, the Government are offering more privacy protection to members of the mafia and terrorists under investigation by the security services than they are to ordinary law-abiding members of the public—for instance, a data subject who is being positively vetted.
What is more, I am concerned that the Data Protection Act 1984 is being watered down. That Act placed a duty on the security services, by virtue of section 2(2), to comply with the data protection principles. That duty has been removed by this Bill; an exemption under clause 28(1)(a) removes the obligation to comply with the principles.
Under section 27 of the Data Protection Act 1984, personal data held for safeguarding national security are exempt only from the enforcement regime, registration and rights of data subjects. That means that GCHQ and MI5 and MI6 had a legal duty to apply the data protection principles, even though there was no way for the data protection registrar to test whether the duty was complied with. The 1984 Act therefore places those organisations under a moral duty to comply with the principles, but, under the provisions of clause 28, they are permitted to process personal data insecurely, disclose personal data to unauthorised persons, and even sell it to newspapers by virtue of the exemption from clause 55(4).
It may seem a flippant question, but I ask the Minister whether the fees raised by the sale of such unlawfully procured personal data will go into the Consolidated Fund, and how much revenue he expects to be raised in the next financial year.
The Minister might say that MI5, MI6 and GCHQ will not sell unlawfully procured personal data. If that is his argument, why is the exemption in clause 28(1)(c) so wide as to include exemption from clause 55(4), which makes the selling of such personal data an offence? That shows how unnecessarily wide the exemption is with respect to safeguarding national security. Selling misinformation to

the newspapers about politicians and perhaps even about the Government will be perfectly lawful for the security services.
In support of my amendment, I draw the attention of the House to some of the differences between warrants and certificates under the Bill. In respect of warrants signed by the Secretary of State—for example, for the interception of communications, or burglary—there is a safeguard, in that such a warrant is signed and validated for six months at a time. By contrast, under the provisions of the Bill, a certificate lasts for ever and is never reviewed.
I note that for warrants under the Interception of Communications Act 1985, there is an obligation under section 6(3) of that Act to discard irrelevant personal information that has been intercepted. Under the Bill, however, the negation of the third and fifth data protection principles means that irrelevant personal data obtained by means of a certificate can be kept indefinitely.
The previous Government gave the security services a new role—to assist the police in dealing with serious crime. The obligations of the police in respect of data protection compliance are apparently not to be required of the security services. The Minister should explain why he has come to that conclusion.
The Government seem to be ignoring the advice of the Data Protection Registrar, who asserts in her document "Our Answers":
The extension of the role of the Security Service into areas of traditional policing should not carry with it an extension of the exemptions provided by section 27"—
the section of the 1984 Act that deals with national security.
There is a significant risk that improper processing of personal data—for example, data obtained by what may be regarded in other circumstances as unlawful means—relating to a serious crime suspect, would not be subject to any data protection rules at all. Such processing can be undertaken by the security services. That could jeopardise the quality of evidence before a court and the subsequent trust placed in it by a jury. If data protection is so thoroughly disregarded, there is a possibility that some serious criminals will not be convicted.
My amendment would go some way towards introducing a smidgen of accountability into the way that the security services process data. It would use the expertise of the commissioners established by section 4 of the Security Services Act 1989, section 8 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, section 91 of the Police Act 1997 and section 8 of the Interception of Communications Act 1985.
It would be the duty of those commissioners to examine procedures with respect to data protection. They would have powers to investigate any procedure relating to the processing of personal data for the purpose of safeguarding national security; the application of an exemption that is required for the purpose of safeguarding national security; and the signing of a certificate by a Cabinet Minister. The relevant commissioner could make any recommendation relating to that investigation, and make recommendations that were needed to safeguard the interests of data subjects. The proposals in my amendment are no different from the current duties associated with warrants.
The amendment would permit the commissioner, if appropriate, to raise any matter that relates to an investigation in an annual report, or in any other report, to the Prime Minister, and to communicate with the Data Protection Commissioner or any other relevant commissioner. That is a pretty moderate amendment.
On 1 June the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East (Mr. Howarth) replied to me that the Government
have decided not to depart from the existing policy that the Security Service should not register any of the personal data they hold under the Data Protection Act 1984.
He went on to say:
I understand similar considerations also apply to the Secret Intelligence Service and GCHQ."—[Official Report, 1 June 1998; Vol. 313, c. 52]
However, it is a departure from data protection policy when the security services take on a traditional policing role, and that is against the advice of the Data Protection Registrar. I believe that it is an unwise decision. At the very least, the Minister should explain it to the House.

Mr. Richard Allan: We have some sympathy with the spirit of the amendment. My noble Friends in another place also tabled amendments on the issue of the security services exemption, because we are concerned about any blanket exemption, where there is no specific justification for exempting data from the data protection principles. The thrust of the Bill derives from European conferences and conversations in which the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department was deeply involved, and which reflected, to ome extent, the experiences of the residents of the former East Germany, who had good reason to be suspicious of the way in which their security services held data.
We have been extremely fortunate in this country, in that—apart from the odd rumour that is kicking around—our security services have not generally been held responsible for holding damaging personal data. However, one could argue that the security services hold the most damaging data about individuals. They could leak information about someone, perhaps accusing him of heinous crimes such as being a member of CND or—dare I say it—a socialist. Rumours have circulated only recently that the security services hold information and files on people as prestigious as members of the current Government, and that such information was potentially leakable and potentially damaging.
We applaud the spirit of the amendment, which seeks to ensure that there is some oversight of security services data and that the buck stops with someone who is accountable under the legislation. We look forward to hearing from the Minister how the Bill would cope if damaging, sensitive personal data were revealed and were traced back to a security services source. If a person sought redress for that, we would be interested to hear what channels would be available to him, and how the issue would be resolved.

Mr. Greenway: I have been looking forward to the contribution of the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead

(Mr. Cohen). He tabled a great number of amendments for the Standing Committee, but sadly, for reasons that I cannot explain, he was not selected to serve on the Committee, so we were denied the opportunity of hearing from him. However, having listened to the hon. Gentleman, and having considered his amendment No. 13, Conservative Members would oppose its inclusion in the Bill.
We considered this important matter in Committee, and we were at pains to support the Government in requiring that the provision be in the Bill. It is provided for by the directive in article 13 and we believe that, on balance, clause 28 provides an adequate appeal mechanism to the tribunal. While we understand that there are always concerns about such matters, we are not convinced that the House needs to go further in this legislation than the appeal mechanism that is already provided in clause 28.

Mr. George Howarth: My hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr. Cohen) and the hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Allan) tempt me along highways and byways in this debate that it would probably be sensible not to pursue. However, it is important to say at the outset that the Data Protection Act 1984, to which my hon. Friend referred, does not exempt agencies from the data protection principles. Only data users who are required to register are bound by the principles. Section 27 of the 1984 Act provides an exemption from registration where the exemption is needed for national security purposes. That is the exact position.
Consistent with that, clause 28 provides for personal data to be exempted from the main elements of the Bill when that is necessary in order to safeguard national security. The question of necessity is subject to ministerial certification. There is a right of appeal for any person who is directly affected by that certification. The exemptions provided in clause 28 apply only to the extent needed, and a Minister must satisfy himself that the exemptions claimed are in fact required for the purpose of safeguarding national security before issuing a certificate.
The right of appeal against a national security certificate is an important new safeguard. It represents an advance on the 1984 Act, which offered no appeal rights. Appeals will be considered by a specially constituted panel of the data protection tribunal, whose membership will be drawn from the chairman and deputy chairman appointed by the Lord Chancellor and designated by him as being capable of hearing such appeals.
My hon. Friend's amendment would, perversely, have the effect of extending the roles of certain commissioners well beyond those that Parliament intended for them. Commissioners were appointed to carry out certain well-defined and limited functions specifically in relation to the security and intelligence services, the use of intrusive surveillance by the police and the interception of communications. Furthermore, the commissioners' remits by no means cover the whole field encompassed by the national security exemption.
The arrangements set out in clause 28, as drafted, give continued effect to the well-established policy that personal data should be exempt from the main elements of the data protection regime, including supervision by the Data Protection Commissioner, where that is necessary in order to safeguard national security. My hon. Friend


chooses not to recognise that the exemption is balanced by the provision for appeals to be made to the tribunal against the issue of ministerial exemption certificates. My hon. Friend's amendment would undermine that policy.

Mr. Cohen: I hear what my hon. Friend has said, particularly in his initial comments. The thrust of my argument is that, under the 1984 Act, the security services have a legal duty to comply with the data protection principles, although they do not have to register. The Bill takes away that duty in the law for security services to comply. Is the Minister saying that I have misread the situation—that the security services still have a duty to comply with the data protection principles and that the 1984 Act has not been weakened in any way?

Mr. Howarth: I apologise if my hon. Friend misunderstood me earlier. The 1984 Act exempts the security services from the principles, and it is important to recognise that fact. In light of my arguments and the necessity for such arrangements, I hope that my hon. Friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Mr. Cohen: I will seek to withdraw my amendment, as I hear what the Minister has said. However, I ask him to re-examine his last comment that the 1984 Act did not require the security services to comply with the data protection principles. As I understand it, section 2(2) of part I of the Act requires them to comply with those principles. I ask my hon. Friend to re-examine that point and perhaps clarify the situation in writing. On the basis of my hon. Friend's comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn

Clause 29

CRIME AND TAXATION

Mr. Greenway: I beg to move amendment No. 8, in page 17, line 45, after 'prevention', insert 'investigation'.
This is the first of two or three important points that the Opposition wish to raise on Report. The entire Committee stage was characterised by several debates about the importance of safeguarding those organisations, other than the police service and public authorities, whose role is to protect us from the criminal and fraudulent activities of others.
I shall briefly explain the background. The Bill essentially blocks or prevents the processing of sensitive data, including matters relating to criminal convictions and criminal records, other than in the case of certain specific exemptions. The main exemptions with regard to crime are set out in clause 29. Those exemptions are clearly enshrined in article 13 of the directive, which the Bill seeks to implement in our law.
The specific exemption is that personal data may, in certain circumstances, be exempt from the provisions of the Bill if they are processed for the prevention or detection of crime. Article 13 refers not just to the prevention or detection of crime and the prosecution of criminal offences but to the investigation of crime. We believe that the inclusion of the word "investigation" in the Bill will give added comfort to those who undertake risk assessment work in order to combat potential fraud

involving credit cards, false insurance claims and so on. Much of that work is of an exploratory nature, when there is no evidence of any crime.
Investigation and detection are two separate activities. For instance, let us suppose that we are talking about a suspicious death. When it is clear that that suspicious death is the result of a murder, the investigation seeks to detect who committed that murder. However, if there is a suspicious death and the investigation seeks to establish the circumstances of that death, it may be discovered that there was no murder at all. However, there is an investigation. Commercial organisations conduct such routine investigations every day in assessing whether certain people are making a succession of fraudulent insurance claims or are involved in credit card or other banking or financial fraud. Many of their investigations conclude that there was no crime committed in a particular case.
As article 13 gives Parliament the opportunity to incorporate the word "investigation" of crime and criminal offences in our legislation, I cannot, for the life of me, understand why the Government are so against including that word. The Minister will argue that that word is superfluous, and that, in the Government's judgment, prevention or detection of crime is adequate. If that is the case, why on earth does the directive allow for the prevention, investigation or detection of crime? Clearly the intention when the directive was drafted was that the word "investigation" would add comfort to the scope of the exemption. Given the seriousness of what we are attempting to provide for, I do not understand why the Government are so against it.
8 pm
Although we had a lengthy debate in Committee, and although we acknowledge that Ministers have said that they will give other comforts to those organizations—I should state for the sake of the record that the order-making power at paragraph 9 of schedule 3 provides that the Secretary of State may exempt several specific circumstances from a number of provisions—the Bill would be better if it included the word "investigation". That word adds something, and we thought it important for that reason to draw the House's attention to the matter. I ask hon. Members to accept the amendment.

Mr. George Howarth: I hope to convince the hon. Member for Ryedale (Mr.Greenway), as he anticipated, that his amendment is unnecessary. Clause 29 sets out specific exemptions that are needed to tackle crime and to collect taxes. They variously affect the fairness and lawfulness principles, subject access, subject information and the non-disclosure provisions. Between them, the purposes set out in subsection (1)(a) and (b) cover the whole process of tackling crime—from measures intended to prevent crime being committed, to the prosecution of an offender if a crime occurs.
The clause does not leave any gaps. The phrases
prevention or detection of crime
and
apprehension or prosecution of offenders
are familiar from the Data Protection Act 1984. They embrace the whole investigative process, which is covered by a combination of "detection", "apprehension"


and "prosecution". The investigation of a crime is an activity rather than a purpose. There are a number of purposes for which someone might want to investigate a crime: they might be benign, such as academic research, or not, such as the furtherance of a crime. The hon. Member for Ryedale went some way to acknowledge that point.
The scope of clause 29 is limited to the purposes of law enforcement and public protection. The investigation of a crime in that context is limited in its purposes to the prevention or detection of crime and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders. Those are the only relevant objects of criminal investigation for current purposes, and they are already covered by clause 29.
There is no disagreement between the hon. Member for Ryedale and the Government. The amendment is simply not necessary to achieve the effect that he and I want to achieve. In the light of that, I hope that he will withdraw it.

Mr. Greenway: As the Minister said, I had anticipated his answer, and it was very much the answer that we got in Standing Committee.

Mr. Hoon: Consistent.

Mr. Greenway: It certainly is consistent—and we have been consistent in our argument.
The Minister has not answered on why the word "investigation" appears in the directive but not in the Bill. We must agree to differ, although Conservative Members must take every opportunity to ensure not only that the directive is properly implemented but that the Bill is absolutely clear and as comprehensive as it needs to be.
We clearly disagree, and I thought it right to draw the House's attention to this important issue. Over the past few months, many hon. Members have received letters from the organisations to which I referred about their work in combating fraud and criminal activity. We are disappointed that we cannot persuade the Minister on the amendment, but have no wish to divide the House. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Greenway: I beg to move amendment No. 9, in page 18, line 1, after 'offenders', insert—
'(ba) the safeguarding of public security,'.
On 22 June, during the Report stage of the Crime and Disorder Bill, there was an important exchange between the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (Mr. Ashton) and the Home Secretary about the extent to which the data protection legislation inhibits the availability and disclosure of information to deal with the vexed problem of football hooligans. I have come across that question before. It was raised seven or eight years ago during the Home Affairs Committee's in-depth inquiry into the policing of football hooligans following the 1990 world cup.
The gist of the problem is that information about certain individuals is available but cannot be disclosed to ferry companies or to organisations and football clubs that are issuing tickets because that would breach the data protection legislation. The Bill gives even more comfort

to data subjects in protecting their rights over sensitive information about criminal matters, especially when that information has not been tested in the courts, and even though the football intelligence unit may have been monitoring the behaviour of certain individuals. Those people may not have been prosecuted even though the police are only too well aware that, given half a chance, they would cause mayhem. Sadly, some of our own people, and others, have caused mayhem in France and Belgium over the past two or three weeks. In his response to the hon. Member for Bassetlaw, the Home Secretary acknowledged not only that that is a problem, but that he would like to do something about it, if that was at all possible. The Minister is well aware of that.
I have spent some time considering the extent to which we might improve the position through the Bill. I previously referred to article 13 on the question of the prevention, investigation and detection of crime, which is one of the exemptions permitted in legislation. It also refers to the national security exemption, which the hon. Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr. Cohen) mentioned, and to our defence. Furthermore, it allows national legislation implementing the directive to safeguard public security through an exemption. That is all that we seek: the amendment would safeguard public security, as provided for in the directive. We believe that, if the amendement were accepted, the police would be strengthened and given opportunities to deal with the vexed problem of these louts and hooligans, who have caused so much mayhem and trouble to all of us.
The Minister, who comes from Liverpool, knows exactly the extent to which people in his city are heartily sick of the handful who cause such trouble and give the rest a bad name. We debated this extremely important matter not long ago in the context of the Hillsborough tragedy. We are not making the suggestion glibly as an off-the-cuff solution; it is a sincere and genuine effort to help in the fight against hooliganism, which the entire country wants the Government to tackle.
I cannot see why the measure would create difficulties for the implementation of the directive. If allowing the police an exemption to deal more effectively with football hooligans does not safeguard the peace and tranquillity of the country, I do not know what does. I can think of nothing that has caused as much alarm and concern to those affected as the antics of those mindless lads.
I hope that I have convinced the House that the amendment is extremely important. The Minister may prefer to change the wording. He has tabled a stack of amendments, some of which we have discussed already. The difficulty is that, once we conclude tonight's Report stage and the Bill returns to the other House, the opportunity to amend the Bill will have gone. If the Government accept the amendment tonight, the other place will at least have an opportunity to put it into a more appropriate form of words with which the Government might feel more comfortable. It is 14 years since the House last legislated on data protection; those of us who served on the Standing Committee, and doubtless all the officials and organisations who have had to deal with this complex Bill, hope to goodness that it is at least another 14 years before we do so again. Clearly, we shall not have an early opportunity to do something about this problem in the future, so I hope that the Minister will look favourably on the argument that we have set out and agree to accept the amendment.

Mr. George Howarth: I associate myself with the sentiment behind the amendment. The hon. Member for Ryedale (Mr. Greenway) knows from statements that my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has made that, like him, we consider those hooligans to be a disgrace not just to the part of the world that I come from—Liverpool—but to every town and city in the country. The Government are determined to do all that we can to reduce football hooliganism.
The hon. Gentleman is aware that we are conducting a review of football-related legislation, which will take account of the lessons to be learned from what happened in France. It is clear that we need to consider implementing measures to deal with the football hooligan element who tarnish our reputation abroad. A number of options will be considered, including the ability to restrict those who cause trouble abroad. I know that, in raising these issues, the hon. Gentleman is sincere about what he seeks to achieve.
Home Office Ministers are sympathetic to proposals to have special checks, for example, on recipients of world cup tickets. We have asked the Association of Chief Police Officers sub-committee on disclosure to explore the legality and feasibility of making those checks. People who apply to join the England members club, which is run by the Football Association, are checked against a National Criminal Intelligence Service database, which holds information about persons who are known to be, or suspected of being, involved in organised criminality associated with football. NCIS is registered with the Data Protection Registrar, and the Football Association is listed as a body to which NCIS intends, or may wish, to disclose data.
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Currently, ACPO has agreed that criminal records should be released only for limited purposes—mainly relating to national security, probity in the administration of the law and protection of vulnerable people, especially children. ACPO concluded that there was very significant legal doubt about its ability to release other information, which could not be resolved within the tight time scale. That was a matter not of data protection, but of its powers under the general law. There was also the practical difficulty of how to be sure that the criminal records released related to the people concerned, rather than to others of the same name.
In any event, there would have been further difficulties about compliance with the Data Protection Act 1984 principles of fair obtaining and processing. The Data Protection Registrar was concerned that nothing had been said to people when they applied for tickets in the first instance, and that the check would have been indiscriminate, without regard to suspicion in individual cases. It appeared that the check would have gone much wider than the particular needs of preventing football hooliganism. The FA's desire to check hooliganism was entirely right and proper: the issue was whether that was the right way in which to do it.
The ACPO sub-committee is looking afresh at the issues involved. It was not possible to resolve the issues in the short time available before the world cup, but there is now an opportunity for ACPO, the FA and, as necessary, the Data Protection Registrar to consult about

the right approach to be taken in future. It is important to have had this debate, and I am grateful to the hon. Member for Ryedale for raising the issue.

Mr. Greenway: I think that the Minister is about to invite me to withdraw the amendment. I entirely understand why he may not wish to accept it, but can he assure me that if the outcome of the discussions—I am grateful for his offer that we should continue to be part of them—is that an amendment to the legislation is required, there would not be a bar to making such a legislative change?

Mr. Howarth: The hon. Gentleman makes a reasonable point, and I am anxious to be as constructive as possible. Once all the consultations with the Data Protection Registrar, ACPO and others are complete, we shall be required to take some action. The Government, particularly the Secretary of State, have made it plain that we are committed to taking whatever action is sensible and necessary to eradicate the problem. If data protection principles are involved, that necessarily implies some action in that direction as well. I do not know exactly what the vehicle would be and I do not want to give assurances on that, but the Government certainly wish to take action and I am sure that the whole House would support us. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Gentleman feels able to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. Greenway: I am grateful to the Minister. Clearly, there is consensus across the Chamber that what can be done should be done. Given what the Minister has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn

Clause 30

HEALTH AND SOCIAL WORK

Mr. Hoon: I beg to move amendment No. 83, in page 18, line 47, at end insert—
'(1A) The Secretary of State may by order exempt from the subject information provisions, or modify those provisions in relation to—

(a) personal data in respect of which the data controller is the proprietor of, or a teacher at, a school, and which consist of information relating to persons who are or have been pupils at the school, or
(b) personal data in respect of which the data controller is an education authority in Scotland, and which consist of information relating to persons who are receiving, or have received, further education provided by the authority.'

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments Nos. 84 to 91 and the Government new schedule.

Mr. Hoon: Amendments Nos. 83 to 91 and new schedule 1 complete an exercise that was begun in Standing Committee. The Government tabled amendments to bring within the scope of the Bill the records currently covered by the Access to Personal Files Act 1987 and the Access to Health Records Act 1990. The main purpose was to ensure that the arrangements


made by the Bill to give effect to the European Court judgment in the case of Gaskin applied to the records covered by the 1987 and 1990 Acts.
The Gaskin judgment deals with subject access requests that are refused because giving the information would identify third parties who have not consented. The judgment says that there must be an independent mechanism for reviewing such refusals. The Bill provides that mechanism by allowing data subjects to go to the commissioner or the courts in such cases.
The purpose of the amendments is to ensure that the judgment is adhered to in the case of records under the Education (School Records) Regulations 1989 and the corresponding Scotland and Northern Ireland legislation. Such records are held by schools on pupils and former pupils. The new schedule gives rights of access to information held in certain unstructured manual records, to which the provisions of the Bill would not otherwise apply. The amendments will bring those records within the scope of the Bill, and thereby give effect to the Gaskin judgment. I hope that the House agrees that the amendments serve a useful and important purpose.

Mr. Greenway: The Gaskin judgment required the Government to introduce a range of amendments to the Bill, most of which were dealt with in Committee. As the Minister said, these are the outstanding amendments. I hope that, when the Bill returns to the other place, they will be accepted as speedily and as graciously as they have been by the Opposition parties tonight and in Committee.

Amendment agreed to.

Amendment made: No. 84, in page 19, line 16, at end insert—
'() In this section—
education authority" and "further education" have the same meaning as in the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 ("the 1980 Act"), and
proprietor"—

(a) in relation to a school in England or Wales, has the same meaning as in the Education Act 1996,
(b) in relation to a school in Scotland, means—

(i) in the case of a self-governing school, the board of management within the meaning of the Self-Governing Schools etc. (Scotland) Act 1989,
(ii) in the case of an independent school, the proprietor within the meaning of the 1980 Act,
(iii) in the case of a grant aided school, the managers within the meaning of the 1980 Act, and
(iv) in the case of a public school, the education authority within the meaning of the 1980 Act, and
(c) in relation to a school in Northern Ireland, has the same meaning as in the Education and Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1986 and includes, in the case of a controlled school, the Board of Governors of the school.'.—[Mr. Hoon.]

Clause 31

REGULATORY ACTIVITY

Amendment made: No. 31, in page 20, line 10, at end insert—
'() the Welsh Administration Ombudsman,'.—[Mr. Hoon.]

Clause 32

JOURNALISM, LITERATURE AND ART

Amendment made: No. 32, in page 21, line 10, leave out '14' and insert '14(1) to (3)'.—[Mr. Hoon.]

Clause 34

INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC BY OR UNDER ENACTMENT

Mr. Cohen: I beg to move amendment No. 4, in page 22, line 30, at end insert—
'(2) The Secretary of State may by order, where personal data are held on a public register, lay down conditions which shall be complied with by any person who has access to the register.
(3) An order under this section may make specific provisions with respect to a particular public register.'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss amendment No. 5, in clause 67, page 41, line 3, at end insert 'section 34'.

Mr. Cohen: The purpose of the amendments is to enable the Secretary of State to impose statutory conditions to protect lists of shareholders, the electoral roll and other public registers. Publicly available registers are unprotected. They are wide open to abuse, and, in most cases, there is no control over who has access to them or how they are used. On 22 April 1997, The Times noted that the Mayfair rapist selected his rich victims from the electoral roll.
I note from my recent parliamentary questions to all Government Departments that several Ministries are not sure for what public records they are responsible. The Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions said that information on what public records it was responsible for was not held centrally. That is astonishing. Several public registers are not actually publicly available. The Home Office keeps a register of forensic pathologists that is available to the public, which is useful information for criminals to access.
Public registers get scant protection under the Bill. The most familiar example of a public register is the electoral roll, copies of which can be obtained by any person for any purpose. Electoral registration officers have no discretion on whether to provide information, even to the most disreputable of characters. The position on data protection and the electoral roll is intolerable.

Mr. Allan: Is the hon. Gentleman aware of the recent confusion about whether electoral registration officers can give access to the register in computerised as opposed to paper form? It is a problem for political parties if they cannot obtain access to the computerised form. We are interested to know how that will be dealt with in the Bill. Both the paper and the computerised form will be covered by data protection principles.

Mr. Cohen: The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. The way things are going, I suspect that the computerised form and other forms will be available to whoever wants them.
Data subjects are obliged by law to provide names and addresses; failure to do so could result in a hefty £400 fine. Any person can obtain a copy of those details


without the data subject being informed. Under clause 34, the electoral returning officer, as data controller, has no obligation to inform data subjects about who has accessed. the register. A clear condition could be imposed that those who access the register should be required to identify themselves, and that list could be publicly available.
I am in favour of certain limits on public registers. For example, the electoral roll should be used only for electoral purposes, unless the elector consents to its use for other purposes. However, I recognise that many organisations have developed goods and services businesses on the basis of this publicly available information. My amendment would not stop any misuse directly: it would merely provide a mechanism to permit the Secretary of State to protect the public should the need arise, and to introduce new rules gradually, so that, if appropriate, such organisations could adjust their practice and be weaned off public sources of information over a period.
Paragraph 11(c) of schedule 8 delays the implementation of the eighth principle on the transfer of personal data abroad for personal data currently processed from the electoral register. As far as I can see, that provision negates any protection afforded by paragraph 14 of part II of schedule 1. If the eighth principle does not apply, it is difficult to see how the Secretary of State can define restrictions by order.
MPs usually live and vote in their constituency. Under the provision in schedule 8, there is nothing to prevent Saddam Hussein or any terrorist or malicious person from being able to purchase copies of the register, in computerised form, to find out where MPs or other well-known individuals live. Admittedly, it is a crude method. Because of his common surname, my right hon. Friend the Member for Islington, South and Finsbury (Mr. Smith) might evade detection. However, one wonders how many people appear on the electoral roll with the surname of my hon. Friend the Member for Wellingborough (Mr. Stinchcombe) or of the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire (Mr.Öpik). Someone might even look up the name Beckham for malicious purposes. Will the Minister explain why data protection legislation seems to expose MPs and others in the public eye to that risk?
After the passage of the Bill, the Minister should take a co-ordinated look at how public registers are kept, who has access to them and what uses are permissible.

Mr. Hoon: I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Leyton and Wanstead (Mr. Cohen) for allowing us to have this short debate, which will be of assistance. He is concerned about clause 34, which performs an important function. It ensures that certain key provisions of the data protection regime do not conflict with the rules relating to information that is required by statute to be made public.
As my hon Friend's amendments recognise, the provision is essentially about public registers. He gave a number of examples: the registers of births, marriages and deaths, registers held by Companies House, the electoral register, and so on. The essential feature of all those registers, which is recognised in clause 34, is that they are all governed by their own discrete legislation.
Those statutes will determine the detailed conditions that apply to the information contained in the registers. They will cover matters such as the nature of the

information contained in the registers, the conditions governing access to the registers, the accuracy of the information, and so on.
The purpose of clause 34 is to ensure that the detailed rules of the specific statutes, rather than the general data protection rules governing the registers, determine those matters. I hope that my hon. Friend will accept that that is sensible. The information contained in the registers is collected for a specific and particular purpose. It is much more appropriate for the specific statute to determine the relevant conditions that apply than for the general data protection legislation to do so. That is not to say that the data protection rules do not apply at all. To the extent that the data protection principles, and other provisions of data protection law, are not dealt with expressly in the specific statutes, they will apply. That is the position under the 1984 Act, and it will be maintained in the Bill.
8.30 pm
I remind my hon. Friend that clause 34 does not provide an exemption for the subsequent use of data collected from the registers. To the extent that any of those who obtain personal data from public registers process those data in a way that would be caught by the Bill, they would have to comply in full with the requirements set out in the Bill.
My hon. Friend wants to go a little beyond that. He wants to provide the Secretary of State with the power to specify conditions governing access to specific public registers. I hope that I have made it clear why the Government do not believe that that is the right approach. Moreover, I invite my hon. Friend—who I know is extremely knowledgeable on this matter—to consider how his proposed new arrangements would be enforced. Not all those seeking access to the registers would become data controllers, so the conditions could not be enforced through the various mechanisms set out in the Bill. Again, that argues for the conditions applying to particular registers to be set by the parent enactments—if I may use that phrase—which will be able to make suitable arrangements for enforcement.
I hope that my hon. Friend will accept that that is the right way forward, and that it is better for these issues to be dealt with in the specific context of the Acts that deal with registers rather than in the context of wider data protection legislation. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for bringing the matter to the attention of the House, but I invite him, in the light of what I have said, to withdraw the amendment.

Mr. Cohen: My hon. Friend is right in saying that I want to go further and impose more general data protection controls on public registers. However, I acknowledge that he has made some good points, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 40

ENFORCEMENT NOTICES

Mr. Cohen: I should like to speak to amendment No. 1, in page 23, line 32, to leave out "the fourth" and insert "any". However, I welcome the Government amendments that have been grouped with it, which,


I think, accept the points that I wanted to make. The rights granted by article 12 (b) and (c) of the European directive, as established by the Bill, should apply to all the data protection principles, and not only to the fourth principle, as originally proposed, so that unlawful and unfairly obtained data—not only inaccurate data—are covered.
There was a danger that the Bill would not implement the data subject's rights under those two articles of the directive, which would also have meant a lessening of protection for data subjects under the Data Protection Act 1984. I welcome the Government amendments.

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Michael J. Martin): Is the hon. Gentleman saying that he is not moving amendment No. 1?

Mr. Cohen: Yes. I am prepared not to move it, as I accept the Government amendments.
Amendments made: No. 33, in page 23, line 33, leave out 'may' and insert
'which requires the data controller to rectify, block, erase or destroy any inaccurate data may also'.
No. 34, in page 23, line 34, leave out 'any inaccurate data and'.
No. 35, in page 23, line 36, leave out 'or' and insert—
'(3A) An enforcement notice in respect of a contravention of the fourth data protection principle'.
No. 36, in page 23, line 39, leave out from 'party' to second 'to' and insert
'may require the data controller either—

(a) to rectify, block, erase or destroy any inaccurate data and any other data held by him and containing an expression of opinion as mentioned in subsection (3), or
(b)'.
No. 37, in page 24, line 2, leave out from 'notice' to 'or' in line 4 and insert
'requires the data controller to rectify, block, erase or destroy any personal data'.
No. 38, in page 24, line 6, leave out 'were inaccurate' and insert
'had been processed in contravention of any of the data protection principles'.—[Mr. Hoon.]

Mr. Richard Shepherd: I beg to move amendment No. 15, in page 24, line 28, at end insert—
'(7A) The Commissioner shall maintain a register containing—

(a) a copy of every enforcement notice issued under this section;
(b) such other particulars relating to such notices as the Secretary of State may by order prescribe.

(7B) The provisions of sections 19(6) and (7) shall apply in relation to the register maintained under this section as they do in relation to the register maintained under section 19(1).'.

Mr. Deputy Speaker: With this, it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 16, in clause 42, page 25, line 20, at end insert
'and may, if he considers it appropriate, inform any other person'.

No. 17, in clause 59, page 36, line 44, leave out
'necessary for reasons of substantial'
and insert 'in the'.
Government amendment No. 46.
No. 18, in page 36, line 44, leave out 'substantial'.

Mr. Shepherd: The amendments reflect concern about a new prohibition on the release of information in clause 59, which would make it an offence for the Data Protection Commissioner or her staff to disclose information about any identifiable business or individual other than in very limited circumstances. The offence would be committed even if the disclosure caused no harm to commercial confidentiality, for example. No such offence exists under the Data Protection Act 1984.
The provision is likely to prevent the commissioner from publicly identifying businesses that have been found to be misusing personal data about individuals by obtaining data through deception, for example, or by selling private information for commercial purposes. The commissioner may be unable to reveal that she has received large numbers of complaints about a particular company, that a company has failed to respond to requests to improve its practices or that an enforcement notice has been served against a firm. Equally, it may be an offence to reveal that a business has agreed to correct a problem without formal action, or that a complaint had proved unfounded.
The registrar has expressed concern at the new provision, which she says may require her and her staff to be unnecessarily guarded in future. The result may be both to deny the public information that they should have and to undermine public confidence in the commissioner's work, by preventing her from explaining what action she has taken to deal with complaints relating to matters of public concern.
The offence is not limited to disclosures likely to cause actual harm, but will be caused by any disclosure of any information about an identifiable business. That contradicts the policy established by the previous Government, whose 1993 White Paper on open government provided that, in any new offences involving the disclosure of information,
the presumption will be in favour of the inclusion of a harm test".
It is also inconsistent with this Government's proposals for a freedom of information Act. The freedom of information White Paper proposes that information should be withheld only where disclosure would cause either harm or substantial harm to specified interests. Existing statutory restrictions on disclosure are being reviewed with a view to repealing or amending those that do not reflect the proposed harm test.
In Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Ryedale (Mr. Greenway) tabled an amendment to restrict the offence to information that is potentially damaging. The amendment was not accepted. The Government say that the new offence is required by the European data protection directive, which states that national supervisory authorities must be subject to
a duty of professional secrecy".
However, the registrar's view, as expressed in January, is that that obligation can be met without the creation of a new criminal offence. Moreover, the directive contains


a number of pro-disclosure provisions, which would permit a far more balanced approach. They include recital 72, which states that
this Directive allows the principle of public access to official documents to be taken into account when implementing the principles set out in this Directive",
and recital 63, which states that supervisory authorities
must help to ensure transparency of processing".
The Government maintain that the restriction is not as serious as it seems, as the commissioner has a discretion to release information under clause 51(2), which states:
The Commissioner shall arrange for the dissemination in such form and manner as he considers appropriate of such information as it may appear to him expedient to give to the public about the operation of this Act, about good practice, and about other matters within the scope of his functions under this Act".
However, precedent under similar provisions suggests that that may be of limited value.
For example, the Health and Safety Commission and Executive are prohibited from disclosing information unless it is for the purposes of their functions, but they are required to ensure that people concerned with matters relevant to the purposes of the Health and Safety at Work Act, etc. 1974 are
kept informed of, and adequately advised on
those matters. The HSC and HSE interpret those two requirements restrictively, and say that they are prohibited from revealing information about individual premises unless to do so would directly prevent risk, or is necessary to protect health and safety. Requests for information about identifiable premises from people who are not themselves in danger, including Members of Parliament, researchers and journalists, are usually refused. The explicit prohibition on releasing information about identifiable businesses is therefore likely to override the commissioner's general discretion to release information, unless, under clause 59(2)(c),
the disclosure is made for the purposes of, and is necessary for, the discharge of…any functions under this Act".
It would be extremely difficult to demonstrate that a particular disclosure was necessary for any function under this Act. If the function can be discharged without the disclosure, the disclosure will not be necessary, and, indeed, will be illegal.
Clause 59(2) permits disclosure in certain other limited circumstances—for example, when the information is already publicly available, when the individual or business concerned consents to the disclosure and when disclosure is made in connection with legal proceedings. The subsection also provides for a limited, highly restrictive, public interest defence.
The amendments would require the commissioner to maintain a public register of enforcement notices, whose disclosure might otherwise constitute an offence. They would permit—but not require—the commissioner to reveal the results of an assessment of whether a particular business was complying with the legislation. At present, that information can be revealed only to the person who asks for the assessment, and its disclosure to a Member of Parliament or a journalist could be an offence. The amendments also attempt to strengthen the public interest defence available to the commissioner or her staff.
Let me deal first with amendment No. 15. Under clause 41, the commissioner may serve an enforcement notice when it appears to her that a data controller is

contravening any of the data protection principles. The notice may require the controller to take specified action or to stop processing data. The amendment requires the establishment of a register of such notices, as is made clear in new subsection (7A), which would have to be available to the public, free of charge, at all reasonable times. Certified copies of entries could be obtained on payment of any prescribed fee. That is provided for by new subsection (7B), which applies the existing provisions of clause 19(6) and (7), relating to the data protection regime.
The amendment would bring the Bill into line with existing legislation, such as the Environment and Safety Information Act 1988 and the Environment Protection Act 1990, which require the establishment of public registers of enforcement notices about environmental and safety hazards. Paragraph (b) of new subsection (7A) would allow the Secretary of State, by order, to require other information relating to such notices to be included in the register. That would allow the fact that a notice had been cancelled under clause 41, or was the subject of an appeal under clause 48, to be recorded; it might also permit the person on whom the notice had been served to add a statement of explanation or mitigation to the register.
Amendment No. 16 refers to clause 42. Under clause 42(1), a person who believes that he or she has been directly affected by any processing of personal data may ask the commissioner for an assessment of whether that processing breaches the Act's requirements. After carrying out the assessment, the commissioner must inform the applicant, to the extent that she considers appropriate, of
any view formed or action taken as a result".
That is in clause 42(4)(b).
8.45 pm
However, while the applicant must be informed of the outcome, the commissioner may commit an offence under clause 59 by revealing the same information to any other person. Thus, although there may have been a well-publicised complaint about a particular practice, the commissioner may not tell anyone—including a journalist, a Member of Parliament or another potentially affected person—about her findings. The amendment allows, but does not require, the commissioner to make such disclosures; however, a requirement may arise under the proposed freedom of information Act.
The discretion is appropriate in this instance. When a complaint relates purely to the circumstances of an individual applicant, wider disclosure may not be appropriate; but when the issue is of general concern and affects a large number of people, disclosure may be justified—if, for example, it reveals that a bank is failing to safeguard personal data about its customers.
There is no reason why the level of disclosure proposed in the amendment should be thought to contravene the obligation of professional secrecy required by the directive, given that the directive also provides that supervisory authorities
must help to ensure transparency of processing".
Let me now deal with amendment No. 17. A public interest test is available under clause 59(2)(e) should the commissioner, or a member of her staff, be prosecuted for an offence relating to the disclosure of information.


The test is particularly restrictive, and amendments Nos. 17 and 18 seek to remove some of the restrictive features. Clause 59(2)(e) provides that no offence is committed if
having regard to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of any person, the disclosure is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest.
That means that it would have to be established that the disclosure was "necessary", not just desirable, in the public interest, and that the public interest related to the
rights and freedoms or legitimate interests
of others. That term does not, on the face of it, acknowledge the public interest in the accountability of the commissioner's work. Moreover, the public interest itself would have to be "substantial".
It is hard to see why that public interest test should be set down so strictly, particularly as most of the Bill's other public interest tests are less demanding. For example, there is no requirement that the public interest be "substantial" before a newspaper can publish personal data under the public interest test in clause 32(1)(b).
Amendment No. 17 would remove the requirement that the disclosure be "necessary" and that the public interest be "substantial". The defence, as amended, would read:
having regard to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of any person, the disclosure is in the public interest.
Amendment No. 18 and Government amendment No. 46 cover similar ground. Amendment No. 18 is an alternative to amendment No. 17. It would delete the word "substantial" in clause 59, but would retain the word "necessary". The amended clause would then read:
having regard to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of any person, the disclosure is necessary for reasons of public interest.
The wording is effectively identical to amendment No. 46, tabled by the Home Secretary. Under that amendment, the clause would read:
having regard to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interests of any person, the disclosure is necessary in the public interest.
I hope that the Government will withdraw their amendment and support mine, because the word "necessary" would remain a problem with both amendment No. 18 and amendment No. 46. A disclosure that was "desirable" in the public interest, but not "necessary", would not be permitted under those amendments. There is an important distinction between the two, and I hope that the Government will accept my amendments.

Mr. Greenway: My hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) very adequately set out the concerns of the Data Protection Registrar. I tried to impress on the Government the importance of several concerns about the provisions that create the offence of unlawful disclosure of information by staff. People who are only doing their job may find themselves committing a criminal offence. The House must be sure that the legislation provides for that criminal offence only when it is strictly necessary.
I was disappointed in Committee that the Government did not accept the harm test to which my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills referred. There seems to

be an inequality in the public interest test, in that the word "necessary" will apply to this provision, even when the Government amendments are made, but not to other exemptions in the Bill. I cannot for the life of me understand why staff who are only doing their job should be subject to a greater hurdle than others when disclosure is accidental, especially as some of the exemptions, as in clause 32, are extremely wide.
I hope that the Minister will acknowledge that those are genuine concerns. If Government amendment No. 46 is made, it would at least allow the other place to return to the matter when it considers our amendments. With that in mind, it may not be too late for the Government to reconsider the word "necessary", to which my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills so rightly referred.

Mr. George Howarth: I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) for his hard work and the good advice that he often takes on these matters. His concern about confidentiality of information is well recognised and respected, and he moved the amendment very much in that spirit.
Clause 40 is a key part of the Bill. It enables the commissioner to issue enforcement notices requiring compliance with data protection principles. Amendment No. 15 would require the commissioner to maintain a register of enforcement notices, to be accessible in much the same way as the main register of data controllers' notifications provided for in clause 19.
The idea of keeping a public record of enforcement notices has been suggested in the past, and we are not unsympathetic to it in principle. I understand that the Data Protection Registrar herself has expressed some interest in such a record, as the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills said.
It was with such an idea in mind that the Government tabled an amendment in Committee to add clause 19(2)(b), allowing the Secretary of State, by notification regulations, to authorise or require the commissioner to include in the register of notifications maintained under that clause certain information in addition to the basic registrable particulars.
It would be possible to use the provision to add information about enforcement notices to the register. Under clause 25, the commissioner can make proposals for the content of notification regulations. The Government look forward to hearing the commissioner's views and will consider the issue further in that context. Against that background, I invite the hon. Gentleman to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment No. 16 would explicitly allow the commissioner to tell any other person, as well as the originator, the outcome of a request for assessment of the compliance of any particular processing with the provisions of the law. I recognise that the provision is discretionary, but I do not think it appropriate for the legislation to be framed in that way.
Requests for assessment may deal with essentially private matters—that is, private either to the data subject or to the data controller. More fundamentally, such requests are at most preliminaries to enforcement action, and they may come to nothing, as there may be perfectly good answers to the questions. I am not in favour of any general presumption in favour of releasing the results of assessments. That is not to say that they might not emerge in one form or another under other parts of the Bill.
Clause 51 places general duties on the commissioner to promote good practice and to disseminate material that she considers appropriate, about the operation of the Act, good practice and any other matters within the scope of his functions. Anonymised information from assessments may appear in one of those contexts, and the result of any assessment may be quoted in enforcement proceedings.
I do not think that a power at large, qualified only by the general term "appropriate", fits what we need in this targeted legislation. Release of information when it serves a particular purpose is fine; but otherwise, just as we have to be careful with the interests of data subjects, we have to be careful with the interests of data controllers. I invite the hon. Member for Aldridge—Brownhills to reflect on the provisions of clause 51 and not to press to a vote amendment No. 16, which is a general amendment to clause 42.
Clause 59 is an important and, I accept, difficult provision. It is important because it discharges the obligation on us to ensure that the supervisory authority—the Data Protection Commissioner and her staff—are subject to a duty of what the directive calls "professional secrecy", in respect of the confidential information to which they have access.
We have found it difficult to get the provision right. Our original proposal in another place was criticised by the Data Protection Registrar, and we revised it on Report there, but we could not, and still cannot, accede to pressure to remove it; the directive requires us to have a statutory provision, which needs to be enforceable through a criminal sanction.
We have considered the detail further in the light of representations, not least from the hon. Members for Aldridge-Brownhills and for Ryedale (Mr. Greenway), and of the Government's own commitment to freedom of information legislation, which the former hon. Gentleman rightly prayed in aid for his argument.
Clause 59 states that one way in which a disclosure may be made with lawful authority is if,
having regard to the rights and freedoms or legitimate interest of any person. the disclosure is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest.
Government amendment No. 46 replaces that with a simple test of necessity in the public interest. I hope that the hon. Member for Aldridge—Brownhills will accept that that goes further in the direction of freedom of information, while still complying with the directive. That is a difficult balance, but amendment No. 46 achieves it.
Amendments Nos. 17 and 18 go in much the same direction, as the hon. Gentleman said. I prefer the Government's wording, for two reasons. First, it maintains the necessity test, which is important for an exemption from the directive's requirements. Secondly, our words are simpler. "In the" rather than "for reasons of is a simpler way to express the point. I hope that the hon. Gentleman will be willing to withdraw his wording in favour of ours.
The hon. Gentleman argued that clause 59 could, perhaps, go further, and we did consider whether there was further scope for easing the restrictions that the clause imposes, while keeping it consistent with the directive. So far, we have been unable to find a way to do that, but we shall certainly continue to have regard for that point as we continue our work on freedom of information. If we can identify any way in which restrictions can

properly be eased, we shall bring forward any necessary amendment in freedom of information legislation. There is scope to revisit the point within that framework, provided that we can find a suitable way to achieve what the hon. Gentleman and the Government want.
I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree that that is a considered response to his concerns, and that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment, safe in the knowledge that we recognise his concerns and are aware of the possibility of revisiting the point at a later stage.

9 pm

Mr. Shepherd: I am extremely disappointed by that reply. I took the trouble to provide the Government with my notes for the debate, and I thought that they would address the issues raised in those notes. However, they have not done so. I thought that there were some benefits in my approach. I was being helpful on the White Paper. There is a muddle, and there is grave concern about how matters interrelate, so I was trying to set out the position. I was also trying to state clearly the anxieties expressed by the Data Protection Registrar, Mrs. France, and by professionals in the field.
I was trying to assist the Government by preventing the need for this business to return to the House once the Lords have amended the Bill along my lines. There is one simple problem in both the Government's amendment and my amendments. My argument is that "necessary" would remain a problem under the amendments. Amendment No. 18 was my fallback position, and I was pleased to see the Government withdraw the substantial point. However, "necessary" is being retained, and that reminds me of my experience under Governments of my own party and their unwillingness to yield once Government amendments had been set out. "Necessary" will remain a problem. A disclosure merely desirable, but not necessary, in the public interest would not be permitted under amendment No. 46. The Minister simply has not addressed that point, although it is of the essence. Perhaps he will consult his colleagues and the civil servants in their Box.
I would gladly not press amendment No. 18 if the Government would not press amendment No. 46. Then we would have a good raft of amendments that would satisfy the House of Lords. We could prevent the need for the matter to come back.

Mr. George Howarth: I have listened carefully to the hon. Gentleman; I hold him in the highest regard. I did not have the opportunity to read the notes that he sent to the Home Office, and I apologise for that. I do not believe, however, that his concerns need to be dealt with in the way he states, because the Government amendments go far enough. I will be sorry if the hon. Gentleman does not feel able to withdraw his amendment. He will be able to revisit the matter, as will the House, under the general heading of freedom of information.
I am loth to say more because I sat through long hours of debate on the Maastricht treaty, and I know of the hon. Gentleman's enormous potential to speak again with alarming frequency and great lucidity. I am desperately anxious not to tempt him to do so.

Mr. Greenway: The House is in a dilemma. We have only the prospect that the Government's amendment is likely to be carried, and we have to face that reality. Yet that amendment includes the word "necessary" and I agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Mr. Shepherd) that that word is not required. I am being helpful to the Minister when I say that the House can only accept the Government amendment, but the Government must expect that amendment to be amended in the other place because my hon. Friend's arguments are extremely valid.
The word "necessary" is unnecessary. It is not applied in other parts of the Bill. The only opportunity open to us now is to accept the Government amendment. If the House does so, I ask the Government to think again so that when the Bill goes to the other place the word "necessary" can be deleted.

Mr. Shepherd: I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Ryedale (Mr. Greenway), and I am concerned.
I made out a case which I tried to get to the Whips because I understand the urgency with which the Government have to manage their programme. These were detailed arguments, but they were not addressed in detail. I am genuinely disappointed by the points made about the word "necessary". I hope that the House will have to return to the matter; the Lords will take an interest in this.
The Government moved favourable amendments—I congratulate them on that—as a consequence of the Lords taking a view on certain parts of the Bill. I have no doubt that our liberty is in the interstices of the details of Bills such as this. The matter is extremely important which is why I should have liked a more sympathetic response. The Government have moved some of the way, but I ask them to reflect on what that simple word "necessary" means to the burden of the argument as contained in the clause. Accordingly and with the advice and guidance of my good and hon. Friend, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 43

INFORMATION NOTICES

Amendment made: No. 39, in page 26, leave out from end of line 5 to second 'the' in line 6 and insert
'and, if such an appeal is brought,'—[Mr. Hoon.]

Clause 44

SPECIAL INFORMATION NOTICES

Amendments made: No. 40, in page 26, line 36, leave out from 'which' to end of line 37 and insert
'proceedings have been stayed under section 32'.

No. 41, in page 27, leave out from end of line 18 to second 'the' in line 19 and insert
'and, if such an appeal is brought,'.—[Mr. Hoon.]

Clause 51

GENERAL DUTIES OF COMMISSIONER

Amendment made: No. 42, in page 31, line 14, leave out 'observance' and insert 'following'.—[Mr. Hoon.]

Clause 53

ASSISTANCE BY COMMISSIONER IN CASES INVOLVING PROCESSING FOR THE SPECIAL PURPOSES

Amendment made: No. 43, in page 31, line 33, leave out 'brings' and insert
'is an actual or prospective party to'.—[Mr. Hoon.]

Clause 57

AVOIDANCE OF CERTAIN CONTRACTUAL TERMS RELATING TO HEALTH RECORDS

Amendments made: No. 44, in page 36, line 8, after 'individual' insert—
'(a)".

No. 45, in page 36, line 9, at end insert
'or
(b) to produce to any other person such a record, copy or part.'.—[Mr. George Howarth.]

Clause 59

CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION

Amendment made: No. 46, in page 36, line 44, leave out 'for reasons of substantial' and insert 'in the'.— [Mr. George Howarth.]

Clause 60

PROSECUTIONS AND PENALTIES

Amendment made: No. 79, in page 37, line 20, after '56', insert—
'() an offence under section 21(2) relating to processing which is assessable processing for the purposes of section 22,'.—[Mr. George Howarth.]

Clause 68

MEANING OF "ACCESSIBLE RECORD"

Amendment made: No. 85, in page 41, line 41, after '(2),' insert—
'(aa) an educational record as defined by Schedule (Meaning of "educational record"),'.—[Mr. George Howarth.]

Clause 70

SUPPLEMENTARY DEFINITIONS

Amendments made: No. 86, in page 43, line 26, at end insert—
'"pupil"—

(a) in relation to a school in England and Wales, means a registered pupil within the meaning of the Education Act 1996,
(b) in relation to a school in Scotland, means a pupil within the meaning of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980, and
(c) in relation to a school in Northern Ireland, means a registered pupil within the meaning of the Education and Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;'

No. 87, in page 43, line 37, at end insert—
'"school"—

(a) in relation to England and Wales, has the same meaning as in the Education Act 1996,
(b) in relation to Scotland, has the same meaning as in the Education (Scotland) Act 1980, and
(c) in relation to Northern Ireland, has the same meaning as in the Education and Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1986;

teacher" includes—

(a) in Great Britain, head teacher, and
(b) in Northern Ireland, the principal of a school;'.—[Mr. George Howarth.]

Clause 71

INDEX OF DEFINED EXPRESSIONS

Amendments made: No. 47, in page 44, line 17, at end insert—
'enactment section 70(1)'.

No. 88, in page 44, line 35, at end insert—
'pupil (in relation to a school) section 70(1)'.

No. 89, in page 44, line 40, at end insert—
'school section 70(1)'.

No. 90, in page 44, line 44, at end insert—
'teacher section 70(1)'.

No. 48, in page 44, leave out line 47.—[Mr. George Howarth.]

Clause 75

SHORT TITLE, COMMENCEMENT AND EXTENT

Amendments made: No. 49, in page 45, line 13, after 'section' insert—
'(ee) paragraph 17 of Schedule 5,'.

No. 91, in page 45, line 13, after 'section' insert—
'(ef) Schedule (Meaning of "educational record"),'.

No. 50, in page 45, line 13, after 'section' insert—
'(eg) Schedule 11.—[Mr. George Howarth.]

New Schedule

MEANING OF "EDUCATIONAL RECORD"

'Meaning of "educational record" for purposes of section 68

1. For the purposes of section 68 "educational record" means any record to which paragraph 2, 5 or 7 applies.

England and Wales

2. This paragraph applies to any record of information which—

(a) is processed by or on behalf of the governing body of, or a teacher at, any school in England and Wales specified in paragraph 3,
(b) relates to any person who is or has been a pupil at the school, and
(c) originated from or was supplied by or on behalf of any of the persons specified in paragraph 4,
other than information which is processed by a teacher solely for the teacher's own use.
3. The schools referred to in paragraph 2(a) are—

(a) a school maintained by a local education authority, and

(b) a special school, as defined by section 6(2) of the Education Act 1996, which is not so maintained.

4. The persons referred to in paragraph 2(c) are—

(a) an employee of the local education authority which maintains the school,
(b) in the case of—

(i) a voluntary aided, foundation or foundation special school (within the meaning of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998), or
(ii) a special school which is not maintained by a local education authority,
a teacher or other employee at the school (including an educational psychologist engaged by the governing body under a contract for services),
(c) the pupil to whom the record relates, and
(d) a parent (as defined by section 576(1) of the Education Act 1996) of that pupil.

Scotland

5. This paragraph applies to any record of information which is processed—

(a) by an education authority in Scotland, and
(b) for the purpose of the relevant function of the authority, other than information which is processed by a teacher solely for the teacher's own use.
6. For the purposes of paragraph 5—

(a) "education authority" means an education authority within the meaning of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 ("the 1980 Act") or, in relation to a self-governing school, the board of management within the meaning of the Self-Governing Schools etc. (Scotland) Act 1989 ("the 1989 Act"),
(b) "the relevant function" means, in relation to each of those authorities, their function under section 1 of the 1980 Act and section 7(1) of the 1989 Act, and
(c) information processed by an education authority is processed for the purpose of the relevant function of the authority if the processing relates to the discharge of that function in respect of a person—

(i) who is or has been a pupil in a school provided by the authority, or
(ii) who receives, or has received, further education (within the meaning of the 1980 Act) so provided.

Northern Ireland

7.—(1) This paragraph applies to any record of information which—

(a) is processed by or on behalf of the Board of Governors of, or a teacher at, any grant-aided school in Northern Ireland,
(b) relates to any person who is or has been a pupil at the school, and
(c) originated from or was supplied by or on behalf of any of the persons specified in paragraph 8,

other than information which is processed by a teacher solely for the teacher's own use.
(2) In sub-paragraph (1) "grant-aided school" has the same meaning as in the Education and Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1986.
8. The persons referred to in paragraph 7(1) are—

(a) a teacher at the school,
(b) an employee of an education and library board, other than such a teacher,


(c) the pupil to whom the record relates, and
(d) a parent (as defined by Article 2(2) of the Education and Libraries (Northern Ireland) Order 1986) of that pupil.

England and Wales: transitory provisions

9.—(1) Until the appointed day within the meaning of section 20 of the School Standards and Framework Act 1998, this Schedule shall have effect subject to following modifications.
(2) Paragraph 3 shall have effect as if for paragraph (b) and the "and" immediately preceding it there were substituted—
(aa) a grant-maintained school, as defined by section 183(1) of the Education Act 1996,
(ab) a grant-maintained special school, as defined by section 337(4) of that Act, and
(b) a special school, as defined by section 6(2) of that Act, which is neither a maintained special school, as defined by section 337(3) of that Act, nor a grant-maintained special school.
(3) Paragraph 4(b)(i) shall have effect as if for the words from "foundation", in the first place where it occurs, to "1998)" there were substituted "or grant-maintained school"'.—[Mr. Hoon.]

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Schedule 1

THE DATA PROTECTION PRINCIPLES

Amendments made: No. 51, in page 47, line 13, after 'where' insert 'at that time'.

No. 52, in page 47, line 15, leave out
'information contained in the data is'
and insert 'data are'.

No. 53, in page 47, line 16, leave out
'information contained in the data is'
and insert 'data are'.—[Mr. George Howarth.]

Mr. David Atkinson: I beg to move amendment No. 14, in page 48, line 40, at end insert—
'9A. The data controller must take reasonable steps to ensure that any computer system used in processing the personal data is capable of dealing accurately with dates later than 31st December 1999.'.
The amendment is a response to the situation facing many computer systems in Britain, and even more so world wide, on the failure to recognise the year 2000, which the Prime Minister has dubbed the millennium bug. It seeks to introduce a statutory obligation on data controllers to ensure that computer systems are millennium compliant, thus ensuring that the personal data that they contain are fully protected from any problems arising from the century date change and the year 2000 being a leap year. [Laughter.] I do not know why that is funny, but no doubt the Minister will enlighten me when he replies.
I hope that the House knows what I am talking about. This is an issue to which I have drawn attention and about which I have warned on several occasions since my initial question to the then Prime Minister in December 1995, following which I introduced an Adjournment debate and have since introduced two private Member's Bills on the issue.

Mr. White: The hon. Gentleman will know that a number of dates in 1999, including 31 December 1999,

may cause problems to certain computers. Why does not the amendment cover all the problem rather than just part of it?

Mr. Atkinson: The hon. Gentleman is obviously an expert on the issue, so he will know that for computer systems to be millennium compliant they will also take account of the problems anticipated before the turn of the century.
The office of the Data Protection Registrar has produced a two-page paper entitled "The Millennium Bomb" which states that there are two problems whenever a two-digit year, represented as 99, changes to 00. It says that personal data may be interpreted as relating to 1900 rather than 2000—that is, the date is out by 100 years—and that the year 2000 is a leap years which is not usually the case for a centenary year.
If computer systems are not millennium compliant, a number of basic data protection issues emerge. Inaccurate personal data may be processed. Obviously, therefore, the provisions of the Bill that relate to accuracy—the fourth principle—and those relating to compensation for damage caused through the use of inaccurate personal data, come into play. There may be unfair processing. If the processing is date dependent—for example, age-dependent calculations—it may give inaccurate results and lead to the deletion of personal data before the planned retention time has expired.
Such eventualities would appear to breach the first principle in the Bill—providing for personal data to be processed fairly. It can result in the irretrievable loss of data, destroyed prematurely, as well as circumstances in which personal data are lost temporarily—for example, personal data that are unavailable for processing while the problem is being fixed. That appears to breach the seventh principle, relating to the loss, destruction of or damage to personal data.
Many more concerns were drawn to the attention of the Science and Technology Select Committee during its investigation of this issue, on which it reported to the House on 7 April. The report was called, "The Year 2000—Computer Compliance".
The Minister may argue that my amendment is unnecessary.

Mr. Hoon: Very good.

Mr. Atkinson: It appears that I have anticipated the Minister. He may argue that because the seventh principle requires:
Appropriate technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data.
I hope that he does not use that defence, which would be an inadequate response to a unique issue relating to computer systems and the data that they process and the protection of that data for which the Bill provides. Nor would it reflect the Government's clear warnings that the problem is serious and must be addressed if we are to avoid serious difficulties.
As the need for computer systems to be millennium compliant is so obvious and serious, it should be mentioned in as many words in the legislation. That is why I propose a new paragraph in schedule 1 which states:
The data controller must take reasonable steps to ensure that any computer system used in processing the personal data is capable of dealing accurately with dates later than 31st December 1999.
I hope that the Government will have the foresight to accept my amendment.

Mr. Hoon: The amendment raises an issue of great topicality. The House is grateful to the hon. Member for Bournemouth, East (Mr. Atkinson) for allowing us to have this brief debate on the data protection implications of the year 2000 problem. He is worried that there may be a risk to personal data processed in computer systems that have not been not programmed to cope properly with the change of date at the end of the millennium. If the problem is as serious as he warns, there could be a risk of corruption of data held on computer systems.
The hon. Gentleman invites the House to amend the Bill expressly to deal with that risk. As he anticipated, however, the Government do not believe that such an amendment is appropriate. We believe that the seventh data protection principle and paragraph 9 of part II of schedule 1, already make adequate provision. They ensure that the data controller must take appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure the required level of security. The requisite level has to be appropriate to the harm that might result from, among other things, accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data. That appears to cover the entire range of eventualities that might occur to personal data as a consequence of some failure of a computer system because of the year 2000 problem.
Problems of this sort could presumably occur for reasons other than the ending of the millennium. The formulation in paragraph 9 is intended to cover the unfortunate consequences that might occur from any failure of a computer system, whether or not it occurs as a consequence of the year 2000 problem. In the light of what I have said, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will agree that his amendment is unnecessary and will feel able to withdraw it.

Mr. David Atkinson: I am disappointed that the Government have not recognised the value of my amendment and surprised at the flippant way in which the Minister responded. I am surprised because of the prominence that the Government are trying to give the issue, especially since the Prime Minister's speech on 30 March warning of the consequences to the nation if we do not get it right. I am especially surprised because the Minister has been aware of the issue for longer than any other Minister because he was Labour's spokesman on it before Labour became the Government on 1 May last year.
If computer systems are not millennium compliant, there will be problems. The privacy of information contained in computer systems will be at risk if they crash because they are not millennium compliant. That is something which few people realise. It appears from what the Minister has said that he and the Government have not yet grasped the issue with the seriousness that it deserves.
By ignoring the opportunity that my amendment provides, the Government have missed a valuable opportunity. They are showing amazing complacency on the issue. I appreciate that my amendment was tabled only early this week, so perhaps Ministers have not given serious thought to this aspect of the Bill. I hope that the Government will give my proposal further thought in the other place.
I clearly have not persuaded the Government, but I hope that they will give it further thought. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: No. 54, in page 48, line 42, leave out 'staff and insert 'employees'.—[Mr. Hoon.]

Schedule 3

CONDITIONS RELEVANT FOR PURPOSES OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLE: PROCESSING OF SENSITIVE PERSONAL DATA

Mr. Greenway: I beg to move amendment No. 10, in page 51, line 7, at end insert—
'4A. The information contained in the personal data has been obtained by the canvassing of data subjects by registered political parties.'.
It may come as a surprise to you, Mr. Deputy Speaker, to learn that the Bill would make the processing of personal data obtained from political canvassing illegal. There are some of us who think that if all political canvassing were banned, it would save us an awful lot of toil and sweat at election time, but in reality—the Under-Secretary and I have discussed the matter—we appreciate and recognise that it is important that the problem that the Bill presents is tackled.
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Member for North-West Cambridgeshire (Sir B. Mawhinney), who first drew attention to the matter when we were considering our response to the Bill. As a former chairman of the Conservative party, he understands and appreciates the importance of electoral law and of ensuring that the data protection legislation does not unnecessarily restrict or prohibit proper canvassing of political opinion by political parties.
When we discussed the matter in Committee, the Minister acknowledged that there was a problem, and agreed to do something about it. We have two choices. Our preferred route is to put something in the Bill, and to do it now. That is what amendment No. 10 would do. It is entirely in keeping with the other provisions in schedule 3. That would leave the matter beyond doubt. The alternative is to do what the Minister said that he would do in Committee—use one of the Secretary of State's order-making powers within the Bill to exempt the processing of data from political canvassing.
The problem that the House must ask the Minister to address tonight—it is a serious point—is whether any order-making power will be introduced after the Bill receives Royal Assent and while the transitional provisions that introduce the various clauses that give rise to the difficulty are in force. In other words, if we take the order-making power route, can we be certain that there will not be a period during which processing of data obtained from political canvassing will be illegal? It is a straight question that we ask the Minister. I think that I know what his preference is, but he understands that this


is a serious problem. It would have been wrong of us not to draw the House's attention to the problem. It is all very well discussing a matter such as this in Committee, but, unless it is debated on the Floor of the House, colleagues might not be aware of how serious the problem is.
I ask the Minister, in all fairness, whether he can give us a categorical assurance that the provisions relating to sensitive data, such as political opinions, membership of trade unions, religious beliefs and so on, to the processing of which people must give explicit consent—clearly, we cannot take an answer to the question "How are you going to vote?" as explicit consent—will not come into force until the Government introduce an order to tackle that serious problem.

Mr. George Howarth: The hon. Gentleman raises an important subject. It is not a partisan issue, but one of which all of us in the House have an understanding and in which all of us have a vested interest. We have to get the process right if we are to be able to conduct our politics properly in future.
Article 8 of the directive requires member states to establish a special regime for the processing of what the directive defines as sensitive personal data, which includes information about an individual's political opinion. If the hon. Gentleman will forgive me, I shall not deal in any detail with the amendment, because he has referred to the approach that we undertook in Committee to adopt and it would be as well if I were to give him some idea of how we intend to proceed on that basis.
The Government's preferred option, as the hon. Gentleman rightly acknowledged, is to deal with the matter through subordinate legislation. Paragraph 10 of schedule 3 permits the Secretary of State to make an order specifying further circumstances in which sensitive personal data may be processed. When the matter was debated in Committee, my hon. Friend the Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Chancellor's Department explained that the Government intended to make an order under that provision that would allow the processing of political opinions data collected for canvassing purposes. I repeat that undertaking today.
As I said, the amendment is not a party political issue, but one which affects all Members of the House, and the Government expect to approach the matter on a cross-party basis when bringing forward the necessary order. In response to the hon. Gentleman's specific question, I cannot say when we shall be in a position to introduce the order; however, preliminary work has been started and we hope to make swift progress. I can assure him that the restrictions on the processing of sensitive data set by the Bill will not be brought into force until the order is ready. In view of that undertaking, I hope that the hon. Gentleman will feel comfortable in withdrawing his amendment.

Mr. Greenway: We should have liked a date, but the Minister has given me the assurance that I sought. The whole House will be gratified to learn that we can go trundling up and down the streets, canvassing our constituents. I suppose that I should ask the Minister whether what he promises will happen before the European elections, but I wonder how much canvassing

will be done, given that no one will have a clue whom they are voting for—but that is another story. We are grateful to the Minister and, in that spirit, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 7

MISCELLANEOUS EXEMPTIONS

Amendments made: No. 55, in page 60, leave out lines 13 to 19.

No. 56, in page 60, line 26, leave out 'if' and insert 'to the extent that.—[Mr. Robert Ainsworth.]

Schedule 8

TRANSITIONAL RELIEF

Amendments made: No. 57, in page 61, line 22, leave out 'sections 7 and' and insert
'section 7 (as it has effect subject to section 8) and section'.

No. 58, in page 61, line 26, leave out 'as' and insert 'relevant'.

No. 59, in page 61, line 31, leave out from beginning to '12A' and insert 'sections 7 and'.

No. 60, in page 61, line 33, leave out 'section 9' and insert 'sections 8 and 9)'.

No. 80, in page 63, line 45, leave out from beginning to end of line 2 on page 64.

No. 81, in page 65, line 9, at end insert—

'PART V

EXEMPTION FROM SECTION 22

Processing which was already under way immediately before 24th October 1998 is not assessable processing for the purposes of section 22.'—[Mr. Robert Ainsworth.]

Mr. Cohen: I beg to move amendment No. 7, in page 65, line 9, at end add—

'PART V

CHANGE TO THE DEFINITION OF RELEVANT FILING SYSTEM AFTER 23RD OCTOBER 2007.

20. The definition of relevant filing system in section 1(1) of this Act shall be modified so that the definition ends after the third occurrence of the word 'individuals'.
21. Paragraph 20 shall have effect after 23rd October 2007.'.

My amendment is about structured manual files, on which there was an important debate in the other place. Such files will not be subject to the new law, so the Bill will allow organisations such as the Economic League to flourish.

The problem relates entirely to the private sector; there will be no problem in the public sector, because the freedom of information legislation will provide access for every individual to manual files, barring personal data. The human rights legislation, too, will minimise the files and personal information held by public bodies if they invade privacy.

In a briefing note on manual records dated 29 January, available on her website, the Data Protection Registrar said that if the Government's approach to structured manual records was
the correct interpretation of the Directive, it is hard to see how it makes practical sense".
It seems that that advice has been ignored.

In another place, Lord Williams of Mostyn, the Under-Secretary, said about the relevant filing systems:
We do not wish the definition to apply to miscellaneous collections of paper about individuals, even if the collections are assembled in a file with the individual's name…on the front".—[Official Report, House of Lords, 16 March 1998; Vol. 587, c. 467.]
There will therefore be a legal reason for some unscrupulous private sector bodies to evade all data protection control.

For example, a private sector organisation such as the Economic League, which kept dossiers on trade union members for the purposes of blacklisting them, will be allowed to keep whatever information it likes, however inaccurate or irrelevant it is, and to disclose it to whomever it likes, so long as it keeps the information on paper and in date order. Similarly, that aspect of the Bill is a godsend to private investigators, allowing them to indulge in covert surveillance of individuals, and will encourage the use of enforced subject access. They, too, will be able to evade all data protection controls.

The lack of data protection controls means that individuals will have no rights, and there will be unlimited disclosure to anybody of secret dossiers and files of irrelevant or inaccurate information, which may be kept for ever. In short, organisations such as the Economic League, and private investigators, will enjoy the same level of total exemption as MI5, MI6 and GCHQ. It is hard to believe that that is what Ministers really intend.

The Government have produced a convoluted definition of a relevant filing system, because they are worried about the costs to the private sector. My amendment is a compromise, telling the private sector that it has nine years to bring all personal files into the ambit of data protection controls. At least after that time, malicious or unfair use of personal data kept on manual files would cease.

Mr. Hoon: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for explaining the purpose of his amendment. I hope that I shall be able to reassure him about the specific examples that he has given. As hon. Members will be aware, the Data Protection Act 1984 does not apply to manual records; it is concerned only with the automated processing of personal data. However, the 1995 directive, to which the Bill gives effect, requires member states to apply their data protection laws to certain manual records. Article 2 of the directive attempts a definition of the manual records that it intends to cover. That definition is accompanied by a more detailed commentary in recitals 15 and 27.
The definition of a "relevant filing system" in clause 1(1) is based on those provisions of the directive. The Government's purpose has been to cover all the manual records that the directive requires member states to cover, but to go no further than the directive requires. The purpose of the directive is to bring within the scope of data protection law the manual records that lend themselves to easy manipulation of the information contained in them, as computerised records do.
The Government support that approach. The greatest risk of infringement of privacy comes from manual records held in such a way that specific information about particular individuals can be easily identified and extracted. I hope that my hon. Friend will accept that his example of a card index held, by the Economic League, would be covered by the Bill, because with each card there would be the possibility of identifying information about a particular individual. Such a system would be included under the Bill.
To that extent, I hope that my hon. Friend will be satisfied that the Government have had regard to his concerns. Where manual records are not structured in such a way as to permit the easy manipulation of specific information, the risk of infringement of privacy is much less. The directive does not require data protection law to be applied to such records; nor does the Bill.
My hon. Friend's amendment would extend the application of the Bill to such records; the Government do not believe that necessary or desirable. To do so would be to impose additional burdens on business and others who use manual records in circumstances in which there is little or no threat to privacy. It would put UK data controllers at a competitive disadvantage.
I agree that the amendment would not come into force until 23 October 2007, but deferring implementation does not necessarily remove the difficulties of substance that I have identified.
I must tell my hon. Friend that the Government cannot accept the amendment. I hope that, given my assurances, my hon. Friend will feel able to withdraw it.

Mr. Cohen: I accept the Minister's assurances and beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Schedule 11

ACCESSIBLE PUBLIC RECORDS

Amendment made: No. 61, in page 68, line 45, after 'is' insert 'a record of'.—[Mr. Robert Ainsworth.]

Schedule 12

MODIFICATIONS OF ACT HAVING EFFECT BEFORE 24 OCTOBER 2007

Amendments made: No. 62, in page 71, line 47, after '3' insert 'or 4'.

No. 63, in page 72, leave out line 9.

No. 64, in page 72, leave out lines 11 to 13 and insert—

'(a) in subsection (2) after "section 12" there is inserted—
"(dd) section 12A,", and
(b) in subsection (4) after "12(8)" there is inserted 12A(3)".'.

No. 65, in page 72, line 14, leave out 'section 14' and insert 'section 14(1) to (3)'.

No. 66, in page 72, line 14, leave out 'and 14' and insert 'and 14(1) to (3)'.

No. 67, in page 72, line 14, at end insert—
'4A. In section 53(1) after "12(8)" there is inserted ", 12A(3)".'.—[Mr. Robert Ainsworth.]

Schedule 13

TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS AND SAVINGS

Amendments made: No. 82, in page 73, leave out lines 20 to 23.
No. 68, in page 74, line 47, at end insert—
'. Subsection (4)(b) of section 40 does not apply where the rectification, blocking, erasure or destruction occurred before the commencement of that section.'.—[Mr. Robert Ainsworth.]

Schedule 14

MINOR AND CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS

Amendment made: No. 69, in page 77, leave out lines 34 to 36 and insert—
'10. Schedule 2 to the Education (Student Loans) Act 1990 (loans for students) so far as that Schedule continues in force shall have effect as if the reference in paragraph 4(2) to the Data Protection Act 1984 were a reference to this Act.'.—[Mr. Robert Ainsworth.]

Order for Third Reading read.—[Queen's Consent and Prince of Wales's Consent signified.]

The Secretary of State for Health (Mr. Frank Dobson): Hear, hear.

Mr. George Howarth: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
I congratulate my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Health on the important role he has played in the passage of the Bill. His presence was not felt in Committee or on Second Reading, but between Report and Third Reading he made a significant contribution.

Mr. Greenway: Yes, but does he understand the Gaskin amendment?

Mr. Howarth: My right hon. Friend's stalwart work on the health service shows that he has the wisdom of Solomon—so I am sure that he does.
The House knows that the principal purpose of the Bill is to give effect to the 1995 EC data protection directive, which has the worthy aim of improving the single market by establishing a common standard of protection of the highest order for individuals. But it is not always an easy instrument to make sense of; the subject matter with which it deals is technical and complex—those who sat through the Committee can only assent to that.
The Government have always had in mind as a target date for implementation 24 October of this year—the date by which the directive requires member states to have implemented its provisions. If, as the Government hope, the Bill reaches the statute book before the summer recess, we shall have made good progress towards meeting that target.
The passage of the Bill is not the end of the matter, however. The Bill provides for a large amount of subordinate legislation. Some of its powers have been put in place at a fairly late stage of the Bill's progress through Parliament; many of them will need to be in place before the new data protection regime will work. We have made a start on that work at the same time as the Bill has been progressing through Parliament so as to minimise the interval between Royal Assent and commencement. Some

progress has been made, but we are not as far forward as we would have wished. With just over three months to go to the due implementation date, a great deal of work on subordinate legislation still needs to be done.
The Government have a choice. We could rush forward in an attempt to meet the target date, which would mean no public consultation, even on important matters, and little or no opportunity for those affected to make the necessary changes to their systems.

Mr. Soley: During the consultation period, will it be made clear to the public that they can complain about inaccurate material that appears in the press; that they have a right to see those files, subject to the conditions in the Bill; and that the press has a duty to correct inaccurate information that it holds on people in its files? It is important not only that the public know that, but that editors and owners know it.

Mr. Howarth: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for those comments. I can confirm that we debated the matter at length and that we attach great importance to the arrangements that have been drawn up. I know that my hon. Friend has a long and distinguished history of raising such concerns.
There is no guarantee that we would be able to meet the 24 October implementation deadline. The alternative approach, which the Government strongly prefer, is to proceed in a more considered way, carrying out public consultation, as appropriate, and allowing reasonable periods for those affected to prepare for the new regime. That means, of course, that the 24 October implementation date would no longer be a realistic target. Although that is regrettable, the Government believe that it is undesirable to rush through the next phase, at the risk of giving imperfect consideration to important matters, and possibly producing a defective regime.
We may miss the target by a short period, but, in the Government's view, it is more important that the Bill should be properly implemented. From information available to us, it seems that a number of European partners are unlikely to meet the 24 October target, and some major countries are likely to be well behind us.
I hope that there is as much understanding on that point as has been shown in all our debates on the substance of the Bill. On Second Reading the right hon. Member for North—West Cambridgeshire (Sir B. Mawhinney) agreed with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State that the best way of taking forward the work of the Bill would be in a non-partisan manner. For the most part, that has been the central feature of the Bill. The Government welcome the positive and helpful spirit that representatives of all parties have contributed to our debates. I pay a particular compliment to the hon. Member for Ryedale (Mr. Greenway), who throughout has been constructive in his approach. That applies also to my hon. Friends.
I am sure that the detailed consideration and attention given to the Bill and the amendments that have been made mean that it is in good shape as it returns to the other place. I commend the Bill to the House.

Mr. Greenway: I am grateful to the Minister for his remarks. The Bill takes the issue of data protection considerably further than the Data Protection Act 1984.


It is a complex Bill, but, as the hon. Gentleman said, we have dealt with it in a co-operative spirit, as the Second Reading debate promised.
I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Esher and Walton (Mr. Taylor), for Poole (Mr. Syms) and for Cheadle (Mr. Day) for their help and support in the Standing Committee, and my right hon. Friend the Member for North—West Cambridgeshire (Sir B. Mawhinney), who was a great source of help and encouragement to me in preparing for the Committee stage.
I shall now introduce a less co-operative note. It ought to be a matter of concern that, notwithstanding the complex nature of the legislation, both in Committee and on the Floor of the House tonight we have dealt with an extremely large number of amendments—well in excess of 200. This evening, we agreed no fewer than 74 amendments to the Bill, which has only 75 clauses.
The Minister says that a delay in implementation is likely. The Bill will give rise to a huge amount of subordinate legislation, which will undoubtedly have an even greater impact on organisations and individuals than some of the structural legislation that it contains. Given the choice of rushing to meet the implementation date set out in the Bill or doing it properly, I would have taken the same decision as the hon. Gentleman. I think that it should be done properly because this measure will have far-reaching implications for every commercial and voluntary organisation in this country. That is why it was so important to conduct detailed scrutiny of the Bill. I believe that that will be necessary also when the subordinate legislation comes forward. Time will tell whether everything works as intended and complies with the directive in every respect.
I have two more points. We have dealt with the first satisfactorily, but I still have concerns about the second. When the Bill came from the other place, two issues had caused the Lords concern. The first involved the then clause 28, now clause 29, and the exemption that we discussed earlier in relation to crime, taxation and Government Departments. The Government have dealt entirely adequately with the issue raised in another place when an important subsection was deleted, and we supported in Committee the inclusion of new clause 29(4).
The second issue of concern involved the then clause 31, which is now clause 32. That clause is unamended, so it will be difficult to amend it in another place. Notwithstanding that fact, we place on the record our lingering concern that the scheme in that clause, which deals with the important issue of journalistic, literary and artistic purposes and seeks to balance press freedom with individuals' freedom—the House debated that issue at some length during consideration of the Human Rights Bill—will not do what the Government expect it to. Time will tell who is right.
We had this debate in Standing Committee—I see the Minister nodding. When proceedings are stayed so that individuals may seek to obtain information, rectify inaccurate data or block processing and they come up against an organisation that claims exemption for journalistic, literary or artistic purposes, it is clear that proceedings will be stayed pending a determination by the commissioner and subsequently, on appeal, by the tribunal. However, the Bill does not say that publication will necessarily be allowed to continue. My impression is

that that will happen in the majority of cases, and that is the spirit in which both sides have proceeded both in Committee and on the Floor of the House and during our earlier consideration of the Human Rights Bill.
I believe—this is very much a personal view—that, given the scope of the exemption in clause 32, some people may seek to abuse the provisions of that clause by claiming that they are processing data because they wish to publish something that they believe to be in the public interest. That will be true in the majority of cases, but some people will seek to abuse that position. That will prompt lawyers to challenge whether the legislation says that publication must be allowed to go ahead pending determination of the concern. At that point, the Government will need to sit up and think whether they have dealt with the problem as adequately as they think they have. We could have improved that provision by amending it, but we failed to persuade the Minister of the case for so doing. I have a feeling that we shall return to the issue, perhaps in several years, and it is on the record that I am not satisfied.
Apart from that, we have done a pretty good job of scrutinising the Bill, and I hope that those who take the trouble to read the report of our debates will find it helpful in understanding the Bill's provisions.

Mr. Cohen: I have presented four data protection Bills to the House, and I congratulate the Government on presenting this Bill. However, I was not selected by the Whips to serve on the Standing Committee that considered the Bill because, obviously, there was great interest from other Labour Members.
The Government have made a worthy attempt to improve data protection and to implement the European directive, although they have not been altogether successful in some aspects. Recital 10 of the directive requires that
'approximation' of the laws of the Member States 'must not result in any lessening of the protection they afford but must, on the contrary, seek to ensure a high level of protection in the Community'.
A lot of the Bill achieves that higher level of protection, but several aspects fail that test. The Government have been unduly influenced—and, I think, misinformed—about the possible costs of implementing data protection in relation to the directive. In her briefing note on the Bill, the Data Protection Registrar says, in respect of the —1,892 million estimated costs, that she
cannot see why data controllers should have to incur increases in compliance costs of this kind".
I think that a false figure has been put out.
Time is short and I do not want to delay the House, so I shall run through a few items to signal where I think that there may be problems and a lessening in rights. I have already referred to the relevant filing system. On enforced subject access, the Bill provides less protection than the Police Act 1997 in respect of employers obtaining criminal conviction certificates, and they will be able to see spent and unspent convictions, bindings over and cautions against would-be employees under enforced subject access, until it is got rid of.
On sensitive personal data, the Bill has worrying aspects. Genetic data should have been regarded as sensitive, and the confidentiality of medical records is a concern. Aspects of the Bill effectively allow for the


increasing of data processing without the patient's consent, and some of those contradict what the General Medical Council recommends. I am concerned that protection for patients, especially that associated with their consent, is not going according to what the GMC advises. Ministers should give some thought to an explanation of why they have moved away from the GMC, at least in that respect.
The second data protection principle is weakened by being linked to a notification procedure. That was not required under the directive, and I do not know why the Government weakened that area, but I am concerned most about the exemptions. The scope of a number of exemptions has been widened, or new exemptions have been introduced. No explanation has been given, and there should have been an explanation if the current law had created any problems. It did not seem to be creating problems, so I do not know why those new exemptions have been introduced.
There are powers in the Bill for data controllers to delay the giving of information. That proposal will not be in the freedom of information Bill, but it will be in this Bill, and it will cost a lot of money.
The Data Protection Registrar has expressed concern about clause 59, which has been described as a "gagging clause", preventing staff from discussing cases of interest with the press. I have outlined some of the aspects of the Bill which I fear will result in a reduction in the rights of data subjects. I suspect that, in future, the European Commission may require the United Kingdom to modify the legislation to deal with some of the problems that I have mentioned.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill read the Third time, and passed, with amendments.

Orders of the Day — NON-SITTING FRIDAYS

Ordered,
That the Order of 19th May 1997 relating to Non-sitting Fridays be amended by leaving out 'and 10th July'.—[Mr. Robert Ainsworth.]

Orders of the Day — Emergency Contraception

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Robert Ainsworth.]

Dr. Jenny Tonge: I should like to think of this Adjournment debate as my contribution to the 50th anniversary of the national health service.
Before I became a Member of Parliament, I was a family planning doctor and general practitioner for many years, and I saw hundreds of examples of young women who needed emergency contraception and could not obtain it. In many cases, that led to unwanted babies or abortions. The problem lies in the fact that appointments have to be made with GPs and it often takes two or three days before one can see them. Casualty departments are overcrowded and, in any case, are not appropriate places to discuss such matters. Moreover, there are fewer family planning clinics than there used to be, and women often have to wait until after the weekend before they can go to one. Thus, women often cannot get emergency contraception within the prescribed 72 hours unless they are very brave and persistent. Young teenagers, in particular, are terribly afraid of making a fuss.
I must state at the outset that I regret the fact that there is so much sexual activity among young teenagers. Many factors are to blame, as I am sure the Minister realises. The fact that unwanted pregnancies and abortion rates are highest in areas of social deprivation will not have escaped her notice, and I know that she is already addressing the problem of sex education by trying to improve matters in schools and to increase personal responsibility among young people. I commend her for those much-needed efforts.
Emergency contraception is not meant to be a substitute for either sex education or regular contraception. They must go hand in hand. However, it is a practical way in which to deal with the world as it is, and its wider use would prevent the high rate of abortion among young women, which must be our main priority. This country has the highest teenage pregnancy rate in Europe. Out of every 1,000 women under the age of 16, 8.5 get pregnant, and in the 16 to 19 age group, between 58 and 59 out of every 1,000 get pregnant. It simply will not do. Half to a third of those pregnancies end in abortion.
The problem is not limited to teenagers. Many older women who are otherwise quite responsible about their sexual lives and their relationships have contraceptive accidents and need better access to emergency contraception.
There are two forms of emergency contraception. The fitting of an intra-uterine contraceptive device, commonly known as a coil, must be done within five days. I do not intend to go into that this evening because the device must be fitted by a properly trained doctor in a clinic.
I want to concentrate on the emergency contraceptive pill. It is a dose of oestrogen and progesterone female sex hormones, which have been used since the 1950s. Indeed, in the 1960s, when I was on the pill, I took the equivalent dose of the emergency contraceptive pill every day—21 days out of 28—and so did many women of my generation.
Emergency contraception is a dose repeated once, after 12 hours, and it prevents pregnancy in about 90 per cent. of episodes. In most cases, its effect is to prevent the


release of the egg from the ovary. It is important for people to know that. If it is taken later in the menstrual cycle, it will prevent implantation in the wall of the uterus of the fertilised egg. It has the same effect as a coil or an intra-uterine device. It is not an abortion in any shape or form. I repeat that point: emergency contraception cannot be used to cause an abortion.

It being Ten o'clock, the motion for the Adjournment of the House lapsed, without Question put.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Janet Anderson.]

Dr. Tonge: Emergency contraception cannot be used to cause an abortion. If a woman is already pregnant, emergency contraception does not work. Abortion occurs after implantation, and the emergency contraceptive pill intervenes before that stage.
Recently, the Daily Mail ran an article claiming that I and my supporters were promoting abortion over the counter. The journalist who wrote that article should be thoroughly ashamed. We are trying to prevent unwanted pregnancies and abortions. Such misleading, inaccurate and unbalanced reporting will harm the very people who need most help. The press are ready to condemn single parents and unmarried mothers, and when people try to do something about the problem, they condemn them, too. Over the years, the press has been responsible for pill scares, which have caused many unwanted pregnancies and abortions. They have put women off taking the birth control pill, and now they are trying to put them off emergency contraception.
I shall deal with some of the issues. The fear of thrombosis is often mentioned. Sixty in 100,000 women who become pregnant will get a deep-vein thrombosis. It is a little-known fact that pregnancy is quite a dangerous condition. In my pill-taking days, when women were taking the higher dose of pill, the rate of thrombosis was 30 in 100,000. With the new pills used today, the risk is even lower: 15 to 30 in 100,000. In the past 10 years, with the use of the emergency contraceptive pill, there have been very few cases of thrombosis. The levels are similar to those of the general population who are neither pregnant nor taking the pill: about 5 in 100,000. It is not a risk.
A one-off high dose of oestrogen and progesterone carries no contra-indications, except if there is an active attack of migraine—anyone knows when that is happening. That is caused by dilation of the cerebral arteries and may be affected by oestrogen.
Suspected pregnancy is a contra-indication simply because the method does not work after implantation of the fertilised egg. As I said, it will not cause an abortion. Experience in the past 40 years has shown that the use of the ordinary contraceptive pill does not have any adverse effects on a baby, even if the mother continues to take the pill while she is pregnant.
A large dose of the same hormone—such as a young woman taking it two or three times in one month—would disrupt the menstrual cycle, but would not have any other effect. Indeed, if a baby swallows a whole packet of contraceptive pills—four or five times the dose of the emergency contraception—the mother is told that it may make her baby very sick, but that, apart from dealing with that, she need take no action.
The emergency contraceptive pill is safer than aspirin, paracetamol, many of the caffeine products that are available as pep pills and many drugs that are currently on sale in supermarkets and petrol stations. Indeed, one can buy contraception in the form of condoms at petrol stations, but, if a condom breaks or the method goes wrong, one cannot get a remedy anywhere in the time scale about which I am talking. I know that this is controversial, but I believe that emergency contraception available over the counter from properly trained pharmacists could prevent an abuse of the method.

Dr. Evan Harris: In this country, we spend much time and money in training pharmacists, only to lock them away in the back of chemists' shops. Does my hon. Friend agree that advice on emergency contraception is an example of how we could use the professionalism and expertise of pharmacists—properly remunerated, I should add—to take the load off national health service clinics and casualty departments, as she suggests?

Dr. Tonge: I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention, with which I whole-heartedly agree. Pharmacists often know much more than many general practitioners about drugs and their interactions. Indeed, I have often seen pharmacists save a difficult situation by correcting a prescription. So, yes, I would welcome greater use of pharmacists.
If the emergency contraceptive pill were made available over the counter, women would have to pay for it, which I believe would, in some cases, be a positive factor. Teenagers, particularly young teenagers, would be reluctant to pay for the pills again when they found out that they could get them free from a clinic, nurse or GP. That would have the added advantage of ensuring that very young people would, on the subsequent times that they needed this method, receive adequate counselling about their sexual behaviour, contraceptive needs and sexual health, which is what we all want. However, I appreciate that that may not be possible immediately.
A pilot scheme operating in Washington state allows for emergency contraception to be available on prescription. Under a protocol agreed by local doctors, local nurses and pharmacists may dispense the emergency contraceptive pill—they are, of course, trained to ask the right questions. The scheme has recently received the blessing of the only company in the United Kingdom that currently makes a packaged form of emergency contraception—Schering Pharmaceuticals—so there would be no difficulty in making emergency contraception available, especially in the light of the Crown review of the prescription, supply and administration of medicines.
The proposals that I have outlined would not make young women more vulnerable. Young women are most vulnerable when they have no one to turn to. They become scared and then they do nothing—they become yet another unwanted pregnancy or abortion statistic. If emergency contraception were made more widely available from nurses and pharmacists under a protocol, young women would have people to turn to at very short notice.
The Minister is committed to reducing the number of teenage pregnancies. I believe that my proposals, combined with her commendable efforts on sex education


for young people, would go a long way towards that commitment. I apologise for this list, but my colleagues in the House and in the medical profession, and I are backed by the British Medical Association, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, the Royal College of Nursing, the Royal Pharmaceutical Society, the Family Planning Association—to which I owe a great debt, as it trained me in this field and it was one of the original organisations to promote family planning—and especially the Birth Control Trust, which I thank very much for its work on this matter. We all want to know how the Government intend to proceed.

The Minister for Public Health (Ms Tessa Jowell): I thank the hon. Member for Richmond Park (Dr. Tonge) for raising this important issue. I pay tribute to her, and to other hon. Members who have worked so hard—particularly in recent weeks—to focus public attention on it. The question of ease of access to emergency contraception is an essential part of broader family planning provision.
The hon. Lady made very clear the case for accessible emergency contraception. Emergency contraception is precisely that: contraception to be used in an emergency, possibly when the regular form of contraception fails. As the hon. Lady rightly said, without it many women may live in fear of an unwanted pregnancy, and may be forced into seeking an abortion. Abortion is, of course, a last resort, but too many women in Britain today resort to it because contraception has failed. In 1997, 170,000 abortions were carried out, the majority for women in their 20s.
Let us look briefly at the facts about emergency contraception. It is provided free as part of national health service comprehensive family planning services. Although we are talking about a pill on this occasion, it is important to remember—as the hon. Lady pointed out—that emergency contraception is available in two forms, the copper intra-uterine device and hormonal emergency contraception.
Hormonal emergency contraception, on which I want to concentrate, was first licensed in the United Kingdom in 1984. It is effective for up to 72 hours after unprotected sex—a fact which I still do not think is lodged sufficiently in the minds of many women, especially young women. It prevents a fertilised egg from being implanted in the uterus, or, alternatively, suppresses ovulation. As the hon. Lady said, it is very effective: more than 95 per cent. of women who take emergency contraceptive pills do not become pregnant. However, it is intended to be used only occasionally, and is not a form of long-term birth control. As the hon. Lady said—I want to underline this—neither is it a form of abortion.
From the data that we have on prescription items, we know that more emergency contraception is being used. As I said in a parliamentary written answer to the hon. Lady, the number of prescription items increased from just under 400,000 in 1992–93 to well over 700,000 in 1996–97.
Emergency contraception is safe and effective, with few contra-indications. Safety and correct use will remain paramount, whatever changes are made in the future to

ease accessibility. A study published today suggests that making emergency contraception more easily obtainable does no harm, that women are not more likely to use emergency contraception repeatedly and that the rate of unwanted pregnancies may be reduced.
The hon. Lady is interested in exploring further whether hormonal emergency contraception might be made more widely available through different routes. I think that we can do much more both to increase information for women and to improve access through existing services.
The current position is that emergency contraception is classified as a prescription-only medicine under both European Community and United Kingdom law. Medicines are so classified if they are likely to present a danger, either directly or indirectly, even when used correctly, if taken without medical supervision; or if they are frequently used incorrectly and, as a result, are likely to present a direct or indirect danger to human health.

Dr. Tonge: Does not the Minister accept, having listened to the experts and to what I said tonight, that the emergency contraceptive pill does not fit into either of those categories?

Ms Jowell: Those are the terms on which the emergency contraceptive pill is currently licensed. That judgment is made by the licensing authority. There is a well-established process for changing the legal classification from prescription-only to pharmacy availability.
The first stage is that the holder of the marketing authorisation, being satisfied of safety in use, proposes the change. My understanding is that only one company is licensed to produce the emergency contraceptive to which the hon. Lady referred. The proposal can come from other sources, and has on occasion come from professional bodies.
It is important to stress that third parties, whoever they may be, must still have detailed information on safety in use, and the manufacturer must be involved in producing patient information for medicine use in the absence of medical supervision.
The second hurdle is the assessment of the safety of a change in classification, which involves the assessment of available scientific and epidemiological evidence by the Medicines Control Agency; careful consideration of the medicine's risks and benefits; rigorous evaluation of the evidence on safety in use; and an evaluation of the direct danger of the medicine based on an assessment of the seriousness, severity or frequency of adverse reactions.
There is also an evaluation of any indirect danger to health; for example, wider public health issues, such as a possible increase in sexually transmitted diseases if increased use of the emergency pill leads to decreased reliance on barrier methods, must be considered.
The third stage is for the Committee on Safety of Medicines to consider every application for deregulation from prescription-only status to pharmacy availability. The committee examines again the evidence of safety in use in relation to criteria for prescription-only status and advises on the product's risks and benefits in the context of its proposed over-the-counter availability.
The penultimate stage is public consultation. If the committee is satisfied that the risks and benefits are acceptable, on the basis of the available evidence, a period


of public consultation follows. Consultation makes possible a wider debate on the social, ethical and moral aspects, as well as the scientific and broader public health issues. The responses are then considered by the Medicines Commission. Only after those four stages have been completed does the Medicines Commission advise Ministers on the proposal to amend the prescription-only medicines order. Ministers then make a decision. Emergency contraception is no exception to that process.
Another route, to which the hon. Lady alluded, is the supply and administration of medicines under group protocols. As she knows, the Crown review into the prescribing, supply and administration of medicines has been considering related issues. The full review is drawing towards a conclusion, and Ministers expect its second report in the summer. The first report, setting out recommendations for the supply and administration of medicines under group protocols, was published towards the end of April, and recommended that the majority of patients should continue to receive medicines on an individual basis, but that group protocols should be used in certain limited situations.
The provision of contraception as part of a comprehensive family planning service could be one such area. Highly qualified nurses are working in family planning, and some of them are currently working effectively under group protocols. I believe that the first report of the Crown review forms a solid basis for setting standards to develop good practice in that area of care. We wish to consider the implications carefully before consulting further on detailed proposals, and we hope to undertake consultation in the next few weeks.
The hon. Lady referred to the scheme being conducted in Washington state in the north-west of the United States of America. Pharmacists are participating in a pilot study in which a collaborative agreement between pharmacists and a prescribing clinician enables the pharmacists to provide the emergency contraceptive pill directly to women according to an agreed protocol. That is a new project in its early days of piloting, and I understand that it will be subject to proper evaluation. We certainly want to consider carefully the implications for the United Kingdom of that type of experiment.
I want to deal with some of the broader aspects. What I have said will make it clear to the hon. Lady that the immediate change is not in prospect. It is essential, however, to consider how we can make emergency contraception more accessible to women who need it. As the hon. Lady said, for the emergency contraceptive pill to be effective, it must be readily accessible within the 72-hour window of opportunity. It can be prescribed by any general practitioner who provides contraceptive services, and it is available at any family planning clinic, most genito-urinary medicine or sexual health clinics and some accident and emergency departments. Young people can also go to young person's clinics or Brook advisory centres. It is not acceptable for women to have difficulty making appointments with their GPs, to find family planning clinics closed or to be turned away from accident and emergency departments. Health authorities should ensure that that does not happen.
No matter how accessible the contraception is, the other side of the coin is information. People must be aware of what emergency contraception offers. Women need timely information about the accessibility of emergency contraception, and about how it works and when it should

be taken. Raising awareness has been a key Government priority. The Department of Health recently funded an awareness-raising campaign by the Health Education Authority, which stressed that the emergency contraceptive pill can be taken up to 72 hours after unprotected sex, and that the other form of emergency contraception—the copper intra-uterine device—can be inserted after up to five days. I am heartened by much of the media coverage that has sought to dispel the myth of the morning-after pill. The hon. Lady referred to what she considered to be irresponsible reporting, but we need to recognise that the media can be important allies for us, particularly in getting the message across to vulnerable young women.
Just lately, some responsible reports referred to the 72-hour time interval, which remains insufficiently understood. More broadly, it is important to get across to as many women as possible further information about exactly how emergency contraception works.
The contraceptive education service run by the Family Planning Association, with Department of Health funding, has published a detailed leaflet for women and their partners on both forms of emergency contraception. As part of contraceptive awareness week, it has launched an information pack on emergency contraception for health promotion units. The service provides answers to questions from women and their partners across a wide range of contraceptive issues, including emergency contraception, and the CES helpline provides information on the location of family planning clinics.
In summary, therefore, whether or not we move in time to a greater accessibility by increasing the places from which women can obtain the emergency contraceptive pill, certain principles will continue to apply. First, safety and correct use will remain paramount. Secondly, women and their partners have the right to a confidentially provided service, and ways will need to be found to ensure that that is honoured, if the pattern of access changes. They also have the right to detailed advice and support in making decisions on their long-term contraception plans, so appropriate mechanisms for referral to a family planning doctor or nurse will need to be firmly in place. Information and accessibility are two key elements which we need to apply to making contraceptive advice more widely available.
The hon. Lady rightly referred to the Government's work on reducing teenage pregnancies. She will know better than most hon. Members that that is a highly complex issue, which cannot rely on one single remedy. It is important that the provision of contraception for young women who she, I and other hon. Members would agree have become sexually active before their time must be in the context of advice, support and counselling.

Dr. Tonge: Does the Minister agree that that young, vulnerable group of women are reluctant to seek help because they have to go to a GP in whom they may not have confidence, because he is known in the area, or to a local casualty department or a local family planning clinic, where they may be known and told off or castigated for what they have done?

Ms Jowell: In many cases, that is so, particularly where young women live in small communities. They are concerned that if they go to the doctor, they may be


spotted by their auntie or another member of their family in the waiting room. That is a deterrent. Although we recognise that many GPs handle the issue with great sensitivity and care, we need to reflect carefully on the particular needs of young women, in providing not just
advice on contraception and sex but the opportunity to talk about sex and contraception in the context of relationships. Later this year, we shall introduce specific proposals for reducing teenage pregnancy, of which these proposals will form part.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at half-past Ten o'clock.